Armenian News Network - Groong: Week In Review Podcast

Sergei Melkonian - Alaska Summit, Trump Corridor, Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Emerging Opposition “Our Way”/”Մեր Ձեվով” | Ep 463, Aug 17, 2025

Armenian News Network / Groong Episode 463

Alaska Summit, Trump Corridor, Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Emerging Opposition “Our Way”/”Մեր Ձեվով”

Groong Week in Review - August 17, 2025

Topics

  • Trump-Putin Alaska Summit
  • Trump Corridor Politics
  • Russian-Azerbaijani Relations
  • Russian-Iranian Recalibration
  • New Opposition Emerging - Our Way

Guest

Hosts


Episode 463 | Recorded: August 18, 2025


Subscribe and follow us everywhere you are: linktr.ee/groong

Asbed (00:00:04):

Hello everyone and welcome to the Armenian News Network Groong Week in Review for

Asbed (00:00:07):

August 17,

Asbed (00:00:08):

2025.

Asbed (00:00:10):

Today we're talking with Sergei Melkonian who is a research fellow at APRI Armenia,

Asbed (00:00:14):

a Yerevan-based think tank.

Hovik (00:00:16):

But first folks,

Hovik (00:00:18):

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Hovik (00:00:24):

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Hovik (00:00:27):

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Hovik (00:00:28):

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Hovik (00:00:29):

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Hovik (00:00:33):

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Hovik (00:00:34):

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Hovik (00:00:36):

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Hovik (00:00:39):

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Hovik (00:00:45):

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Hovik (00:00:52):

Now that is pretty far-fetched today because we're not even at 20% of that.

Hovik (00:00:58):

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Hovik (00:01:01):

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Hovik (00:01:18):

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Asbed (00:01:22):

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Hovik (00:01:42):

All right, on to the show.

Asbed (00:01:45):

Dr. Melkonian, welcome back to the Groong Podcast.

Sergei (00:01:49):

It's always a pleasure to be with you.

Sergei (00:01:51):

Thanks for the invitation.

Hovik (00:01:54):

Let's begin with the Alaska summit.

Hovik (00:01:57):

So just if you've been under a rock for the last two weeks,

Hovik (00:02:02):

there was a summit in Alaska that took place on Saturday.

Hovik (00:02:06):

Many speculated that it could be Yalta 2.0 recalling the 1945 pact between United

Hovik (00:02:13):

States,

Hovik (00:02:14):

United Kingdom and USSR that essentially redrew

Hovik (00:02:17):

the world map, the post-war world map.

Hovik (00:02:20):

And some analysts even expected that the Trump route and the South Caucasus in

Hovik (00:02:26):

general would be on the table at the summit.

Hovik (00:02:29):

But judging by official readouts, the talks were confined to Ukraine.

Hovik (00:02:32):

Trump and Putin essentially agreed that the core issues of the war in Ukraine must

Hovik (00:02:37):

be tackled first.

Asbed (00:02:39):

Well, Hovik, it does sound like actually the summit was cut pretty short.

Asbed (00:02:44):

It lasted a lot less time than they thought.

Asbed (00:02:47):

And also, I think Trump had...

Asbed (00:02:50):

planned a fairly lavish working lunch, so-called working lunch, but that didn't happen either.

Asbed (00:02:56):

So either agreements were reached extremely quickly or they were frustrated and

Asbed (00:03:01):

were done with the summit very quickly.

Hovik (00:03:04):

Well, let's ask our guest that because, yes, I've seen also differing interpretations that

Hovik (00:03:08):

They agreed on what they agreed, and they didn't agree on what they didn't agree.

Hovik (00:03:12):

But there were some agreements.

Hovik (00:03:13):

And today,

Hovik (00:03:14):

Trump is hosting Zelensky in Washington,

Hovik (00:03:16):

along with leaders of European states,

Hovik (00:03:19):

now taking a harder line against Moscow than Washington itself.

Hovik (00:03:23):

That list includes Friedrich Merz, Britain's Keir Starmer, and Emmanuel Macron.

Hovik (00:03:30):

So,

Hovik (00:03:32):

Sergei, what is your take on the current state of the war in Ukraine and what took place in

Hovik (00:03:38):

Alaska last week?

Sergei (00:03:40):

One billion dollar question, right?

Sergei (00:03:43):

First.

Hovik (00:03:43):

I don't have that, but yes.

Sergei (00:03:46):

We should admit that Russia-U.S.

Sergei (00:03:49):

agenda is pretty large.

Sergei (00:03:52):

It's not only about Ukraine.

Sergei (00:03:53):

So this is why Alaska summit was neither Tehran conference nor

Sergei (00:03:59):

Yalta conference.

Sergei (00:04:00):

So it was just about preliminary agreements or partly to agree on the second part of the agenda.

Sergei (00:04:07):

Because again, Russia-U.S.

Sergei (00:04:09):

negotiations, they include restoration of U.S.-Russia diplomatic tariffs.

Sergei (00:04:15):

It includes Ukraine.

Sergei (00:04:16):

It includes security in Europe.

Sergei (00:04:18):

It includes Iranian file, Middle East, non-proliferation, strategic stability.

Sergei (00:04:26):

So the agenda is really large.

Sergei (00:04:28):

And it's not only about Ukraine.

Sergei (00:04:30):

But obviously, the key issue was how to make a deal on Ukraine.

Sergei (00:04:39):

And as far as...

Sergei (00:04:45):

President Trump now hosts President Zelensky in the White House.

Sergei (00:04:49):

So it means that there is a process.

Sergei (00:04:51):

So it means that there are some preliminary agreements in Alaska.

Sergei (00:04:55):

And based on statements that we heard from Witkoff,

Sergei (00:04:59):

from Trump,

Sergei (00:05:01):

and other officials,

Sergei (00:05:03):

so we may assume that most probably Russia was able to agree with the United States

Sergei (00:05:12):

should not focus on a ceasefire, but rather they should discuss a comprehensive agreement.

Sergei (00:05:20):

So it means,

Sergei (00:05:21):

and obviously Trump is interested to finalize all the process,

Sergei (00:05:28):

because the ceasefire is not the peace,

Sergei (00:05:31):

but Trump wants to be a major peacemaker in the world,

Sergei (00:05:35):

so he also would like to have a kind of comprehensive peace agreement.

Sergei (00:05:42):

Russia was able to kick the ball on the Ukrainian side because Russia put its own

Sergei (00:05:47):

preconditions uh demonstrating that Russia is ready to have a comprehensive peace

Sergei (00:05:53):

agreement what are what are some of those preconditions uh so for Russia as far as

Sergei (00:05:58):

we understand so they did not change their red line so uh at least Crimea and

Sergei (00:06:05):

Donbas should be recognized as Russia territories other and then the next step

Sergei (00:06:10):

obviously other

Sergei (00:06:12):

regions also should be agreed under Russian sovereignty because this is Russia's

Sergei (00:06:17):

red line and Russia didn't do step back for these years.

Sergei (00:06:24):

Second, it's about status of Ukraine.

Sergei (00:06:28):

So Ukraine should not be neither a member of NATO, neither a member of EU.

Sergei (00:06:33):

It also includes that zero external presence should be another part of Ukraine.

Sergei (00:06:42):

These are two key security concerns for Russia.

Sergei (00:06:47):

Then comes the right of Russian language, Russian Orthodox Church, et cetera, et cetera.

Sergei (00:06:53):

But as we see,

Sergei (00:06:55):

the European leaders,

Sergei (00:06:58):

they were,

Sergei (00:07:01):

let's say,

Sergei (00:07:02):

in a high level of alert after the last summit,

Sergei (00:07:06):

because it was clear that if

Sergei (00:07:10):

US and Russia are able to make pressure on Zelensky,

Sergei (00:07:14):

because this is what is taking place right now.

Sergei (00:07:17):

It means that Europeans will be out of making security architecture in eastern part of Europe.

Sergei (00:07:26):

And the key power that will shape the architecture,

Sergei (00:07:30):

there are two powers,

Sergei (00:07:32):

United States and Russia,

Sergei (00:07:33):

and both Ukraine out,

Sergei (00:07:35):

and Europe is out.

Sergei (00:07:37):

So it means that if the world order changed and this is a modus,

Sergei (00:07:42):

a new modus vivendi,

Sergei (00:07:43):

it means that in other parts of Europe,

Sergei (00:07:46):

also the new architecture might be shaped by non-European actors.

