Armenian News Network - Groong: Week In Review Podcast
Armenian News Network - Groong: Week In Review Podcast
Arthur Martirosyan - May 9, India Pakistan, Armenia Azerbaijan, New Pope | Ep 435, May 11, 2025
Groong Week in Review - May 11, 2025
Topics
- May 9 Victory Parade
- Ukraine
- India and Pakistan
- Armenian Azerbaijani Talks
- American Pope
Guest
Hosts
Episode 435 | Recorded: May 12, 2025
SHOW NOTES: https://podcasts.groong.org/435
VIDEO: https://youtu.be/DYQGg6pHONI
Subscribe and follow us everywhere you are: linktr.ee/groong
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Hello,
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everyone,
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and welcome to this Armenian News Network Groong, Week in Review for
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the week ending with May 11,
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2025.
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Today, we're talking with Arthur G. Martirosyan.
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He is an international conflict management expert with CM Partners.
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Hello, Arthur.
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Welcome back.
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Hi.
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Thank you.
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Thank you for having me.
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Great to have you.
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So we're covering the events of the previous week,
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which was the week ending on May 10 or May 11.
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And the obvious event of the week was May 9, Victory Day.
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And Victory Day in Moscow this year was as much a display of global politics as it
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was a simple Russian military parade.
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Xi Jinping's presence as the guest of honor underscored China's expanding influence
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and shifting global dynamics.
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And despite pressure from EU bureaucrats, some EU leaders attended.
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reflecting the complexity of current alliances.
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Meanwhile,
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in the United States,
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Trump is pushing for a new holiday to celebrate the Allied victory of World War II
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and framing it as a distinctly American triumph,
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a move that underscores,
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I guess,
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the battle over historical narratives that we're seeing right now.
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In Moscow,
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Russia positioned itself along China and other Global South leaders and signaling a
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potential challenge to the post-World War II order.
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What were your overall impressions,
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Arthur,
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on the global significance of this year's May 9 celebrations?
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Is Russia using Victory Day to signal its alignment with the Global South and
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potentially reshaping global balance of power?
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Well,
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I think we need to start from a definition of where the world is today,
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and it's very far from the order that was established after World War II,
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that is the Potsdam-Yalta system,
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which was working more or less,
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but in the last 20 years or so,
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it's been kind of gradually getting to a point where
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we can no longer talk about the order.
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So the new world order is still in the making.
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What shape it's going to take,
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it's very hard to say,
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but you quite correctly pointed out that the new alliances,
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the new kind of power dynamic is developing and much will depend on also where
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Russia ends the game.
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not so much on Ukraine, but in its relationship with the West.
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That scenario where it's going to further escalate is going to suddenly drive them
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closer to China.
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And not surprisingly,
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Russians who were denying the presence of North Koreans in the battlefields in Kursk,
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openly demonstrated that,
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yes,
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they were there,
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and they're ready to do more fighting with Russians.
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So this is a clear signal that Russia may choose to develop new kind of alliances
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and get away from what would be an
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normal development,
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essentially,
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culturally,
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with more proclivities to European culture country,
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Russia,
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would be driving in directions that are not necessarily resonate with its own identity.
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But that's not an impossible scenario.
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And I think May Day or May Celebration Victory Day continues to be divisive.
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I see it as a reaction of the West to this.
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And I think Germans are doing things that were very uncommon or even unbelievable
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even 10 years ago when Germans
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celebration in Berlin is kind of more controlled,
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what flags,
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what can be on display,
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and so on.
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So the issue is certainly historic,
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but Russia has been,
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especially under Putin,
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has been using this as one of the cornerstones of the Russian identity,
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kind of glorious victory in that war.
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And now Trump challenging that and kind of
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claiming credit for winning in that war,
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is,
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I think,
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in a way,
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a historical,
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as is a historical,
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the Russian claim that they could have won this war without the Allies.
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It was a joint effort.
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And kind of when you get into distribution of it,
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obviously the human toll,
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the biggest was the Soviet and not to a little degree Armenian input.
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500,000 mobilized from Armenia, men, and then losses were anywhere around 200,000.
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So a very small place like Armenia contributed in a way,
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as again,
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if we talk about the human toll,
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more than are comparable to the British losses in that war.
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And the British were fighting it in many different fronts,
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in Africa,
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in the Far East,
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and obviously on the European theater.
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But in terms of technology,
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in terms of what the West contributed through Lend-Lease,
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it's,
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I think,
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goes without any questions that that was a major contribution to the Russian
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victory in that war.
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Do they need to claim a victory without others?
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I think that would be a historical, no matter who does it.
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They need to come to some kind of a consensus
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that it was a joint effort,
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which it was historically,
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and that neither side should try to minimize or claim exclusive credit for the
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results of that war.
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But as I said, for Russians, it's a matter of identity.
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Will the U.S.
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be able to revise that history and create a new narrative where Americans
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E.J.
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80 years after the war will be celebrating it as solely American victory,
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I doubt that is possible,
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but nothing I mean these days of social engineering is is impossible,
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it will depend on how much effort it's going to be there's going to be put into this,
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we know what happened,
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I mean.
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Indeed.
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The German high command after Hitler's suicide was headed by Admiral Dönitz.
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And he sent his representative Yodel to Reims in France,
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where the headquarters of General Eisenhower,
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the chief commander of the Allied forces,
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was stationed at the time.
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And yes, on May 7th, he signed the capitulation.
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But he did that because for them,
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it was better to surrender to Americans,
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to the West,
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than to surrender to the Soviets.
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Obviously,
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that irated Stalin,
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although his general was in range at the time as witnessing the ceremony.
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but he demanded that a new capitulation act be signed, and a new one was signed on the 8th.
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The texts are identical.
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I mean, there are slight differences in the two texts, but essentially...
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Now,
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General Keitel and a few other senior officers of the German command signed the
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capitulation that Russians demanded.
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But it was agreed that the ceasefire would be at 23:00 at night of May 8 in Reims
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and in Karlshurst in Berlin.
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both capitulations,
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and 23:00 in Europe was already after midnight in Moscow,
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and that's why it's May 9th.
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But can they now turn it into an apple of contention?
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I don't think it's wise to go that way.
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It's obvious that a country that lost over 27 million people,
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it's going to be an ongoing trauma.
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And you could pay not much attention to the military parade.
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But what happens when people now in the third generation or even in the fourth
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generation are still coming out with the pictures of their grandparents who
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perished in that war or were fighting in that war?
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That alone says a lot about how important it is for the Russian identity.
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And obviously the state uses that because they need some fundamentals of their identity, right?
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Around what we're going to be united as the Russian people or the Rossiani.
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A symbol of cohesion, basically.
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Essentially, yes.
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So that's why they put so much effort into that.
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As to China, China was also part of that world war.
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We forget, but the Chinese lost also around 30 million people in that war.
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with Japan and internal the civil war that continued in China.
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So for them, too, it's an important historical event.
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And that's why I'm not surprised that Xi Jinping accepted the invitation.
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But beyond the symbolism,
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beyond the identity issues and history,
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this is also a manifestation of the relationship,
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which
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probably is going to be important in terms of the emerging world order.
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Armenia,
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as you said,
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also contributed heavily in terms of both soldiers,
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as you said,
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I think more than 500,000 just on the Soviet side and hundreds of thousands of deaths.
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So May 9 also,
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I think,
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carries a special significance,
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especially for Eastern Armenians or Armenians from the Republic of Armenia.
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May 9 was celebrated as a triple holiday,
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the day of liberation of Shushi and the day of the formation of the Artsakh army,
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which were three separate holidays,
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but they were all celebrated as one.
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So Nikol Pashinyan attended Victory Day events in Moscow,
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but Armenia chose not to send a military contingent for the parade.
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which is a notable contrast to Azerbaijan,
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whose leader Ilham Aliyev did not attend last minute,
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but sent a military contingent to the parade.