Hovik (00:07:52):

Judging from Zelensky's defiance and the hardline notes stuck by Paris,

Hovik (00:07:56):

Berlin,

Hovik (00:07:57):

and London,

Hovik (00:07:59):

much of Moscow's package already looks dead on arrival.

Hovik (00:08:03):

So

Hovik (00:08:05):

You know, we,

Hovik (00:08:06):

as Armenians,

Hovik (00:08:07):

put a lot of importance on the end of the Ukraine war first,

Hovik (00:08:12):

as soon as possible, because we expect that it would help increase Russia's attention to South Caucasus.

Hovik (00:08:19):

So the question, I guess, is partly motivated by that.

Hovik (00:08:23):

Do you see a negotiated end to the Ukraine war,

Hovik (00:08:25):

given what has happened on Saturday and all the statements that we're hearing

Hovik (00:08:30):

today?

Sergei (00:08:30):

The best case scenario in terms of negotiation, that might

Sergei (00:08:41):

It's impossible to resolve the conflict within one or two agreements.

Sergei (00:08:46):

The same is with the Washington summit that was in August 8th.

Sergei (00:08:53):

So it's obvious that Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict is not over even if the so-called

Sergei (00:09:00):

peace deal was initial.

Sergei (00:09:03):

So this is not enough.

Sergei (00:09:04):

So there should be a kind of process.

Sergei (00:09:06):

Russia should provide security guarantees both for Ukraine and for Europe.

Sergei (00:09:10):

NATO plus Europe plus US plus Ukraine,

Sergei (00:09:14):

they should provide some security guarantees for Russia to solve each other's

Sergei (00:09:19):

security dilemmas.

Sergei (00:09:20):

And even coming back to the first part of your question,

Sergei (00:09:24):

even if they start to solve somehow the conflict in Ukraine,

Sergei (00:09:28):

it doesn't necessarily mean that Russia will

Sergei (00:09:35):

its focus to the South Caucasus until the security dilemma still will exist from Europe.

Sergei (00:09:42):

And we see the level of military production in Europe continues to increase.

Sergei (00:09:47):

So Russia will still pay more attention to its Western flank,

Sergei (00:09:53):

will keep much more troops there,

Sergei (00:09:55):

will keep administrative resources there rather than refocus to the South Caucasus,

Sergei (00:10:02):

Central Asia, I mean,

Sergei (00:10:03):

other part of post-Soviet space.

Hovik (00:10:07):

And in general, how do you think the war is going?

Hovik (00:10:10):

Because we've heard that many experts opine that this war will be decided on the ground.

Sergei (00:10:17):

Yeah, I'm not an expert in military,

Sergei (00:10:19):

but as I was able to follow the developments in Ukraine,

Sergei (00:10:25):

there is a combination of the change.

Sergei (00:10:28):

change that happened on the ground and diplomacy and it's important to gain the

Sergei (00:10:32):

momentum for example when Ukraine forces were able to keep under control big part

Sergei (00:10:37):

of Russia's region so Ukraine has much more better position to swap territories to

Sergei (00:10:44):

have a qualitatively different

Sergei (00:10:47):

peace deal with Russia.

Sergei (00:10:49):

Now, when Russia controls some territories outside of Donbas and Russia took back all

Sergei (00:10:55):

the Kursk region,

Sergei (00:10:56):

so it means the situation has changed and Russia tries to,

Sergei (00:10:59):

again,

Sergei (00:11:00):

put more pressure on diplomacy while it has dominant position because nobody knows

Sergei (00:11:05):

what will happen, for example,

Sergei (00:11:07):

in six months.

Sergei (00:11:08):

But when we talk with the Russian colleagues, most of them, they are convinced that

Sergei (00:11:15):

So they are ready to continue the war in 2025,

Sergei (00:11:18):

in 2026,

Sergei (00:11:19):

despite new sanctions or more pressure from Europe.

Sergei (00:11:24):

So there is no clear timeline, at least from Russia's perspective.

Sergei (00:11:30):

For example, until December 31st, 2026, they should end the war.

Sergei (00:11:34):

So there is no such timeline for them.

Asbed (00:11:40):

Sergei,

Asbed (00:11:41):

the Alaska summit came on the heels of a meeting in the White House a week before

Asbed (00:11:46):

that, where Pashinyan,

Asbed (00:11:48):

Aliyev,

Asbed (00:11:49):

and Trump put their initials on an agreement for the so-called Trump route,

Asbed (00:11:53):

slicing through Syunik.

Asbed (00:11:55):

Most Western countries congratulated that it was a great agreement,

Asbed (00:12:00):

but the two key stakeholders outside of Armenia and Azerbaijan were Russia and

Asbed (00:12:06):

Iran. And Tehran's response was split,

Asbed (00:12:09):

where the foreign ministry gave a fairly cautious nod saying Iran's interests

Asbed (00:12:14):

appeared to be safeguarded.

Asbed (00:12:17):

But voices close to the supreme leader fired back with stern warnings that Iran

Asbed (00:12:22):

would not permit US troops on its border with Armenia.

Asbed (00:12:25):

Meanwhile, Moscow kept it fairly diplomatic.

Asbed (00:12:28):

And after Pashinyan called Putin after the White House meeting,

Asbed (00:12:32):

Deputy Prime Minister Alexei overtook Wade in and said,

Asbed (00:12:35):

if Armenia thinks that this path is good,

Asbed (00:12:37):

then Russia supports it,

Asbed (00:12:40):

since Armenia is still considered a strategic ally.

Asbed (00:12:44):

But he did remind Yerevan of the cornerstones of its security that it should not ignore.

Asbed (00:12:49):

He said the membership in the Eurasian Economic Union and the Russian base near

Asbed (00:12:54):

Gyumri should be taken into account.

Asbed (00:12:57):

The Russians have also stated that point nine of the November 2020 trilateral

Asbed (00:13:01):

ceasefire agreement is still in force in their view.

Asbed (00:13:05):

And we should remind that point nine of that statement talks about Russian control

Asbed (00:13:11):

of this corridor, whether you call it the Zangezur corridor,

Asbed (00:13:14):

the Trump route or whatever you want to call it.

Asbed (00:13:17):

So were Iran and Russia caught off guard by the Trump route, Sergei?

Sergei (00:13:23):

Obviously, there is a difference when we compare Russia's position and Iranian position.

Sergei (00:13:30):

So for the Iranian side, these developments are much more, let's call it, sensitive.

Sergei (00:13:36):

Because if, for example, the railway connectivity will be restored, it will pass literally

Sergei (00:13:51):

at Armenia-Iran border.

Sergei (00:13:53):

Coming to the initial reaction,

Sergei (00:13:55):

and there is a smooth shift,

Sergei (00:13:59):

because as you mentioned,

Sergei (00:14:01):

initially it was divided,

Sergei (00:14:02):

so we have a conservative win,

Sergei (00:14:04):

mostly affiliated with the Supreme Leader,

Sergei (00:14:07):

Mr. Velayati and Mr.

Sergei (00:14:08):

Harazi's statements that Iran will not tolerate any external presence when it goes

Sergei (00:14:16):

to its borders.

Sergei (00:14:18):

And we had a statement from Mr.

Sergei (00:14:21):

Araghchi and Mr.

Sergei (00:14:22):

Pezeshkian that Armenia was able to mitigate Iranian or nullify Iranian concerns

Sergei (00:14:33):

related to this trip project,

Sergei (00:14:36):

because it will be carried within Armenia,

Sergei (00:14:41):

within all principles,

Sergei (00:14:42):

territorial integrity,

Sergei (00:14:43):

sovereignty,

Sergei (00:14:44):

etc.

Sergei (00:14:45):

But then a few days later, we see that even position of Mr. Pezeshkian has changed.

Sergei (00:14:53):

And now he's in Armenia,

Sergei (00:14:54):

he did a new statement related to this project,

Sergei (00:14:58):

that maybe this is not a good idea to have an external presence.

Sergei (00:15:03):

And now they do not divide.

Sergei (00:15:04):

Is it military or it's civilian presence?

Sergei (00:15:07):

So it's about general US presence in general.

Sergei (00:15:11):

It means that maybe somehow the political,

Sergei (00:15:14):

the reformist blocs narrative was somehow affected with the Supreme Leader's Office

Sergei (00:15:22):

statements.

Sergei (00:15:23):

And plus IRGC,

Sergei (00:15:25):

there were statements from IRGC generals that it's,

Sergei (00:15:29):

again, Iran will not tolerate.

Sergei (00:15:32):

And they tried to find a kind of consensus because we see that there was not at

Sergei (00:15:37):

least consensus on August 9 when they did the statements.

Sergei (00:15:43):

But now we see that Iran is looking for a consensus around this project.

Sergei (00:15:48):

And this consensus is shifting mostly to the in favor of conservative wings narrative.

Sergei (00:15:53):

because the so-called Zangezur corridor for Iran is not about connectivity,

Sergei (00:15:58):

it's not about economic prosperity,

Sergei (00:16:01):

it's about security.

Sergei (00:16:02):

This is why security block is in charge of this possible geopolitical change in the region.

Asbed (00:16:10):

Yeah, we've recently talked to an expert in Iranian affairs.

Asbed (00:16:15):

He also said that basically there's a lot of friction between conservatives and he

Asbed (00:16:21):

called them constructivist inside the Tehran political columns in addressing this

Asbed (00:16:27):

because they perceive this as an effort to encircle or contain Iran and split it

Asbed (00:16:33):

from Russia.

Sergei (00:16:35):

Yeah, and this is the biggest challenge for Iran as far as with the fall of Assad in

Sergei (00:16:40):

Syria,

Sergei (00:16:41):

with the problems with Hezbollah,

Sergei (00:16:44):

with Hamas,

Sergei (00:16:45):

etc.

Sergei (00:16:46):

Iran lost almost its access to Iran.

Sergei (00:16:50):

it's close to be cut from the north and it will be detached from Russia.

Sergei (00:16:57):

And we know that there are problems with the connectivity with the north-south.

Sergei (00:17:01):

There are three routes.

Sergei (00:17:03):

First is Caspian, eastern branch, passing through Central Asia, then Caspian, then western.

Sergei (00:17:09):

Within Caspian, again, there are problems.

Sergei (00:17:11):

For example, Ukraine was able to strike Russian ports in the northern part of Caspian Sea.

Sergei (00:17:18):

there are problems with the level of water in the Caspian Sea, et cetera.

Sergei (00:17:22):

The Western section is mostly about railway connectivity via Azerbaijan.

Sergei (00:17:28):

But as far as we see, there are tensions between Azerbaijan and Russia.

Sergei (00:17:33):

Before that, there were tensions between Azerbaijan and Iran.

Sergei (00:17:35):

So it's risky to put all legs in one basket.

Sergei (00:17:39):

And Armenia is a key alternative as the only Eurasian Union member state bordering

Sergei (00:17:45):

with Iran who signed an FTA agreement with Eurasian economy

Sergei (00:17:48):

So Iran extremely needs this alternative.

Sergei (00:17:52):

And while there is such a scenario that the United States somehow might be deployed

Sergei (00:17:58):

on its northern border,

Sergei (00:18:00):

so that means the economic disaster and security disaster for Iran.

Sergei (00:18:04):

That's why they will

Sergei (00:18:06):

try to mitigate by any cost this challenge.

Sergei (00:18:09):

This is why we have, for example, President Pezeshkian nowadays in Armenia.

Sergei (00:18:17):

Today, as a matter of fact.

Sergei (00:18:19):

Yes.

Sergei (00:18:20):

Obviously, this trip, official visit, was discussed before August 8.

Sergei (00:18:26):

But it's quite important to have Iranian president in Armenia because at least Dr.

Sergei (00:18:34):

Pezeshkian was twice

Sergei (00:18:36):

in Azerbaijan.

Sergei (00:18:39):

And the last time Iranian president paid official visit to Armenia was in 2019.

Sergei (00:18:46):

So it was six years ago for the last time.

Hovik (00:18:49):

Yeah, I was going to say, I was just going to add, notably, it was before the 2020 war, too.

Hovik (00:18:54):

So that should be taken into account.

Hovik (00:18:56):

And also, I wanted to,

Hovik (00:18:57):

a lot of attention was cast by our previous guests on the makeup of the delegation.

Hovik (00:19:04):

We know that Pezeshkian arrived with a pretty high power campaign.

Hovik (00:19:08):

economic and political delegation.

Hovik (00:19:10):

Do you know if the delegation also included military components or military parts?

Sergei (00:19:15):

There is a military official based on official photos from today's meeting with the

Sergei (00:19:24):

expert community and academic community.

Sergei (00:19:27):

There is an advisor on foreign policy, Dr. Sanayi.

Sergei (00:19:31):

He's head of ERA's think tank and

Sergei (00:19:37):

South Caucasus.

Sergei (00:19:40):

It's also,

Sergei (00:19:41):

this delegation includes the business part because,

Sergei (00:19:48):

yes, Armenia is an important neighbor for Iran,

Sergei (00:19:51):

but the problem is based on 2024 data,

Sergei (00:19:53):

our trade trade number is $737 million,

Sergei (00:19:55):

so not so high.

Sergei (00:19:56):

And then from Iran,

Sergei (00:20:08):

to increase until $3 billion within coming years.

Sergei (00:20:15):

It's a really complicated issue, despite Iran signing an FTA with Eurasian Economic Union.

Sergei (00:20:22):

We have some projects with Iran.

Sergei (00:20:24):

Two Iranian companies are engaged in north-south connectivity in the southern part

Sergei (00:20:29):

of Sunni,

Sergei (00:20:30):

from Agarak to Kajaran,

Sergei (00:20:32):

from the Iranian border to Kajaran,

Sergei (00:20:35):

two Iranian companies they construct.

Sergei (00:20:44):

Then we are discussing new gas supplies from Iran within this swap deal, gas and electricity.

Sergei (00:20:54):

So we have something on the agenda, but $737 million is not enough for bilateral trade.

Asbed (00:21:01):

Sergei, was Overture's response a coping mechanism?

Asbed (00:21:04):

Because what are Russia's interests and red lines in this corridor matter?

Sergei (00:21:09):

Russia's stance on Trump deal...

Sergei (00:21:13):

Obviously,

Sergei (00:21:14):

they were very cautious because the processes are taking place and Russia is

Sergei (00:21:19):

completely out.

Sergei (00:21:21):

And not only Russia focused on Ukraine,

Sergei (00:21:25):

there is an important change when we talk about Russia's positions in the South

Sergei (00:21:30):

Caucasus,

Sergei (00:21:32):

tensions in Russia-Azerbaijan relations.

Sergei (00:21:35):

Let me give you an example.

Sergei (00:21:36):

During today's Putin's official visit to Baku in August 2024,

Sergei (00:21:43):

Mr. Lavrov did statement that Armenian sabotage unblocking communications in the

Sergei (00:21:47):

region.

Sergei (00:21:48):

And then there was a tough reaction from Iranian side.

Sergei (00:21:52):

A Russian ambassador was invited to Iran MFA.

Sergei (00:21:57):

Mr. Demircioğlu had a discussion with him explaining Iranian concerns.

Sergei (00:22:05):

ambassador recently appointed to Azerbaijan.

Sergei (00:22:08):

And Russia and Azerbaijan are making reference on Article 9 that Armenia is not

Sergei (00:22:14):

ready to provide this route.

Sergei (00:22:18):

But then,

Sergei (00:22:20):

when tensions in Russia-Azerbaijan relations occurred within this fighter jet,

Sergei (00:22:25):

within this airplane was crashed by Russia's air defense system in late 2024.

Sergei (00:22:31):

We see this escalation did not allow Russia somehow to be engaged in regional affairs.

Sergei (00:22:39):

So Russia has not good relations with Armenia.

Sergei (00:22:42):

Russia-Azerbaijan relations are deteriorating.

Sergei (00:22:45):

So Russia cannot even use a toolkit to be somehow on the agenda.

Asbed (00:22:51):

Yeah, we want to dig a little bit deeper into the Russian-Azerbaijani relations in just a

Asbed (00:22:56):

moment.

Asbed (00:22:57):

Can I ask a question?