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And this divergence could,
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in my opinion,
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highlight the evolving dynamics in the region as both countries try to realign themselves.
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Interestingly,
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Armenia's pro-Western leadership also appears to be engaging in some of the same
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battle or revisionism over the historical record
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On May 9,
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on Armenia's Public TV,
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they aired a primetime interview with Artsurun Hovhannisyan of the “Haghtelu enq”
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fame from the 40-day falsified Artsakh war that was presented to the people on the screens.
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And he challenged some deeply rooted beliefs prevalent everywhere in the post-Soviet world.
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I mean, talk about historical revisionism.
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You know,
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he was basically saying that the Germans,
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one of the things he was saying was the Germans were ready to give all of Western Armenia,
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unite Western Armenia and give it back to Armenia if they had one.
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Meanwhile,
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here I am thinking that Germany and Turkey were going to invade Armenia as well as
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Central Asia was going to become Turkish as part of that deal.
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uh so what's going on and can you talk about the significance of the victory to
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Armenians specifically and also this uh revisionism that Pashinyan is engaging in as
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it's very obvious to us it's it's a bigger package for uh Pashinyan he's been
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talking about uh some of the myths of the soviet empire that armenians were not uh
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kind of free in expressing their will,
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and therefore even the genocide commemoration was something that was pushed on
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Armenians from Moscow and KGB as part of the Cold War kind of calculus.
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anti-Turkey stance of the Soviets, a NATO member.
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So he's been saying all that stuff without necessarily providing historical evidence,
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but he went to Moscow.
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We saw that he didn't feel very comfortable.
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Arthur, I know Asbed is a grandchild of genocide survivors.
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I am a grandchild of genocide survivors.
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I'm not sure if you have a family,
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but most people I know,
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I mean,
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just so that our listeners who may not be Armenian understand that most Armenians,
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just like,
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you know,
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in the Russian case,
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have direct family evidence of the Genocide.
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So this package of denial that includes Genocide denial as well is like a horror
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show for us,
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if I may say so.
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So, you know, please continue.
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I was not giving my evaluation of what he's doing.
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I'm just saying that he's doing that.
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And he's doing that because that's part of his somewhat warped vision of a new real Armenia,
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where Armenia will be in good terms with the neighbors and namely with Turkey.
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And therefore, we should do per Pashinyan.
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do what Turks have been demanding, that is, turn over that page, history.
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It's past, okay?
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And in that past,
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there are so many different issues,
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and he accepts,
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essentially,
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the narratives and myths
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spread by the Turkish propaganda.
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And he invites a revision of our history using those narratives.
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And that goes also with the May 9, and Hovhannisyan came to this interview
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almost claiming that he was going to kind of dismantle some of the myths about that war.
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But in fact,
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he didn't say anything that was not known from voluminous literature,
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including Western literature.
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War specialists,
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historians have written so much about it in many details,
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all episodes that he was talking about.
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He was making all sorts of inaccuracies in his presentation, and I'm not interested
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right now in making all those corrections.
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There were more than a dozen inaccurate things that he said.
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For instance,
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he was saying that May 9 was not celebrated in the Soviet Union until after
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Stalin's death in 1965.
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That is not true.
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It was not a holiday.
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It was not a day off until 1965.
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But that does mean that it was not recognized as an important holiday in the calendar.
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And there were many more of those, small inaccuracies.
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But the most important piece that he provided was his admiration with the German
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military might and machine.
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Not directly,
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but kind of implying that the Soviets were winning their battles by sheer numbers,
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and they were not counting the losses,
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and therefore it was a war where one side was ready to
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sacrifice as many soldiers and officers as was necessary to achieve the goal,
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and the other side was acting differently.
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This is certainly not very correct,
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because if anyone has seen the Battle of Berlin documentaries on that,
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including Western documentaries,
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Even teenagers were called up from Hitlerjugend to defend Berlin.
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And Goebbels, after Stalingrad, was talking about total war.
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Total war.
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And that's a very different notion, right?
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But Hovannisyan was not the only one to talk about it.
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There were other shows,
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kind of debates,
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and in one the anchor was saying,
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people didn't want to fight that war.
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Why are they calling patriotic war?
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It's an exaggeration.
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I mean, if anyone was watching that from Moscow, that sounded as an insult, really as an insult.
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But back to Hovannisyan,
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and one myth that he was trying to push is related to Operation Gertrude.
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He claimed that operation was planned by Germans,
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and as you said,
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if successful,
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it would allow for the creation of Greater Armenia,
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and the Soviet Armenia and Western Armenia would be united in one big state.
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That's sheer nonsense.
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Historians who know the history of the operations that were not implemented in World War II
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know about this Operation Gertrude from the British intelligence sources.
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It can be even speculated that a leak was organized,
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and maybe by German counterintelligence and Schellenberg's office,
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so that they could feed that to Americans.
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And Life magazine published even a map of that plan in 1943,
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right before the meeting of Ismet İnönü of Turkey with Churchill and Roosevelt in Cairo,
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so that they could show him what Germans have on their mind.
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And knowing Germans, they could have pushed that leak
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And in parallel, delivered to Turks a proof that it is a fake, right?
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Not surprisingly,
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Churchill and Roosevelt were not able in 1943,
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this is end of 1943,
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to persuade in on you that...
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He needed to give up his policy of active neutrality,
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which was essentially an alliance with Germany as he was supplying them very much
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needed by the German military industry components and resources like chrome and cobalt,
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without which it would be impossible to
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produce the armor of the panzer divisions.
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And there were other areas where they were collaborating.
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So what do we make of this Gertrude operation?
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Gertrude operation was a contingency plan.
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Even if it was, it was a contingency plan.
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But Hitler gave up on it as they were preparing Barbarossa plan.
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And he was the one who instructed Franz von Papen,
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the ambassador to Ankara,
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Third Reich's ambassador to Ankara,
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to pull out a friendship treaty with Ankara,
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which was done on June 18th.
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1941, right before the war started.
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So general staffs of all countries,
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and if you look into what sorts of operations were planned and not implemented,
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all sorts of contingency and scenario,
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things that were developed by general staffs of warring parties,
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I mean,
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I wouldn't be surprised if something like that existed.
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So Germans had some kind of a plan because they wanted to get to Suez,
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and they wanted to cut off the Brits from their colonies, essentially.
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There could have existed that kind of a plan.
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Moreover, they were eager to get to the Caspian Sea and the oil.
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But strategically,
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in Barbarossa's plan,
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their plan was to get to the Caspian Sea through the Caucasus,
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and then essentially from the Caucasus down to...
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to Iran and further down.
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As to Turkey,
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as I said,
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Hitler gave up on the idea of militarily engaging with Turkey,
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not because militarily they couldn't achieve that goal,
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but because the resources were concentrated on Barbarossa.
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And obviously,
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the defeat in the battle for the Caucasus,
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and then followed by another major defeat of Wehrmacht,
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that is Stalingrad,
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changed those plans.
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But it didn't mean that Germans could go back to get through there.
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They thought that they still could persuade Turkey to step up in that war on the
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side of the Axis,
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diplomatically could be achieved.
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But militarily,
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a defeat after a defeat,
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and it was followed by Kursk,
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and Germans were driven out.
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made in on you very, very suspicious of the possibility.
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And Turkish historians are writing about this stuff on what factions existed in
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Turkey at the time.
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There was pro-British or pro-Anglo-Saxon faction, which was small, but it existed.
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And before the war,
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Brits were trying to get Turkey on their side and even had a trade line to rearm
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the Turkish army.
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But the truth is,
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the fact is that Turkey at that time took a kind of a waiting position,
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kind of trying to see who's going to be the winner here so that they can
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jump on a bandwagon with the winners.
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And for that purpose,
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starting July 1942,
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they had major concentration of their military,
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and they started a mobilization.
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Even men over 60 were mobilized.