Asbed (00:22:59):

Let's continue on this Trump route for just a second,

Asbed (00:23:03):

Sergei,

Asbed (00:23:04):

because Pashinyan has insisted the Washington-endorsed Trump Route safeguards

Asbed (00:23:09):

Armenia's sovereignty and borders.

Asbed (00:23:12):

He says the transit with Azerbaijan is also going to be strictly reciprocal and

Asbed (00:23:16):

every agreement will be balanced,

Asbed (00:23:18):

no strings attached.

Asbed (00:23:20):

Okay, that's what he said.

Asbed (00:23:21):

So the question is, what does Pashinyan mean by using the word reciprocal?

Asbed (00:23:26):

Will Armenians be able to travel through Azerbaijan,

Asbed (00:23:28):

for example,

Asbed (00:23:29):

from Ijevan to Russia or through Nakhijevan to Yerevan in a supposedly unimpeded

Asbed (00:23:35):

manner?

Asbed (00:23:36):

In fact, let me go just a slight provocative level more.

Asbed (00:23:40):

Will they be able to do this without ever seeing an Azeri?

Sergei (00:23:42):

To be honest, I have no idea what...

Sergei (00:23:47):

that Mr.

Sergei (00:23:48):

Pashinyan by reciprocal approach,

Sergei (00:23:51):

because it means that in Nakhijevan,

Sergei (00:23:55):

US-affiliated company also should be deployed in Armenia that want to reach from

Sergei (00:24:03):

Yerevan to Mehri,

Sergei (00:24:06):

for example,

Sergei (00:24:07):

should again have the same unimpeded access as Azerbaijani citizens traveling from

Sergei (00:24:13):

Baku to Nakhijivan.

Sergei (00:24:16):

And if,

Sergei (00:24:17):

as for me,

Sergei (00:24:18):

if there is no US-affiliated organization presence,

Sergei (00:24:23):

and if there is no unimpeded access for Armenians,

Sergei (00:24:27):

it means that there is no reciprocity approach.

Sergei (00:24:32):

That's first.

Sergei (00:24:33):

Second, why there is no reciprocity?

Sergei (00:24:36):

Because in this statement that it was signed,

Sergei (00:24:39):

we see that they were discussing an exclusive approach only

Sergei (00:24:49):

They were not discussing the unblocking all communications in the region.

Sergei (00:24:53):

They were focused on the one communication.

Sergei (00:24:57):

And Armenia will not bear

Sergei (00:25:01):

I mean, it's obvious because some,

Sergei (00:25:04):

let's call them experts,

Sergei (00:25:06):

try to portray that Armenia will benefit by becoming a regional hub because the

Sergei (00:25:13):

connectivity will go from Baku to Meghri,

Sergei (00:25:16):

then Nakhijevan,

Sergei (00:25:17):

then Yerevan,

Sergei (00:25:18):

then Gyumri, then Kars.

Sergei (00:25:20):

But in fact, we have constructing Kars, Nakhijevan, between Azerbaijan and Turkey.

Sergei (00:25:26):

So it means that the connectivity will

Sergei (00:25:28):

run from Baku to Meghri, Nakhijevan, then Kars.

Sergei (00:25:32):

That's right.

Sergei (00:25:33):

The only 42 kilometers of Armenia that will be part of this connectivity project.

Sergei (00:25:40):

Second,

Sergei (00:25:41):

as my colleague,

Sergei (00:25:42):

Waiyad Aftal,

Sergei (00:25:43):

mentioned just recently,

Sergei (00:25:46):

the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway is using only 20% of its capacity.

Sergei (00:25:53):

This is why when we talk about the

Sergei (00:25:57):

so-called middle corridor that's mostly like a bubble because if there is

Sergei (00:26:04):

Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway that use 20% of its capacity,

Sergei (00:26:08):

there is no huge trade turnover between Central Asia and Europe within this middle

Sergei (00:26:14):

corridor and no one is going to spend money to improve its capacity.

Sergei (00:26:20):

So it means that

Sergei (00:26:21):

less goods will be used to transfer something within this Trump project if the

Sergei (00:26:30):

Baku-Tbilisi cars is using less than 50% of its capacity.

Asbed (00:26:35):

What kind of traffic are we talking about over the Trump route that,

Asbed (00:26:38):

for example,

Asbed (00:26:39):

it's not good enough to put it through the Baku-Tbilisi-Gars railway?

Sergei (00:26:44):

You know, it's not even important.

Sergei (00:26:45):

I will explain why.

Sergei (00:26:47):

Because when we talk about connectivity,

Sergei (00:26:50):

or political projects, we should have a kind of feasibility study.

Sergei (00:26:55):

And we'll have a reference point

Sergei (00:26:57):

to show that according to this research,

Sergei (00:27:00):

there will be,

Sergei (00:27:01):

I don't know, tens of thousands of tons of cargo pass via Syunik based on these calculations.

Sergei (00:27:07):

But as far as there are discussions on blocking communication within almost last,

Sergei (00:27:12):

more than the last four years,

Sergei (00:27:15):

and we have zero feasibility study,

Sergei (00:27:18):

it means it's not about economic benefit or integration in a global connectivity

Sergei (00:27:23):

project, et cetera.

Sergei (00:27:24):

It's about geopolitical interests.

Hovik (00:27:26):

Okay.

Hovik (00:27:28):

OK,

Hovik (00:27:30):

I want to take us back to Russia and Azerbaijan because there is some news even

Hovik (00:27:36):

today about it.

Hovik (00:27:38):

But to our listeners, I just want to set the stage.

Hovik (00:27:40):

So over the past month, Russia has zeroed in on Ukraine's energy grid.

Hovik (00:27:45):

This time,

Hovik (00:27:47):

the strikes hit facilities owned by Azerbaijan's SOCAR,

Hovik (00:27:51):

the state-owned company,

Hovik (00:27:53):

the oil and gas company.

Hovik (00:27:55):

just as Azeri gas had begun flowing into Ukraine through the Trans-Balkan pipeline.

Hovik (00:28:01):

And Russian and Azerbaijani relations were already spiraling after the December

Hovik (00:28:07):

2024 crash of the AZAL passenger jet,

Hovik (00:28:11):

as you mentioned,

Hovik (00:28:12):

Sergey.

Hovik (00:28:13):

So two weeks ago,

Hovik (00:28:14):

After that attack,

Hovik (00:28:16):

Aliyev issued a sharp warning to Moscow,

Hovik (00:28:19):

saying that if Russian strikes continued against Azerbaijani assets,

Hovik (00:28:24):

Baku would consider supplying arms to Ukraine.

Hovik (00:28:27):

He framed it as a red line,

Hovik (00:28:29):

saying that Azerbaijan could not stand by while its companies were attacked.

Hovik (00:28:32):

Today,

Hovik (00:28:33):

Russia seems to have answered that threat with force,

Hovik (00:28:36):

launching multiple direct hits on SOCAR oil depots in Odessa and setting off

Hovik (00:28:41):

massive fires.

Hovik (00:28:43):

And of course,

Hovik (00:28:44):

we know what's happening with the South Caucasus in Zangezur,

Hovik (00:28:47):

which as you said, it seems to be intertwined into the Russian-Azerbaijani relationship.

Hovik (00:28:52):

So you continue from here and let us know what are the core reasons why the

Hovik (00:28:56):

Russian-Azerbaijani relationship is tanking and also how it may affect geopolitics

Hovik (00:29:01):

in the South Caucasus.

Sergei (00:29:03):

I think there are different layers in this tension.

Sergei (00:29:08):

First is personal between Aliyev and Putin,

Sergei (00:29:13):

because Aliyev had high expectations from Putin to publicly regret,

Sergei (00:29:20):

expect condolences,

Sergei (00:29:22):

10 times say,

Sergei (00:29:23):

I'm sorry,

Sergei (00:29:24):

etc,

Sergei (00:29:25):

etc, and do it many times in public.

Sergei (00:29:27):

While based on what happened, for example, in November 9,

Sergei (00:29:32):

2020, when Azerbaijan shot down Russia's peacekeeper helicopter in Armenia.

Sergei (00:29:39):

And what happened in September 2023,

Sergei (00:29:41):

when Azerbaijan killed Russian peacekeepers,

Sergei (00:29:44):

including deputy head of command,

Sergei (00:29:46):

based on their phone conversation,

Sergei (00:29:49):

and Ali expressed his regrets,

Sergei (00:29:53):

etc.