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So they brought the number of their army to one million,
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and 75% of that force was placed near the border with Georgia,
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Batumi,
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and Soviet Armenia, Georgia and Soviet Armenia, respectively.
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Were they thinking of getting into that war?
(00:23:30):
Most likely, but that was contingent also on what could happen in Stalingrad.
(00:23:36):
They were waiting for it.
(00:23:37):
So when Hovhannisyan is talking about those issues,
(00:23:41):
He can do that on Armenian public television, which is a propaganda outlet, essentially.
(00:23:48):
But I don't think any serious historian can take his claim, because there's no evidence.
(00:23:53):
He would be a hard place to provide any empirical data or evidence to support his claim.
(00:24:02):
And we do not need to forget that in Oberzalzburg on August 22nd, 1939,
(00:24:10):
Hitler,
(00:24:11):
motivating his troops to be ruthless,
(00:24:14):
was also mentioning Armenians and saying that who now remembers Armenians?
(00:24:20):
So it's very difficult to believe that Hitler would have any plans to recreate
(00:24:28):
greater Armenia,
(00:24:29):
especially knowing that there were no Armenians left in Western Armenia in genocide.
(00:24:35):
And 25 years after the genocide, all of a sudden he would have that kind of a plan.
(00:24:42):
It's, I think it's, but then there is a question, why is he doing this?
(00:24:45):
First, he was trying to,
(00:24:48):
over-exaggerate, and at some point he even said that maybe over-exaggerating the land lease.
(00:24:54):
So saying that the Soviets provided Foda for the war,
(00:24:59):
and Americans provided the technology,
(00:25:02):
and therefore superior technology,
(00:25:05):
Americans' superior technology.
(00:25:07):
And kind of the hint is that that's the same case even now, right?
(00:25:13):
Number two is the obvious spiel of Pashinyan propaganda,
(00:25:18):
that Turks really,
(00:25:20):
after the Genocide,
(00:25:21):
they really didn't want to go after Armenia and Armenians.
(00:25:26):
It was Soviet propaganda.
(00:25:29):
And hence, here is our war historian who will tell you the truth as it was.
(00:25:36):
But he came up with another myth, right?
(00:25:39):
Sadly, I think that will be circulating not only in Yerba,
(00:25:44):
but in Armenia,
(00:25:45):
and people will be saying,
(00:25:46):
yes,
(00:25:48):
what point of Armenia participating in that war?
(00:25:51):
He was talking about the grand Armenian army,
(00:25:54):
army that we've never had before,
(00:25:56):
300,000 people,
(00:25:58):
but that army was part of the Soviet empire.
(00:26:01):
Yes, he acknowledged that.
(00:26:03):
Unfortunately,
(00:26:04):
he said it was part of the Soviet empire,
(00:26:06):
but we didn't have the independent state to have that kind of army.
(00:26:10):
And again,
(00:26:12):
what they are doing is these are innuendos and playing with subtle themes that the
(00:26:19):
true real Armenia that we're going to create,
(00:26:23):
look how much we contributed to the effort that was not really ours.
(00:26:28):
Was it our war?
(00:26:29):
It was not our war.
(00:26:31):
Turks were not really threatening us.
(00:26:33):
Moreover, Germans wanted to help us create Great Armenia there.
(00:26:38):
So we can, over time, become even more powerful that way.
(00:26:45):
This is obviously propaganda nonsense based on innuendos, right?
(00:26:49):
I mean, people will be, what conclusions they are going to arrive after listening to nonsense.
(00:26:57):
That one day we can do that, see how we should be proud of what we did.
(00:27:03):
And yet we have also to understand that we did it not for ourselves.
(00:27:07):
And if we are creating this new Armenia that Pashinyan is talking about,
(00:27:12):
we're going to have a victory not only in the football,
(00:27:18):
in soccer,
(00:27:19):
when we,
(00:27:20):
as he promised,
(00:27:20):
are going to be number one in the world in soccer,
(00:27:25):
but also would be able to recreate that kind of an army,
(00:27:28):
that kind of a force.
(00:27:30):
This is nonsense.
(00:27:32):
Yeah, Arthur, I do want to address some of the other things coming back to modern day history.
(00:27:37):
And just to close off that discussion about history,
(00:27:40):
I don't need the KGB to tell me about my Genocide and I don't need the KGB to
(00:27:44):
understand the significant contribution of Armenians and the fact that Armenia
(00:27:51):
wouldn't just exist in its form if Russia,
(00:27:53):
for instance,
(00:27:54):
or Soviet Union lost that war.
(00:27:56):
So I think it's important to set that record straight and thank you for doing that.
(00:28:00):
Now,
(00:28:01):
coming back to the parade,
(00:28:04):
very quickly,
(00:28:04):
what are your thoughts about Pashinyan not sending a military contingent for the
(00:28:08):
parade and Aliyev also canceling his trip,
(00:28:11):
but obviously there was an Azerbaijani contingent?
(00:28:15):
Well,
(00:28:16):
Aliyev could tell Moscow that his father's birthday is coming and he's tied up with preparations.
(00:28:23):
Unfortunately,
(00:28:24):
he cannot come,
(00:28:26):
but he's,
(00:28:27):
as usual,
(00:28:27):
he's sending the contingent,
(00:28:30):
and without Azerbaijan,
(00:28:32):
the victory would not be possible,
(00:28:34):
because it was Azerbaijani oil.
(00:28:35):
Again, it was not Azerbaijani oil, it was the Soviets, right?
(00:28:39):
It was Soviet at the time.
(00:28:42):
And it was oil fields that Armenians developed as well, if he's using that.
(00:28:48):
Anyway, I don't want to go there.
(00:28:50):
But essentially, his message is, yes, we are a military power in this region.
(00:28:57):
And here is a small but important piece of evidence.
(00:29:03):
Look at our special...
(00:29:06):
troopers.
(00:29:08):
They are on par with others participating in that parade.
(00:29:13):
Whereas Pashinyan is taking completely the opposite.
(00:29:17):
So he's not sending, and that's a message also to Aliyev, by the way, that we are
(00:29:26):
any military parades.
(00:29:28):
We don't want to show our military capacity and whatnot.
(00:29:34):
It's kind of a dove there.
(00:29:36):
Plus,
(00:29:37):
had he sent the military contingent,
(00:29:42):
it would be much more difficult for him to keep the line with the
(00:29:48):
with the Europeans, right?
(00:29:50):
So here you can say,
(00:29:52):
well,
(00:29:52):
I need to go because this is an important thing for Armenians,
(00:29:56):
for their contribution,
(00:29:58):
and my people would not understand if I didn't go,
(00:30:01):
but I didn't send the military contingent.
(00:30:04):
unlike my predecessors or unlike Aliyev.
(00:30:08):
So he's looking at every issue from the point of view how he's going to be saying
(00:30:14):
one thing in one place,
(00:30:16):
another thing in another place.
(00:30:17):
But I must say that he was visibly uncomfortable sitting next to Lukashenko in that parade.
(00:30:26):
And I don't know if an Armenian leader these days could have had the stomach to be
(00:30:33):
there when the Azeris were participating in that parade.
(00:30:38):
The very least he could have done was walked out right at that moment and then come back maybe.
(00:30:45):
But he didn't do that because he doesn't have, for him, it's a dumb deal.
(00:30:51):
We are sending the message to Turks and Azeris.
(00:30:55):
We are a new, different Armenians now.
(00:30:58):
more in line with what you expect to see when you're dealing with Armenians.
(00:31:03):
The past is past,
(00:31:05):
and the new Armenia and new Armenians that we're going to educate and we're going
(00:31:10):
to give them the new way of looking at the history is going to be very much
(00:31:15):
acceptable for you.
(00:31:16):
I hope you understand that that's not what I'm saying.
(00:31:21):
I myself have a very difficult time to reconcile with what he's doing, but
(00:31:27):
The fact is that that's what he's doing.
(00:31:29):
That's exactly what he's doing.
(00:31:31):
Yeah, absolutely.
(00:31:32):
He comes across that way as well.
(00:31:35):
Okay.
(00:31:35):
Well,
(00:31:35):
from one war commemoration,
(00:31:37):
let's go to another one that is actually still in progress,
(00:31:40):
Arthur.
(00:31:41):
Last week,
(00:31:41):
the conflict in Ukraine intensified as Russian forces launched a series of missile
(00:31:46):
strikes against infrastructure in Ukraine,
(00:31:49):
in Kyiv and Kharkov.
(00:31:50):
Meanwhile, US President Trump
(00:31:52):
ramped up support for EU hardliners in negotiations with Russia,
(00:31:56):
threatening sweeping sanctions if Moscow does not agree to unconditional ceasefire.
(00:32:01):
I mean, he changed a little bit the tone.
(00:32:04):
I don't know if you've seen his recent statements on this.
(00:32:07):
On Thursday,
(00:32:08):
there's going to be an important meeting in Istanbul,
(00:32:10):
and I urge Zelensky to go to that meeting.
(00:32:15):
There's a hope that they're going to sign something.
(00:32:17):
No worry about the need to have a ceasefire as a precondition for the talks.
(00:32:23):
That's exactly what Putin said.
(00:32:25):
In negotiation sense, these are moves setting up the table.
(00:32:32):
Who's going to be at the table?
(00:32:33):
What's going to be the agenda?
(00:32:35):
And Trump himself today, he said that, well, I'm going to be in the region.
(00:32:39):
I don't know what I'm going to be doing on Thursday.
(00:32:41):
But if I carve some time, I'm a parachute in Istanbul to be there for that important meeting.
(00:32:49):
I doubt Putin has any intention to go to that meeting.
(00:32:54):
He said very clearly that he's ready to send his negotiators there,
(00:32:58):
but whether he himself is going to go,
(00:33:01):
it's not clear right now,
(00:33:02):
and I doubt he's going to go.
(00:33:05):
And Zelensky took that as an opportunity to say that he is brave enough to go, right?
(00:33:11):
I'm there.
(00:33:12):
Putin, come.
(00:33:13):
This is kind of a macho game that he's trying to demonstrate,
(00:33:18):
and also to use that as a way to persuade Trump that,
(00:33:22):
see,
(00:33:23):
it's Putin who doesn't want to do this.
(00:33:25):
I'm ready.
(00:33:26):
I'm ready here.
(00:33:28):
Right now, he put his signature under the deal on the rare metals.
(00:33:33):
And he's doing everything.
(00:33:35):
I mean, in this game, blame game with Putin is Putin doesn't want it.
(00:33:41):
I'm ready to do it.
(00:33:42):
Putin says, no, they're not ready to do it.
(00:33:45):
I announced a three-day ceasefire,
(00:33:48):
and they didn't really respect it,
(00:33:50):
although it was an important holiday for us and for many Ukrainians.
(00:33:55):
So essentially, Zelensky
(00:33:58):
has been trying to improve his alternative, and his alternative is Europeans.
(00:34:03):
That's why they were in Kiev.
(00:34:07):
I think that combination I haven't seen in,
(00:34:11):
I don't remember even at the height,
(00:34:13):
in the very beginning of the war,
(00:34:15):
that kind of a combination when
(00:34:18):
Tusk,
(00:34:19):
Mertz,
(00:34:19):
Macron,
(00:34:21):
you have all the major European players,
(00:34:23):
Starmer,
(00:34:24):
obviously,
(00:34:24):
they're in Kiev to support him.
(00:34:28):
And they were putting it as an ultimatum to Russia.
(00:34:31):
Agree to a 30-day ceasefire and then negotiations will start.
(00:34:36):
As Macron said, no negotiations are possible while bullets are flying.
(00:34:41):
That's logical.
(00:34:42):
But of course, they're going to keep replenishing Ukraine while there's a ceasefire.
(00:34:47):
Well, that's exactly what Putin is saying.
(00:34:52):
The 30 days for what?
(00:34:54):
Are you sure that 30 days are enough to negotiate the deal?
(00:34:58):
Or do you think that's going to be possible to do just in one day,
(00:35:01):
get there and take the document from...
(00:35:06):
2022,
(00:35:06):
April 15,
(00:35:08):
even if they take that as a base,
(00:35:10):
that text of that agreement,
(00:35:12):
I think so many things have changed.
(00:35:14):
And I doubt that Zelensky is going to agree to the terms that were in that draft agreement,
(00:35:21):
although we know what happened,
(00:35:24):
right?
(00:35:24):
I mean, although Boris Johnson has been denying that he urged them not to
(00:35:29):
to go with that agreement.
(00:35:31):
There are all sorts of indications that, in fact, maybe things were changing on the battlefield.
(00:35:37):
And Ukrainians looked at it as a kind of, yes, we were there.
(00:35:43):
We almost were close to signing an agreement.
(00:35:46):
But who said that it's agreed if everything is not agreed?
(00:35:50):
So essentially, the war could have been over in 2022.
(00:35:56):
But Arthur,
(00:35:56):
I wanted to understand as a conflict management expert,
(00:35:59):
what do you think about Trump's tactics?
(00:36:01):
Is he helping or undermining his own efforts for a negotiated settlement at this
(00:36:06):
point when he sides with the EU hardliners?
(00:36:11):
Well, I think he needs to bring both parties to the table.
(00:36:14):
As I said, these are moves to set up the table, right?
(00:36:18):
So he thinks that he already has Zelensky, right?
(00:36:22):
Zelensky is going to come.
(00:36:24):
Yes, he has his precondition, the 30-day ceasefire, but he's coming.
(00:36:28):
So now it's the time to bring Putin to the table.
(00:36:31):
So how I'm going to get Putin to the table?
(00:36:35):
I need to show that I have a threat,
(00:36:38):
a real threat of doing something nasty if he chooses not to attend that very
(00:36:45):
important meeting.
(00:36:46):
So it's his way.
(00:36:48):
It's from the arsenal of transactional negotiations where to bring one party to the table,
(00:36:56):
you need to show them the consequences of not attending.
(00:37:01):
That's what he's doing.
(00:37:03):
But can he really go when push comes to shove?
(00:37:07):
Can he really go with those things?
(00:37:10):
Will other things from the transactional world and things that are very sweet for
(00:37:15):
him in dealing with Russians
(00:37:18):
because he's been trying to get as much as possible from Ukrainians transactionally
(00:37:24):
to compensate what he calls $350 billion assistance,
(00:37:30):
and to get something from Russians.
(00:37:31):
And with Russians, he's saying, see, Ukrainians are giving us this.
(00:37:35):
What can you give us?
(00:37:36):
And Russians are ready to please him.
(00:37:39):
We know that much of the discussion with Witkow was around those issues.
(00:37:44):
There were first leaks, and now there is proof that that might be really true.
(00:37:51):
An idea that the North Stream can be made again operational,
(00:37:56):
and this time Americans will step in,
(00:37:59):
and not Germans,
(00:38:00):
but Americans will be running the operation with Russians 50-50 or whatever they
(00:38:05):
agree on.
(00:38:07):
But Russians will be getting the gas,
(00:38:10):
selling it to Americans at below market price,
(00:38:14):
and then Americans will deliver it to Europeans and sell it at whatever price they
(00:38:19):
want to sell it to them.
(00:38:21):
Much higher,
(00:38:22):
obviously,
(00:38:22):
or equal to the gas that they're going to be supplying to the European markets.
(00:38:28):
Liquified gas, right?
(00:38:30):
So it's a great deal.
(00:38:32):
And there are many other deals that they've been talking about.
(00:38:35):
His view of this is, I need to show to my constituencies here in the U.S.
(00:38:41):
that I'm a dealmaker and I can bring peace when I'm saying so.
(00:38:46):
Because I'm the one who can do it.