Sergei (00:29:54):

I mean, there was a kind of gentleman agreement, how do they solve these problems?

Sergei (00:29:59):

But as far as we see Mr. Aliyev,

Sergei (00:30:05):

So this is some kind of personal problem.

Sergei (00:30:08):

A second layer is bilateral.

Sergei (00:30:12):

Azerbaijan tried to portray itself as a country that shifts from small states to middle power.

Sergei (00:30:20):

This is why Azerbaijan should challenge great states,

Sergei (00:30:23):

great powers like France within this so-called anti-colonial

Sergei (00:30:29):

narrative.

Sergei (00:30:30):

Now, Azerbaijan tries to challenge Russia.

Sergei (00:30:34):

Before that,

Sergei (00:30:35):

I mean, after 2020 war,

Sergei (00:30:36):

Azerbaijan was challenging Iran when there was a terrorist attack against the

Sergei (00:30:42):

Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran,

Sergei (00:30:44):

and Azerbaijan started arrest Iranian citizens,

Sergei (00:30:49):

etc, etc.

Sergei (00:30:50):

And now it's

Sergei (00:30:52):

other region tries to challenge somehow Russia uh again but it's it's not only

Sergei (00:30:57):

about other region because based in June 2021 declaration uh we should also keep

Sergei (00:31:03):

turkey in the mind because it's not only about a region there is a big brother

Hovik (00:31:07):

behind it and the second June 2020 do you mean the Shushi declaration yes yes yes

Sergei (00:31:13):

okay and the second the third layer as i see is the regional war

Sergei (00:31:18):

for Azerbaijan was not able to change the regional configuration with the United

Sergei (00:31:24):

States,

Sergei (00:31:25):

while Azerbaijan didn't have high level of relations with the new administration.

Sergei (00:31:32):

So Azerbaijan was not able to change the configuration in the South Caucasus with

Sergei (00:31:37):

the United States,

Sergei (00:31:38):

while it has good relations with Russia.

Sergei (00:31:41):

So Armenia was able to increase

Sergei (00:31:45):

its level of cooperation with the United States,

Sergei (00:31:47):

yes, with previous administration,

Sergei (00:31:49):

when Armenia signed a charge-run strategic partnership.

Sergei (00:31:52):

And there was a second part of this puzzle missing.

Sergei (00:31:56):

It was Azerbaijan.

Sergei (00:31:57):

So for Azerbaijan, it was important to distance itself from Russia somehow, to have free...

Sergei (00:32:07):

Windsor of opportunity to change the regional configuration as it was with the

Sergei (00:32:13):

participation of the United States.

Sergei (00:32:15):

So there are three different layers, as I see.

Hovik (00:32:18):

Is the Trump Route a symptom or a driver of the degradation of this relationship?

Hovik (00:32:23):

It seems like you're pinning it as a symptom.

Hovik (00:32:25):

And how is Russia exactly reacting to these changes?

Hovik (00:32:30):

Is Russia rethinking its strategy in the South Caucasus in any way?

Sergei (00:32:35):

Obviously this is a symptom because even if we read the Azerbaijani Constitutional

Sergei (00:32:41):

Act,

Sergei (00:32:43):

in the Azerbaijani Constitution there is a reference to this Constitutional Act.

Sergei (00:32:47):

we may say that Azerbaijan is anti-Russian narrative-based as a new country that

Sergei (00:32:55):

emerged after the USSR collapse.

Sergei (00:32:57):

Because if you read the Constitutional Act,

Sergei (00:32:59):

it's written that Azerbaijan was occupied by Russians,

Sergei (00:33:03):

resources were stolen,

Sergei (00:33:05):

etc., etc.

Sergei (00:33:06):

Azerbaijani people were suffering under Soviet occupation before it was Tsar occupation, etc.

Sergei (00:33:12):

So this is a pure anti-Russian narrative-based country.

Sergei (00:33:17):

But Russia didn't pay attention for that because,

Sergei (00:33:19):

I mean, for Russia,

Sergei (00:33:20):

it's not even secondary when it was developing relations with Azerbaijan.

Sergei (00:33:26):

Coming to what is important for Russia now,

Sergei (00:33:29):

as far as I understand,

Sergei (00:33:31):

Russia,

Sergei (00:33:32):

at least some circles in Russia,

Sergei (00:33:35):

they realized that they call it geopolitical conversation failed because from a

Sergei (00:33:41):

Russian perspective,

Sergei (00:33:43):

they tried to replace

Sergei (00:33:44):

pro-Western Armenia by pragmatic Aliyev to become a key Russia's partner in the South Caucasus.

Sergei (00:33:53):

Now they realize that this approach failed and losing Armenia, they lost Azerbaijan.

Sergei (00:34:00):

But now still we see that Russia has almost zero strategy in the South Caucasus.

Sergei (00:34:08):

based on the official statements, based on some expert comments, based on private discussions.

Sergei (00:34:14):

So Russia is waiting when we talk about obviously.

Sergei (00:34:20):

And the key, not concern, but key,

Sergei (00:34:24):

pillar of the argument is let's see what will happen.

Sergei (00:34:29):

Because the same October 8th agreement might be like a November 9th agreement and

Sergei (00:34:35):

all this will not be implemented on the ground.

Sergei (00:34:42):

left on the paper.

Sergei (00:34:44):

And they see that this is a challenge for the United States to do anything.

Sergei (00:34:48):

Because from their perspective,

Sergei (00:34:50):

it will be extremely complicated to implement all the deal on the ground and having

Sergei (00:34:57):

the United States long-term presence in the region.

Sergei (00:35:02):

So it means that they will wait how the situation has changed.

Sergei (00:35:06):

And after the Ukrainian case,

Sergei (00:35:10):

they might be able to even include on the agenda with the United States,

Sergei (00:35:15):

the South Caucasus or Central Asia or some other Eastern European part.

Asbed (00:35:21):

Or Iran, as a matter of fact, because after the 12-day- Iran is on the agenda, yes.

Asbed (00:35:27):

Yeah.

Asbed (00:35:28):

After the 12-day U.S.-Israeli war on Iran,

Asbed (00:35:31):

Moscow was forced to recalibrate its entire regional posture, because this comes

Asbed (00:35:37):

only months after Russia and Iran signed the Comprehensive Strategic Agreement

Asbed (00:35:42):

This was back in January of this year.

Asbed (00:35:45):

And that pact was supposed to lock in long term cooperation on energy,

Asbed (00:35:48):

arms sales,

Asbed (00:35:49):

regional security and all kinds of cooperation.

Asbed (00:35:52):

It was a comprehensive strategic agreement.

Asbed (00:35:56):

Now, suddenly, the Kremlin is facing a dilemma.

Asbed (00:35:59):

how to uphold its commitments and not antagonize other countries,

Asbed (00:36:03):

not come into direct confrontation with countries like Israel and the United

Asbed (00:36:08):

States. How is Russia reshaping its diplomacy with Iran after the war?

Sergei (00:36:13):

For Russia, the 12 days war was a big challenge because

Sergei (00:36:22):

For Russia, it was obvious that Iranian partners will ask them not for economic support,

Sergei (00:36:27):

but for military technical support,

Sergei (00:36:29):

especially with fighter jets and air defense system.

Sergei (00:36:33):

But as far as we understand, Russia was not able to provide all the systems in time.

Sergei (00:36:38):

But based on different OSINT research, we said that Russia sent some air defense systems

Sergei (00:36:44):

that Iran has deployed in Isfahan to secure nuclear facilities.

Sergei (00:36:52):

But obviously this is not enough.

Sergei (00:36:54):

Now the key military technical provider for Iran is China, not Russia.

Sergei (00:37:00):

And maybe it was somehow on Russia-China bilateral agenda when Russia was able to

Sergei (00:37:08):

ask China that based on this agreement,

Sergei (00:37:10):

I should provide some assistance.

Sergei (00:37:11):

But as you see, I'm not able.

Sergei (00:37:13):

If it's okay for you, you may provide assistance to Iran.

Asbed (00:37:18):

So when you say that they were unable, do you attribute that to the Ukraine war again?

Sergei (00:37:23):

Yeah, obviously,

Sergei (00:37:24):

because the sophisticated approach that Ukrainians are using against Russia doesn't

Sergei (00:37:34):

allow Russia to even...