(00:38:49):
I'm the hegemon.
(00:38:50):
And failure to do that, he needs some kind of a face saving to get out of it.
(00:38:56):
I think he now somewhat regrets that he said that he can quickly solve this one.
(00:39:01):
Maybe India and Pakistan was easier to...
(00:39:05):
to handle, right, to get it back to a frozen status.
(00:39:10):
There are some skirmishes still,
(00:39:12):
but essentially,
(00:39:14):
yes,
(00:39:14):
they're going to be back to a frozen status over Kashmir.
(00:39:19):
But Ukraine is very different because it's not just about Ukraine.
(00:39:24):
For Russians, it's about the new security architecture in Europe.
(00:39:29):
And to negotiate that,
(00:39:31):
you really need to step beyond just the Ukraine as an item on the agenda.
(00:39:39):
Are they willing to expand that agenda?
(00:39:42):
And if they are, obviously those negotiations are going to take much longer.
(00:39:47):
Plus,
(00:39:48):
there is the battlefield calculus,
(00:39:50):
as some of the observers have correctly observed,
(00:39:53):
and that calculus is not in the favor of Ukrainians.
(00:39:58):
Even now, during this celebration of
(00:40:01):
May 9th,
(00:40:02):
Ukrainians made attempts to carve some space,
(00:40:06):
get some space,
(00:40:07):
but they were thrown back or not able to get in control of the territories with
(00:40:14):
losses again,
(00:40:15):
and they're losing.
(00:40:16):
Yes, it's not very fast, but they're losing, most importantly,
(00:40:21):
human capital, and mobilization is the weakest point right now for Ukrainians.
(00:40:28):
On this topic of Ukraine,
(00:40:30):
I know that we should talk about India-Pakistan,
(00:40:33):
and we'll go to it,
(00:40:34):
but I do want to ask,
(00:40:35):
because Armenia's entire economy is dependent heavily on Russia,
(00:40:41):
so how likely would you assess any deal
(00:40:45):
falling through, so failing, and these negotiations failing.
(00:40:49):
And what is Armenia's vulnerability to these sweeping sanctions?
(00:40:55):
In a few words, if you can say something about that.
(00:40:59):
Well, it will depend on the scope of these sanctions.
(00:41:02):
It will depend on what Trump decides to enact.
(00:41:06):
And Europeans already are preparing the 17th package of sanctions,
(00:41:11):
no matter what happens,
(00:41:12):
by the way,
(00:41:13):
in Istanbul.
(00:41:14):
They're going to go ahead with that.
(00:41:16):
And the British enacted some sanctions on May 9th, on that very day.
(00:41:24):
And those,
(00:41:25):
interestingly,
(00:41:26):
if you look at who's sanctioned by the Brits now,
(00:41:30):
there are some Azerbaijani names,
(00:41:32):
individuals,
(00:41:33):
who were involved in trading Russian oil.
(00:41:37):
Yeah, the so-called dark fleet, shadow fleet.
(00:41:40):
Well, the dark fleet is the ships.
(00:41:43):
These are individuals who were involved in the trade.
(00:41:48):
I don't know many details right now,
(00:41:50):
about what specifically gave those grounds to Starmer and his cabinet,
(00:41:57):
but apparently they had evidence that these individuals were involved in trading
(00:42:02):
the Russian oil in Europe.
(00:42:05):
But it's also somewhat hypocritical,
(00:42:08):
because much as they speak about sanctions,
(00:42:11):
and Merz is talking about defending Ukraine till the end,
(00:42:17):
they are buying Russian gas.
(00:42:20):
Right now.
(00:42:20):
Rebranded Russian gas.
(00:42:23):
Yes.
(00:42:25):
In the port of Rotterdam and in other ports,
(00:42:30):
Again, the liquid gas that Russia is supplying, they're buying Russian gas.
(00:42:36):
And it's not a big secret.
(00:42:39):
I mean, everybody knows it's happening.
(00:42:41):
And in fact,
(00:42:42):
they have increased their purchases because they are facing crisis,
(00:42:46):
energy crisis in many European countries.
(00:42:50):
So to go back to Armenia and Armenia's vulnerabilities,
(00:42:56):
If, and this is if, right?
(00:42:57):
It's a scenario.
(00:42:59):
If Trump really goes ahead with the sanctions,
(00:43:02):
if Russians refuse to participate,
(00:43:04):
but they are not refusing to participate,
(00:43:06):
it's who's going to participate,
(00:43:08):
right?
(00:43:08):
They will always have this way of saying,
(00:43:11):
no,
(00:43:11):
no,
(00:43:11):
we're participating,
(00:43:12):
and negotiations can take a long time.
(00:43:15):
But let's assume that that scenario of Trump enacting new sanctions is going to happen.
(00:43:22):
Depending on what the scope and targeting of those sanctions might be,
(00:43:27):
it may affect obviously Armenia,
(00:43:29):
because Armenia has been taking
(00:43:31):
huge opportunity of kind of re-exporting stuff to Russia.
(00:43:37):
The trade, I think, up to 70% right now is to the Eurasian Economic Union.
(00:43:46):
So the cost of that for the Armenian economy can be huge, obviously.
(00:43:52):
And in that scenario, a lot will depend what Pashinyan is going to choose to do.
(00:43:57):
One thing is obvious, his government,
(00:44:00):
despite the fact that for seven years they've been in place,
(00:44:05):
they haven't really developed many viable alternatives so that they could say no to Russians.
(00:44:14):
Those sensitivities are going to be huge.
(00:44:17):
And it was those sensitivities and vulnerabilities,
(00:44:20):
especially with summer coming,
(00:44:23):
apricot trade and agricultural produce and whatnot,
(00:44:26):
and not just that,
(00:44:27):
many other things in addition,
(00:44:30):
forced him to go to Moscow.
(00:44:32):
That was also part of the calculus.
(00:44:34):
Yeah,
(00:44:35):
I don't know how he's going to compromise on this issue,
(00:44:37):
especially when it's the oligarchs who back him who are making most of the profit
(00:44:41):
from that trade and retrade.
(00:44:44):
But Arthur, you mentioned India and Pakistan.
(00:44:47):
So let's go from one war to another.
(00:44:49):
Tensions flared over there just about three weeks ago.
(00:44:52):
Crisis began with a militant attack on Indian-administered Kashmir,
(00:44:57):
killed 26,
(00:44:58):
mostly tourists,
(00:45:00):
I think it was.
(00:45:01):
These terrorists were actually Pakistan-based groups,
(00:45:05):
and India launched missile strikes on Pakistani air bases,
(00:45:09):
prompting a retaliation involving Turkish drones.
(00:45:12):
In response, India activated its Russian-made S-400 air defense systems.
(00:45:19):
And on May 10,
(00:45:19):
just a couple of days ago,
(00:45:21):
Trump announced a ceasefire between the two countries.
(00:45:23):
And of course, both of them report ongoing violations.
(00:45:27):
So the conflict has drawn in regional powers,
(00:45:29):
Turkey,
(00:45:29):
Azerbaijan backing Pakistan and Israel supporting India.
(00:45:34):
Meanwhile,
(00:45:35):
these regional alliances remain very fluid as Azerbaijan and Israel align against
(00:45:39):
Armenia and Iran,
(00:45:41):
while Israel and Turkey clash over Syria.
(00:45:43):
So...
(00:45:44):
Can you explain why this escalation happened and why now?
(00:45:48):
And also,
(00:45:49):
is there an opportunity for Armenia to leverage this fluidity and make something of
(00:45:54):
an opportunity for itself?
(00:45:57):
Well, I don't want to go way back to 1947.
(00:46:02):
Yeah, I think we have very little time.
(00:46:07):
And then the ceasefire, which was more or less permanent 1972, the frozen conflict,
(00:46:15):
has had its dimension.
(00:46:16):
By the way,
(00:46:17):
it also has the so-called line of control,
(00:46:21):
where India controls about 45 percent of the territory,
(00:46:26):
Pakistan controls the rest,
(00:46:28):
and then also Pakistan has given some territory to China,
(00:46:33):
and China is also big in this conflict and confrontation.
(00:46:39):
Why it happened now, I mean, this is not the first time, by the way.
(00:46:43):
I remember,
(00:46:44):
if I'm not mistaken,
(00:46:45):
September 2016,
(00:46:46):
when Pakistani-supported militants in Kashmir attacked an Indian base,
(00:46:53):
and I think 18 Indian soldiers were killed.
(00:46:57):
And they were on the brink of escalation at that time, but they avoided that escalation then.
(00:47:05):
Then another point that could bring escalation was the abrogation of Article 370 of
(00:47:13):
the Indian Constitution.
(00:47:15):
which long has been demanded by the Indian nationalists.
(00:47:20):
Essentially, that article was giving a special status to Jammu and Kashmir.
(00:47:27):
And now,
(00:47:28):
according to India,
(00:47:30):
it's Indian territory period,
(00:47:32):
just like other provinces of India,
(00:47:35):
directly controlled from New Delhi.
(00:47:39):
That was 2019.
(00:47:40):
And since then, I think Pakistanis reinvigorated the support of the militants in Kashmir.
(00:47:49):
And as you probably know,
(00:47:52):
there's significant Muslim population,
(00:47:54):
I mean,
(00:47:55):
the division there,
(00:47:56):
six very small numbers.
(00:47:58):
But
(00:48:00):
Up to 30 percent are Muslim.
(00:48:02):
So Muslim militancy on the rise.
(00:48:06):
And sooner or later, something like that could have happened.
(00:48:09):
It was just a matter of time when this frozen conflict could erupt.
(00:48:14):
And interestingly, UN has had its observer mission since way back, I think.
(00:48:23):
But the functions of that observer mission are almost nonexistent.
(00:48:29):
On paper, they exist.
(00:48:30):
There are people who are there to implement some observing, but none of it is really working.
(00:48:38):
There are lessons to learn from those kinds of arrangements.
(00:48:43):
So that's one.
(00:48:44):
Number two, what's the need for Armenia and how Armenia can make use of it?
(00:48:52):
Obviously,
(00:48:52):
Armenia has had much better relations with India,
(00:48:57):
and with Pakistan is,
(00:48:59):
I think,
(00:49:00):
one of the countries that has not recognized Armenia and does not have any
(00:49:06):
diplomatic relations.
(00:49:07):
They've been fully supportive of Azerbaijan on this,
(00:49:10):
although,
(00:49:11):
interestingly,
(00:49:12):
the conflict there is the reverse of Karabakh,
(00:49:15):
right?
(00:49:16):
But it doesn't matter.
(00:49:17):
as it doesn't matter who's,
(00:49:19):
uh,
(00:49:20):
whose ally in,
(00:49:21):
uh,
(00:49:22):
uh,
(00:49:22):
this world disorder,
(00:49:24):
which more,
(00:49:24):
uh,
(00:49:25):
looks more like,
(00:49:26):
um,
(00:49:26):
um,
(00:49:27):
early 20th century arrangements,
(00:49:29):
when you could be in a tactical alliance with one group of countries,
(00:49:34):
but at the same time,
(00:49:36):
building an alliance with a country that is in hostile relations with one of the
(00:49:41):
members of your alliance.
(00:49:43):
So these are very tactical, not really strategic alliances.
(00:49:47):
They're based on very short-term satisfaction of the interests and needs of
(00:49:55):
those who create those fleeting alliances.
(00:49:58):
And Armenia, I think, can be very careful in how it treats this one.
(00:50:07):
But it's obvious for me that there are many more opportunities now to even
(00:50:15):
reinvigorate the relations with India.
(00:50:19):
which both in terms of trade and in terms of even military procurement has been
(00:50:26):
significant and can be even more significant in the coming years.
(00:50:32):
But I think that's one of the areas where you have to be extremely cautious because
(00:50:38):
as you noted,
(00:50:41):
There are different big players like China, for instance, right?
(00:50:44):
I mean, you don't want to necessarily get to hostile relations with China by...
(00:50:52):
orally going, supporting India in this.
(00:50:57):
And this has to be very precise diplomatic calculus.
(00:51:01):
Some,
(00:51:02):
I haven't seen it really happen,
(00:51:04):
but some say that Xi Jinping in Moscow was trying to avoid Pashinyan,
(00:51:10):
to avoid any handshake with him or avoid any communication with him.
(00:51:15):
And that's not surprising because Armenia has been acting like a
(00:51:20):
an elephant in China shop because the minute they came to power,
(00:51:28):
for whatever reason,
(00:51:29):
they signed up to this new camp that was inaugurated by State Department against China.
(00:51:37):
Why did they do that?
(00:51:38):
What did we gain from it?
(00:51:39):
So I'm just giving that as an example of very uncouth diplomacy.
(00:51:44):
You have to play it very smart and calculate well.
(00:51:48):
But given the miserable shape of our diplomacy and the head of that diplomacy is
(00:51:56):
still Pashinyan,
(00:51:58):
although Mirzoyan is the Foreign Affairs Minister,
(00:52:01):
I'd be surprised if he's not going to make mistakes on this one too.
(00:52:07):
Luckily for us, the ceasefire can
(00:52:10):
hold and then it can be a more quieter situation where you don't need to side with
(00:52:17):
one camp or the other.
(00:52:19):
So let's talk a little bit about Armenia and Azerbaijan.
(00:52:22):
And to me, it's nauseating to talk about this because every time we say the same thing,
(00:52:28):
But we're obliged because Armenian officials again,
(00:52:31):
one more time,
(00:52:32):
kept repeating that peace with Azerbaijan or signing the peace deal is near imminent.
(00:52:39):
Let me remind you that since Armenia announced that this peace deal was agreed upon,
(00:52:46):
Border shootings have been nonstop.
(00:52:48):
Before that, you know, they were even like, you know, it was two months of relative quiet.
(00:52:54):
But now,
(00:52:55):
like ever since they announced that there's a peace is near imminent,
(00:52:58):
every day there's border shootings,
(00:52:59):
houses being damaged,
(00:53:01):
terrorized villagers.
(00:53:02):
And EU observers are there to see that, right?
(00:53:05):
And the EU observers are there, but are not specifically making any noise about it.
(00:53:10):
You know,
(00:53:10):
they're,
(00:53:11):
I don't know,
(00:53:11):
maybe they were having lunch at that time or,
(00:53:14):
you know,
(00:53:14):
they were having a nap.
(00:53:15):
But the person you said,
(00:53:17):
Mirzoyan,
(00:53:19):
who unfortunately is the Armenian foreign minister,
(00:53:21):
said everything is agreed upon.
(00:53:23):
But...
(00:53:24):
Azerbaijan, for some reason, keeps making contradictory statements.
(00:53:27):
How dare they?
(00:53:29):
Anyway, what is the Pashinyan team smoking?
(00:53:32):
Please tell us, and where can I get some of that?
(00:53:35):
And also, what do we believe about the real state affairs in these talks?
(00:53:40):
Well, it's probably more appropriate about Mirzoyan when it comes to smoking some substances.
(00:53:47):
I think, by and large, they agreed on maybe some of the...
(00:53:54):
Important points.
(00:53:55):
We don't know.
(00:53:57):
Again,
(00:53:57):
we don't know exactly what they haven't agreed on,
(00:53:59):
but Azeris are not making any secrets about it.
(00:54:04):
They want more because they can see that they can get more.
(00:54:09):
And now, how do you get more?
(00:54:11):
You put pressure.
(00:54:12):
If Armenia declares that its vision,
(00:54:16):
its existence,
(00:54:17):
is pinned to that peace agreement and to these corridors that are going to open and
(00:54:24):
trade and prosperity on par with post-war Europe in the Caucasus,
(00:54:31):
that's the model that he's probably thinking about.