Sergei (00:37:37):

switch off one air defense system.

Sergei (00:37:41):

That might be both in Europe or moreover in the central part of Russia.

Sergei (00:37:48):

So Russia needs much more air defense system because we see that the number of

Sergei (00:37:54):

airstrikes from both sides,

Sergei (00:37:57):

from Ukrainian sides too,

Sergei (00:37:59):

against Russia, it increased.

Sergei (00:38:00):

So it means that Russia's air defense system is not prepared for the increasing

Sergei (00:38:05):

number of Ukrainian strikes.

Sergei (00:38:08):

and Russia was not able,

Sergei (00:38:09):

no, it was able,

Sergei (00:38:10):

but the cost will be higher if they put,

Sergei (00:38:15):

for example,

Sergei (00:38:16):

S-400 under St.

Sergei (00:38:17):

Petersburg, it protects St.

Sergei (00:38:18):

Petersburg, and said to protect S-400.

Sergei (00:38:23):

And I think that that time, at least, they were not ready to pay this price.

Asbed (00:38:30):

If Iran is going to acquire some of these air defense systems from China,

Asbed (00:38:33):

do you think that this is going to be a problem between China and Russia?

Asbed (00:38:37):

Will they be competing or cooperating on these arms sales or,

Asbed (00:38:41):

let's say,

Asbed (00:38:42):

being the number one partner of Iran?

Sergei (00:38:46):

I don't see that this is a problem for Russia because Iran was a military technical

Sergei (00:38:53):

partner for Russia for a long time.

Sergei (00:38:56):

always there were different problems with the S-300 supplies, with SU fighter jet supplies.

Sergei (00:39:02):

So that was problematic.

Sergei (00:39:04):

So this is not Algeria,

Sergei (00:39:05):

for example,

Sergei (00:39:06):

when Algeria is a traditional key Russia's military technical partner and there are

Sergei (00:39:11):

zero problems with it.

Sergei (00:39:13):

And here, so Russia is not going to compete with Iran.

Sergei (00:39:17):

But Russia tries to somehow reshape its stance and its approach in the Middle East.

Sergei (00:39:25):

And maybe some Russia,

Sergei (00:39:29):

Iran game may take place in the Middle East,

Sergei (00:39:33):

because for example,

Sergei (00:39:34):

we see how Syrian officials,

Sergei (00:39:37):

the new jihadi government,

Sergei (00:39:38):

asked Russia to relaunch its patrol in the south,

Sergei (00:39:45):

because they realized that they are not able to do anything with Israel.

Sergei (00:39:49):

And not only Quneitra, but other Syrian provinces

Sergei (00:39:57):

within several weeks and bringing some new external actor because Israel will not

Sergei (00:40:04):

tolerate,

Sergei (00:40:05):

for example,

Sergei (00:40:06):

Turkish presence there.

Sergei (00:40:08):

But Israel is fine with Russia's presence because there is an experience,

Sergei (00:40:13):

there was a big conflict mechanism that was working with Russia and Syria since

Sergei (00:40:22):

2015, 2016.

Sergei (00:40:23):

And Russia is trying to find a kind of new

Sergei (00:40:27):

role in some Middle Eastern cases.

Sergei (00:40:30):

But as far as Russia is out,

Sergei (00:40:33):

for example, from Palestinian agenda,

Sergei (00:40:36):

so we may not talk about Russia's growing position in the region because this is

Sergei (00:40:40):

the key,

Sergei (00:40:41):

the core regional agenda.

Hovik (00:40:46):

Okay.

Hovik (00:40:47):

Thank you, Sergei, for all these questions.

Hovik (00:40:50):

We did a whirlwind through the region, but I want to bring us back to Yerevan.

Hovik (00:40:59):

The new opposition movement,

Hovik (00:41:02):

Our Way,

Hovik (00:41:05):

started by billionaire Samvel Karapetyan,

Hovik (00:41:08):

plans to challenge Nikol Pashinyan in the 2026 elections.

Hovik (00:41:11):

At least that was announced by the movement's

Hovik (00:41:16):

members, including Narek Karapetyan, his nephew, I believe.

Hovik (00:41:21):

The group has distanced itself from former presidents Kocharyan and Sargsyan,

Hovik (00:41:26):

who currently form the main parliamentary opposition.

Hovik (00:41:32):

and instead aims to be a technocratic government.

Hovik (00:41:36):

So despite his detention,

Hovik (00:41:38):

political observers say that Karapetyan retains significant sympathy and influence

Hovik (00:41:42):

among voters who are disillusioned by both the ruling regime and the mainstream

Hovik (00:41:50):

opposition.

Hovik (00:41:51):

There is also speculation that former Prime Minister Karan Karapetyan,

Hovik (00:41:57):

no relation to Samvel,

Hovik (00:41:58):

will also join or lead this new bloc.

Hovik (00:42:01):

So what are your thoughts?

Hovik (00:42:03):

Does the emergence of our way signal a real reshaping of political landscape in Armenia?

Hovik (00:42:12):

Or is it just another recycled opposition project under a new label?

Sergei (00:42:18):

To answer this question, we should have an update in polls.

Sergei (00:42:22):

Because based on last polls, Samvel Karapetyan was completely out because they didn't even

Sergei (00:42:30):

state that they are going to launch their campaign, to have a political party.

Hovik (00:42:37):

Are you talking about the IRI poll?

Hovik (00:42:40):

Yes.

Hovik (00:42:41):

It was conducted before the launching of the party.

Hovik (00:42:45):

Yeah, that was in June, I think.

Sergei (00:42:47):

Yeah. So we need some new, maybe, I mean,

Sergei (00:42:50):

I'm more than convinced that all political parties have their monthly-based polls,

Sergei (00:42:57):

et cetera, but it's not,

Sergei (00:42:58):

I mean,

Sergei (00:42:59):

open access, so we cannot do any kind of reference.

Sergei (00:43:02):

But based on their statements,

Sergei (00:43:04):

I see,

Sergei (00:43:05):

as far as I see,

Sergei (00:43:06):

they try to portray themselves as an alternative,

Sergei (00:43:11):

because now there is a lack of alternative,

Sergei (00:43:13):

based on Iran poll,

Sergei (00:43:15):

when more than 40% of Armenians are not ready to vote for any political party.

Sergei (00:43:20):

So as I said,

Sergei (00:43:21):

they won't try to focus on this 30% of our main citizens that do not want neither

Sergei (00:43:30):

former president nor ruling party.

Sergei (00:43:36):

So they try to be somewhere in the middle.

Sergei (00:43:39):

And here there might be different configurations.

Sergei (00:43:43):

Obviously they will depend on the final results.

Sergei (00:43:49):

Because again, we don't know how the campaign will take place.

Sergei (00:43:52):

Now, obviously many from different circles will blame them that they are completely pro-Russian.

Sergei (00:44:00):

Someone will blame them that they are corrupted.

Sergei (00:44:04):

So they will try to put labels to make them closer to the former presidents to

Sergei (00:44:13):

reduce the level of support.

Sergei (00:44:15):

But as you mentioned, Narek Karapetyan,

Sergei (00:44:18):

He stated that they are not going to run with Sir Sargsyan and with Robert Kocharyan.

Sergei (00:44:26):

So this is the first strong statement that's called this way since the launch of

Sergei (00:44:33):

political campaign.

Sergei (00:44:34):

And there might be different configurations.

Sergei (00:44:37):

There might be different alliances.

Sergei (00:44:39):

It depends who will be in the parliament,

Sergei (00:44:42):

because we have not only ruling party,

Sergei (00:44:46):

former presidents,

Sergei (00:44:47):

and Samvel Karapetyan,

Sergei (00:44:48):

we have also Yevrokve political alliance.

Sergei (00:44:56):

Most probably we will have some new political faces,

Sergei (00:45:00):

but they are well-known serving on different positions in Armenia.

Sergei (00:45:06):

So nobody knows what will happen.

Hovik (00:45:10):

What is your take on Karen Karapetyan?

Hovik (00:45:12):

People are speculating that he might be involved.

Hovik (00:45:15):

I know you deal a lot with Russian circles,

Hovik (00:45:18):

and he's currently in Russia at least,

Hovik (00:45:20):

so you have more context than us in this regard.