(00:54:35):
We are not in Europe.
(00:54:36):
Azerbaijan is not Germany, and we are not France in some ways.
(00:54:43):
So the calculus of Azerbaijan is,
(00:54:47):
if that's something that they really need,
(00:54:51):
their diet to get it,
(00:54:53):
What you do, it's very common for the Asian bargaining tactics.
(00:55:00):
If I know that you want something badly from me, what do I do?
(00:55:05):
I raise the price.
(00:55:08):
I raise the price.
(00:55:09):
I want more of it.
(00:55:10):
And I can see that you need it to demonstrate to your people that at least in some
(00:55:16):
areas you've been successful.
(00:55:18):
Because the program of this government from 2021
(00:55:24):
has nothing to do with the reality.
(00:55:26):
None of the promises has been to their constituency,
(00:55:29):
to their voters,
(00:55:31):
has been implemented,
(00:55:32):
none.
(00:55:33):
On the contrary, they've been doing exactly the opposite of it.
(00:55:37):
Azerbaijan demands put an end to the Minsk Group.
(00:55:40):
The program of the government,
(00:55:44):
2021,
(00:55:44):
says that our solemn promise to our voters is that we're going to cooperate with
(00:55:50):
the Minsk Group to bring a just solution to Karabakh,
(00:55:55):
blah,
(00:55:55):
blah,
(00:55:55):
blah.
(00:55:57):
Now Pashinyan says we need to quit Pashinyan
(00:56:00):
We need to put an end to the Minsk group.
(00:56:04):
Number two, and probably more important, is the constitution.
(00:56:09):
They want the constitution to be changed,
(00:56:10):
and to be changed the way they want,
(00:56:12):
as if they're drafting our constitution now.
(00:56:16):
Because for Aliyev,
(00:56:18):
Armenia is the country that was defeated,
(00:56:21):
and it needs to take the vote of a defeated party,
(00:56:25):
right?
(00:56:26):
Roman statement, right?
(00:56:28):
Woe to the defeated.
(00:56:30):
So you have to, and he wants to put a complete end to that.
(00:56:35):
And as he observes Pashinyan and his government, he sees that I can get even more.
(00:56:42):
If not in writing, then somehow in secret protocols or some things that they're going to sign.
(00:56:50):
And if they don't implement it,
(00:56:52):
I can show it to everybody that it was signed,
(00:56:56):
that they agreed to do that.
(00:56:57):
That can be about the border demarcation.
(00:57:00):
That can be...
(00:57:02):
I do not rule even that out,
(00:57:04):
that Pashinyan's government may say that in principle they would not object if
(00:57:10):
Azerbaijanis returned to the new real Armenia,
(00:57:15):
right?
(00:57:15):
Because we as a European and tolerant nation have to learn how to live with our neighbors,
(00:57:24):
right?
(00:57:24):
And kind of open it up.
(00:57:26):
So the list of demands from the Azerbaijani side is increasing.
(00:57:32):
But because the negotiations are happening through closed channels,
(00:57:36):
really tightly sealed,
(00:57:39):
Mirzoyan is not allowed to say even what they demand.
(00:57:42):
Therefore, he says, I don't even understand what they are doing.
(00:57:46):
No, he probably is one of the very few who knows what exactly Azerbaijan is demanding now.
(00:57:53):
knowing perfectly well that 2026 is coming,
(00:57:57):
next year is going to be,
(00:57:59):
let's say,
(00:58:00):
starting probably end of this year,
(00:58:03):
you're going to be into your electoral cycle,
(00:58:06):
and you really badly need that piece of paper that is going to be the same piece.
(00:58:13):
And if that's what you really, really want, then... The price will be higher.
(00:58:17):
Yeah.
(00:58:17):
Right, you need to give us more, more concessions.
(00:58:21):
So Mirzoyan may be saying this to pretend that he doesn't know anything about it,
(00:58:26):
but I doubt that he doesn't.
(00:58:30):
There is a very small coterie of people around Pashinyan who are well informed
(00:58:35):
about what's going on there,
(00:58:37):
but
(00:58:38):
They know that if they go public with those things and say,
(00:58:41):
we cannot do this,
(00:58:42):
this is what Azerbaijan demands and we're not going to do that,
(00:58:45):
that is not related to the constitution because he's willing to change the constitution.
(00:58:51):
But other things that they demand, he knows it's going to be costly for him if he does that.
(00:58:56):
Therefore, they keep it very quiet.
(00:58:59):
But that's most likely what's happening.
(00:59:02):
That's the negotiation dynamic.
(00:59:06):
Arthur, just a quick question before we end the show.
(00:59:09):
There's a new pope, Leo XIV, who is the first American pope.
(00:59:13):
I was wondering if you had any thoughts about what the Armenian Church's
(00:59:17):
relationship should be with this new pope,
(00:59:20):
what the expectations should be,
(00:59:21):
considering the fact that the Vatican had recently hosted an Azerbaijani propaganda conference.
(00:59:28):
Any thoughts about this?
(00:59:30):
Well,
(00:59:30):
I think this whole issue goes to the challenge that we've had for so long now,
(00:59:38):
for more than seven years now.
(00:59:41):
For us to be effective in getting the church to do what is possible here,
(00:59:48):
it has to work in tandem with the state.
(00:59:52):
Because, for instance, do we have Catholic Armenians in the United States?
(01:00:00):
Sure we do.
(01:00:04):
Could they reach out to the new pope?
(01:00:06):
Yes, they could.
(01:00:07):
But what is it that they,
(01:00:09):
other than the religious issues,
(01:00:12):
what are the things that they could approach him with?
(01:00:16):
If the Armenian state that has the ambassador to Vatican is not acting on egregious
(01:00:24):
demonstration of Azeri falsifications in Vatican,
(01:00:30):
The state, and that is the ambassador, is not doing anything.
(01:00:35):
What can the church do in that case?
(01:00:37):
Not much, really.
(01:00:39):
They can,
(01:00:39):
certainly they will be doing,
(01:00:40):
I'm sure,
(01:00:41):
but they're not going to be as effective as they could have been had there been
(01:00:47):
this tandem of state and church.
(01:00:51):
The same goes to diasporan organizations and the state.
(01:00:56):
So whenever you have this split, and that split is significant, it's really a huge cleavage now.
(01:01:05):
It's the one that is going to be to our detriment to put out a united action.
(01:01:14):
or mobilizing united action to support Armenian interests.
(01:01:18):
Why?
(01:01:19):
Because those very interests are interpreted very differently.
(01:01:23):
You have the state leader who has a very different interpretation of what are
(01:01:28):
national interests,
(01:01:30):
and you have lay Armenians who have,
(01:01:35):
especially in Diaspora,
(01:01:36):
I hope,
(01:01:37):
who,
(01:01:37):
just as Hovik and you,
(01:01:41):
the blood starts boiling once you hear about the genocide and what is ready to
(01:01:48):
compromise on the issues of identity.
(01:01:50):
So I think the new pope overall most likely will continue in the footsteps of the previous pope.
(01:02:03):
He was brought from Peru by Francis to Vatican, was given an important job.
(01:02:12):
That means there was trust, and that means that he supported what Francis was trying to do.
(01:02:17):
I've also read that he's a little bit cooler on LGBTQ agenda,
(01:02:24):
but on other issues,
(01:02:25):
most likely he's going to continue to push the reforms of the Catholic Church.
(01:02:31):
And does Armenian Church have a way to participate in a dialogue on those reforms?
(01:02:38):
Yes, of course we do.
(01:02:40):
And not only the Armenian Church, I mean the apostolic church, but also the Armenian Catholics.
(01:02:47):
And I don't know the numbers.
(01:02:49):
I'm not sure how many there are, but there are.
(01:02:52):
And they could also be a very vocal, very effective ways of getting our messages to to Vatican.