Hovik (00:45:24):

Do you think that he might get involved,

Hovik (00:45:26):

and will his presence,

Hovik (00:45:27):

or how will his presence,

Hovik (00:45:30):

because he's seen,

Hovik (00:45:31):

I think, in general as a popular and successful former prime minister,

Hovik (00:45:35):

change the political weight of this new movement.

Sergei (00:45:39):

I may share only those that I heard from our diaspora, I mean both from Russia and from St.

Sergei (00:45:45):

Petersburg.

Sergei (00:45:47):

The key point that I heard from them is Karen Karapetian was very disappointed.

Sergei (00:45:54):

Disappointed because he came,

Sergei (00:45:55):

he moved to Armenia to do something good and actually he did really good things.

Sergei (00:46:03):

starting from the reforms in the legal sphere,

Sergei (00:46:10):

and there were some other reforms that were,

Sergei (00:46:13):

for example,

Sergei (00:46:14):

initiated by USAID,

Sergei (00:46:16):

and then they were imposed for a long time.

Sergei (00:46:18):

So there were a lot of changes during his time, and within this

Sergei (00:46:24):

the so-called revolution.

Sergei (00:46:27):

He was disappointed because the agreements were not respected.

Sergei (00:46:32):

It means that maybe there were some agreements that also included himself.

Sergei (00:46:38):

And he is in a comfort zone now in Russia.

Sergei (00:46:42):

and most probably he would not prefer to go out from the comfort zone and come back to Armenia.

Sergei (00:46:50):

But these are diasporan discussions.

Sergei (00:46:55):

I don't know.

Sergei (00:46:57):

It's obvious that when it comes to Russia, it's not only about the person's decision.

Sergei (00:47:05):

If,

Sergei (00:47:07):

for example,

Sergei (00:47:08):

he will strongly disagree with his participation,

Sergei (00:47:12):

definitely he will not participate.

Sergei (00:47:14):

But if he will be under discussion,

Sergei (00:47:19):

etc., but then he will be green-lighted,

Sergei (00:47:23):

let's call it, from the decision-making center,

Sergei (00:47:26):

then, I mean, he will come.

Sergei (00:47:28):

So there are different factors that may affect on his decisions.

Hovik (00:47:31):

Yeah, because obviously Samvel Karapetyan himself cannot run yet because he's in detention.

Hovik (00:47:39):

And if Pashinyan has his way, many say he would remain in detention.

Hovik (00:47:43):

So do you see this arrest of Karapetyan,

Hovik (00:47:47):

Samvel Karapetyan in this case,

Hovik (00:47:49):

and the campaign against the church as Pashinyan's way of keeping power in 2026?

Hovik (00:47:54):

And if not Karapetyan,

Hovik (00:47:57):

If not Karen Karapetyan, then who else would need to be involved?

Hovik (00:48:01):

Or what else would need to change?

Hovik (00:48:03):

Some say that the repressions will only increase.

Sergei (00:48:06):

As I see, this is a part of a big, larger agreement with Turkey and with Azerbaijan.

Sergei (00:48:17):

That includes different, let's call, files.

Sergei (00:48:19):

It includes Artsakh file,

Sergei (00:48:22):

it includes Church file,

Sergei (00:48:23):

it includes the so-called revanchist file,

Sergei (00:48:26):

etc, etc.

Sergei (00:48:27):

And Armenia's government now try to demonstrate that there is a political will to

Sergei (00:48:36):

reach peace by any cost.

Sergei (00:48:38):

And this is very controversial based on the initial peace agreement.

Sergei (00:48:45):

Because based on this peace agreement,

Sergei (00:48:47):

Azerbaijan should not interfere in Armenian domestic affairs.

Sergei (00:48:51):

But by Azerbaijan's demand, Armenia is going to change the constitution.

Sergei (00:48:56):

And we see that,

Sergei (00:48:57):

again, by Azerbaijani demand and maybe by Turkey demand,

Sergei (00:49:01):

we see the campaign against Church because the timeline is important.

Sergei (00:49:07):

Church stated that Nikol Pashinyan should resign right after the war.

Sergei (00:49:12):

So why,

Sergei (00:49:13):

for example, right after elections from June 2021,

Sergei (00:49:17):

there was not campaign against Church?

Sergei (00:49:19):

Because if we pay attention to the timeline,

Sergei (00:49:22):

we see that there are many coincidences within meetings and decisions of

Sergei (00:49:27):

preliminary agreements between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Sergei (00:49:30):

So for Armenian government,

Sergei (00:49:31):

it's important to demonstrate that Armenia is fully committed to this process.

Sergei (00:49:36):

Armenia will do everything needed to nullify any possible disagreement

Sergei (00:49:45):

For Armenian government, it's important to have consensus among larger society within Armenia.

Sergei (00:49:52):

So they pay less attention to diaspora.

Sergei (00:49:54):

They try to detach diaspora from Armenia because for diaspora, it doesn't matter.

Sergei (00:50:00):

Is it US diaspora or Russian diaspora?

Sergei (00:50:03):

Because in many, I mean, most cases, Russian and American diaspora, they're on the same page.

Sergei (00:50:11):

when it comes to Artsakh,

Sergei (00:50:12):

when it comes to church,

Sergei (00:50:14):

when it comes to concessions,

Sergei (00:50:16):

et cetera, et cetera.

Sergei (00:50:17):

So this way,

Sergei (00:50:18):

as I see, there is a detachment process of Armenia from diaspora,

Sergei (00:50:22):

and they put many efforts to have a consensus that does not include

Sergei (00:50:29):

somehow are self-fired.

Sergei (00:50:32):

And during today's press conference,

Sergei (00:50:35):

Prime Minister Pashinyan literally stated about that,

Sergei (00:50:37):

that we should forget about it if we want peace.

Sergei (00:50:40):

And then he stated that there are territories under Armenia control,

Sergei (00:50:45):

but they should be under Azerbaijan sovereignty.

Sergei (00:50:48):

It means that most probably the next step forward is the

Sergei (00:50:54):

but maybe some new decision with the so-called enclaves.

Asbed (00:50:59):

More handovers, more concessions?

Sergei (00:51:02):

This process is based on the later concessions.

Sergei (00:51:06):

There is no other modus

Sergei (00:51:09):

how the peace may be reached,

Sergei (00:51:11):

because we see that every year Armenia is doing concession,

Sergei (00:51:14):

concession by concession.

Asbed (00:51:15):

And that is what's needed.

Asbed (00:51:17):

I mean, that's why a change is needed in the Armenian government,

Asbed (00:51:20):

because as this government negotiates,

Asbed (00:51:23):

it doesn't really negotiate.

Asbed (00:51:24):

They're just unilateral handovers to the other side.

Sergei (00:51:28):

You know, based on these agreements, we have expectations, but Azerbaijan has benefits.

Sergei (00:51:34):

Let me give you an example.

Sergei (00:51:36):

Washington summit, August 8th, what did Azerbaijan get from this statement?

Sergei (00:51:43):

International recognition of unimpeded access from Azerbaijan to Nakhijevan.

Sergei (00:51:48):

So there is one paper from November 9th, now they have one more paper.

Sergei (00:51:52):

So there is an international consensus that this connectivity should have,

Sergei (00:51:58):

and this should be unimpeded access.

Sergei (00:52:01):

Point number two, Azerbaijan got a waiver of Section 907.

Sergei (00:52:07):

They were struggling for all this time to reach this goal.

Asbed (00:52:14):

Let me insert one thing, that that is not entirely up to Trump to do.

Asbed (00:52:19):

That's going to go to Congress,

Asbed (00:52:20):

and Congress will have to agree with it because that was not an executive.

Hovik (00:52:24):

No, the waiver is Trump's authority.

Asbed (00:52:27):

Well, Trump has the authority to waive it.

Asbed (00:52:31):

uh and one year at a time yeah which is what he got one year at a time so if he

Asbed (00:52:35):

wants to completely cancel the Section 907 thing so that he doesn't have to deal

Asbed (00:52:39):

with it anymore not for his uh the rest of his term or forever then it's going to

Hovik (00:52:44):

have to go to the house no but but what i mean is like every year uh since uh

Hovik (00:52:50):

almost since Section 907 has been in place successive presidents have waived that

Hovik (00:52:55):

until 2020 or 2021 right when um

Hovik (00:53:00):

when Biden decided not to waive it, or maybe it was 2023.