(01:03:01):
But if combined with the state, I mean, that's that's
(01:03:04):
Well, that's the key issue.
(01:03:06):
Just about anything really eventually goes back to the state,
(01:03:10):
because even the diaspora and efforts,
(01:03:12):
when you try to lobby for something,
(01:03:14):
request something from our representatives,
(01:03:16):
they say,
(01:03:17):
well,
(01:03:17):
your country is not on board with that.
(01:03:20):
And I'm sure that the same was said by Vatican.
(01:03:24):
If Armenian organizations approach the Vatican on the Azeri conference on Albanian
(01:03:31):
churches and whatnot,
(01:03:32):
falsification of that stuff,
(01:03:34):
I think they could have said the same thing.
(01:03:36):
They could have said,
(01:03:37):
well,
(01:03:38):
we understand that the Armenian state is trying to achieve peace with Azeris.
(01:03:44):
We didn't hear anything from the Armenian state,
(01:03:47):
and therefore we considered it kosher for them to be spreading lies here in Vatican
(01:03:53):
about Christianity.
(01:03:56):
Okay, well, let's wrap up our topics today.
(01:03:59):
We're out of time.
(01:04:00):
I'd like to ask each of you if there's something on your mind that you would like
(01:04:03):
to share with our listeners.
(01:04:06):
And I know that Hovik has a topic,
(01:04:07):
so I think I'll go straight to him and I'll give Arthur a minute to think about
(01:04:12):
what he wants to talk about.
(01:04:14):
Hovik?
(01:04:16):
Well,
(01:04:16):
the only thing that I wanted to let our listeners and viewers know about was that
(01:04:22):
unlike the much fabled Europe where protesters can throw eggs at Macron and not
(01:04:29):
suffer any consequences,
(01:04:32):
in Armenia,
(01:04:33):
if you call the wife of Pashinyan a “hoghatu”,
(01:04:38):
Essentially, that means a giver of land.
(01:04:42):
A surrenderer of land.
(01:04:45):
You will be fined 375,000 drams for that as a penalty.
(01:04:52):
And this appears to be completely normal for all the Western liberal...
(01:04:57):
ambassadors,
(01:04:58):
observers,
(01:04:59):
because I haven't seen this anywhere in the news and we had to dig through Armenian
(01:05:03):
sources only and opposition sources only to discover it.
(01:05:08):
And it doesn't matter if you're like a 70-year-old grandma,
(01:05:11):
I mean,
(01:05:12):
or a grandfather,
(01:05:13):
but in this case 69-year-old Tigran Dermoyan was charged for simply calling Anna
(01:05:19):
Hakopyan a “Hoghatu”.
(01:05:21):
A well-deserved name, I believe.
(01:05:25):
But yeah, that is the case of justice in Armenia.
(01:05:29):
And the judge, I believe, well, I don't know who the judge is, but I think it's the same judge.
(01:05:33):
He's famous for giving pro-government rulings.
(01:05:38):
But I mean, this is just ridiculous.
(01:05:40):
But that's approximately for our international audience.
(01:05:44):
That's approximately a thousand dollar fine,
(01:05:47):
which is two or three months of pay for the average worker.
(01:05:51):
How much is it for a pensioner?
(01:05:53):
Yeah,
(01:05:53):
well,
(01:05:54):
and two,
(01:05:54):
three months of pay,
(01:05:55):
but also multiple more times that for the minimal salary,
(01:05:59):
if you consider that maybe like 20 times the minimal salary.
(01:06:03):
For a pension, it can be a year.
(01:06:06):
And that's my point for a 69 year old person.
(01:06:09):
That's a year of their pension.
(01:06:11):
Arthur, something on your mind that you would like to share?
(01:06:14):
Well, I'm surprised that Hovik is surprised.
(01:06:19):
In 2018,
(01:06:21):
when Mirzoyan made this trip to Dushanbe,
(01:06:25):
I was trying to test if they really stand by their words that they're going to be
(01:06:29):
transparent and they're going to put out all the expenses that were made to fly...
(01:06:36):
the Armenian presidential jet to Dushanbe.
(01:06:44):
They certainly didn't do that.
(01:06:46):
Later,
(01:06:46):
they adopted a law by which this kind of information cannot be disclosed to the
(01:06:54):
public because it's state secret.
(01:06:57):
From that point, it was obvious to me that these guys are not about the things that they
(01:07:05):
speak about in public, you know, in squares, when they promise things, all of that is fake.
(01:07:15):
They say one thing, but they act as usual as normal.
(01:07:20):
And since it was the election of a new pope,
(01:07:24):
and the new pope,
(01:07:25):
the American,
(01:07:26):
spent a lot of time in Peru,
(01:07:27):
and he was with the Augustinian order,
(01:07:34):
I can remind you of St.
(01:07:36):
Augustine's famous quote where he said,
(01:07:40):
a state that does not uphold justice is just a band of robbers.
(01:07:48):
So in a sense,
(01:07:50):
none of the institutions that we have really work the way they should in a republic
(01:07:56):
and to say nothing about democracy.
(01:07:58):
So we shouldn't be surprised at what these guys are doing.
(01:08:02):
And the battles that our opposition parliamentarians are trying to wage in the parliament,
(01:08:10):
well,
(01:08:11):
I commend them for what they're doing,
(01:08:13):
but I at the same time understand that in real political terms,
(01:08:17):
there is not much that they can gain other than awareness of some of the public
(01:08:23):
that we live in a country that does not stand up to the standards of a true republic.
(01:08:30):
Where you have...
(01:08:32):
independent
(01:08:34):
judiciary, and executive is separated from the legislative.
(01:08:40):
That's one thing that we should all be concerned about, both in Diaspora and here in Armenia.
(01:08:47):
So I wouldn't want to end with a very pessimistic take on what's going on here.
(01:08:55):
I'd say that I also have some very conservative hopes that
(01:09:04):
The process of getting to peace, the first step this Thursday can be made.
(01:09:12):
And when I say the first step, I also understand that it's not going to be a quick process.
(01:09:17):
It's not going to end right there.
(01:09:21):
For us, it's going to be very important how it ends.
(01:09:24):
You mean in Istanbul or in Turkey?
(01:09:28):
All right.
(01:09:28):
All right.
(01:09:29):
We're going to leave it there for today.
(01:09:31):
Thank you, Arthur, for joining us.
(01:09:32):
Very much appreciated your time and your insight.
(01:09:36):
Yeah.
(01:09:36):
Good luck.
(01:09:38):
Yeah.
(01:09:38):
Bye-bye.
(01:09:39):
Bye-bye.
(01:09:39):
Bye.
(01:09:42):
Okay, that was our week in review for May 11, 2025.
(01:09:46):
We recorded it on May 12, 2025.
(01:09:49):
We've been talking with Arthur G. Martirosyan, a senior consultant with CM Partners.
(01:09:55):
In 1994,
(01:09:56):
after graduating from Yale University,
(01:09:58):
he joined Conflict Management Group and Harvard Negotiations Project.
(01:10:02):
And since then,
(01:10:03):
he has worked on conflicts in the former Soviet Union,
(01:10:05):
the Middle East,
(01:10:06):
the Balkans,
(01:10:07):
Africa,
(01:10:08):
and Latin America.
(01:10:11):
And for more information on all our guests, you can go to the page for each episode.
(01:10:17):
So podcasts.groong.org slash episode number.
(01:10:21):
I believe this is 345.
(01:10:24):
435.
(01:10:25):
435 probably.
(01:10:25):
Anyway, you will see it in the description.
(01:10:30):
Go there, read up on our guests.
(01:10:32):
While you're on our page, there's a little donate button at the top.
(01:10:35):
Click on that and see if you can help us out and keep the lights on.
(01:10:39):
We would very much appreciate it.
(01:10:41):
uh yeah and thank you in general and also don't forget to comment thank you take
(01:10:47):
care we'll talk to you next week bye