Hovik (00:53:05):

So the only gap has been that,

Hovik (00:53:07):

and Trump has essentially restarted the waiver process continuously.

Hovik (00:53:11):

So it seems like I don't know if even removing or striking Section 907 is even on the agenda.

Hovik (00:53:20):

They don't need that.

Sergei (00:53:22):

So my point was that Azerbaijan has concrete benefits within agreements,

Sergei (00:53:29):

while we have expectations.

Sergei (00:53:31):

So based on our analysis,

Sergei (00:53:33):

it's obvious that this agreement will reduce the probability of escalation until

Sergei (00:53:39):

the June 2026 elections.

Sergei (00:53:42):

So that's something good for me.

Sergei (00:53:46):

What else is good?

Sergei (00:53:47):

Maybe this connectivity agreement

Sergei (00:53:51):

somehow will allow to open the Armenian-Turkish border.

Sergei (00:53:57):

But this is, again, this is discussable.

Sergei (00:53:59):

Is it beneficial or it's a challenge for Armenia?

Sergei (00:54:04):

So, I mean, we do not have clear benefits.

Sergei (00:54:09):

We have only expectations that one day peace will be signed.

Sergei (00:54:13):

The aggression is not canceled.

Sergei (00:54:15):

It's just postponed.

Sergei (00:54:17):

While Azerbaijan has, like, changed on the ground.

Sergei (00:54:21):

And the next change,

Sergei (00:54:22):

obviously,

Sergei (00:54:23):

will be connected with the enclaves and with the Armenian constitution.

Sergei (00:54:29):

This is all that we have.

Asbed (00:54:31):

Okay, thank you.

Asbed (00:54:33):

Just a quick note, Hovig,

Asbed (00:54:34):

you were talking about Karapetyan,

Asbed (00:54:35):

and I guess when it comes to talking about the new movement called Our Way,

Asbed (00:54:40):

Mer Dzevov,

Asbed (00:54:42):

you have to keep your Karapetyans straight.

Asbed (00:54:44):

It seems like everybody is Karapetyan.

Asbed (00:54:46):

There's Samvel Karapetyan,

Asbed (00:54:48):

Narek Karapetyan,

Asbed (00:54:49):

and we have Karen Karapetyan who is not related to them.

Asbed (00:54:52):

So I hope that people who have to join this movement don't have to change their

Asbed (00:54:56):

names to Garabedian.

Asbed (00:54:57):

So on top of that,

Hovik (00:55:05):

Karabetyan obviously is a very popular Armenian last name,

Hovik (00:55:09):

but also the first name,

Hovik (00:55:10):

Samvel,

Hovik (00:55:11):

Narek,

Hovik (00:55:12):

and Karen are also probably in the top five of the first names.

Hovik (00:55:16):

Good luck searching for that, yeah.

Hovik (00:55:21):

It's like John and Smith, last names almost.

Hovik (00:55:24):

But yeah, we now have to pay attention because there are more Karapetyans to talk about.

Asbed (00:55:31):

All right.

Asbed (00:55:32):

Well, more coming on that topic, but let's wrap up for today.

Asbed (00:55:36):

We've run out of time.

Asbed (00:55:37):

I'd like to ask each of you,

Asbed (00:55:38):

Sergei,

Asbed (00:55:39):

Hovig,

Asbed (00:55:40):

if there are things on your mind that you would like to share with our audience.

Asbed (00:55:43):

Let's start with you, Sergei.

Sergei (00:55:45):

I think we should understand that Azerbaijan is not ready for peace.

Sergei (00:55:50):

until we have a conflict agenda.

Sergei (00:55:53):

While Azerbaijan did not solve these issues,

Sergei (00:55:56):

the following list of issues,

Sergei (00:56:00):

we may argue that Azerbaijan is not interested in peace.

Sergei (00:56:03):

First, the so-called Western Azerbaijan agenda.

Sergei (00:56:08):

So this is a rare fascist,

Sergei (00:56:09):

Azerbaijani geopolitical ambitious agenda to replace Armenia by Western Azerbaijan.

Sergei (00:56:17):

Second, we have still prisoners in Bangkok.

Sergei (00:56:21):

So if we have prisoners, it means that still conflict is on the agenda.

Sergei (00:56:28):

Then,

Sergei (00:56:29):

if Azerbaijan is really committed to peace,

Sergei (00:56:35):

there should be recognized the rights of Artsakhtsi Armenians.

Sergei (00:56:41):

So Azerbaijan should pay attention that there was an ethnic cleansing.

Sergei (00:56:47):

And Azerbaijan should find a kind of solution what it may do within this process.

Sergei (00:56:54):

So we have at least three issues on the agenda.

Sergei (00:56:58):

So-called Western Azerbaijan,

Sergei (00:56:59):

prisoners in Baku,

Sergei (00:57:01):

and we have ethnic cleansing conducted in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Sergei (00:57:06):

And for Azerbaijan, all three issues are out of the so-called peace deal.

Asbed (00:57:12):

Thank you, Sergei.

Asbed (00:57:13):

What's on your mind, Hovigk?

Hovik (00:57:16):

I would like to continue on that topic because I think that many,

Hovik (00:57:20):

of course,

Hovik (00:57:21):

are celebrating and congratulating Armenia and Azerbaijan,

Hovik (00:57:25):

even Western-funded,

Hovik (00:57:28):

foreign agent-controlled news sources in Armenia.

Hovik (00:57:33):

Meanwhile, many are just overlooking this simple component.

Hovik (00:57:35):

If Azerbaijan was truly interested in peace,

Hovik (00:57:38):

it would not set a precondition that is almost guaranteed to fail.

Hovik (00:57:41):

The precondition I'm talking about is the change in Armenia's constitution.

Hovik (00:57:45):

which requires,

Hovik (00:57:46):

depending on how you calculate the number of voters in Armenia,

Hovik (00:57:49):

it requires 700,000 people to show up.

Hovik (00:57:53):

That would mean that if the turnout is only 700,000,

Hovik (00:57:57):

it would have to have 100% yes vote in order for the Armenian constitution to

Hovik (00:58:02):

change.

Hovik (00:58:03):

That will never happen.

Hovik (00:58:05):

now you can think okay how is Azerbaijan going to motivate or how is Pashinyan

Hovik (00:58:10):

under Azerbaijan's guidance going to motivate maybe two million Armenians to come

Hovik (00:58:15):

to the polling booth so that maybe

Hovik (00:58:18):

I don't know, like 30% or 40% or 50% of them would vote yes.

Hovik (00:58:21):

Because I believe besides just meeting quorum, there would have to be a 50% or 25%.

Hovik (00:58:26):

I forget the exact.

Hovik (00:58:28):

Maybe Sergei would know.

Hovik (00:58:29):

But in any case,

Hovik (00:58:30):

it is a huge number of people that would have to vote yes on the Armenian

Hovik (00:58:33):

constitution.

Hovik (00:58:34):

600.

Asbed (00:58:34):

Yeah, 600,000.

Hovik (00:58:39):

That's never going to happen.

Hovik (00:58:41):

So Azerbaijan basically has guaranteed that a peace treaty will never happen as

Hovik (00:58:45):

long as its preconditions remain.

Hovik (00:58:47):

And as far as I know, Azerbaijan has doubled down on its preconditions and not pulled them back.

Asbed (00:58:53):

Okay.

Asbed (00:58:54):

Thank you both for your thoughts.

Asbed (00:58:56):

That was it for today.

Asbed (00:58:57):

Thank you very much for joining us, Sergei.

Asbed (00:59:00):

We hope to talk with you soon.

Sergei (00:59:02):

Thank you. It's always a pleasure to see you.

Asbed (00:59:04):

We appreciate your time and insight.

Hovik (00:59:06):

Thank you, Sergei.

Asbed (00:59:13):

Hovik, are we going to do a kitchen sink today?

Hovik (00:59:16):

Well, I noticed we've been skipping the kitchen sink.

Hovik (00:59:18):

So of course we are,

Hovik (00:59:20):

because there is no shortage of stories that are too hot,

Hovik (00:59:24):

too weird,

Hovik (00:59:25):

or just too corrupt to leave out.

Hovik (00:59:28):

And I feel that we've been more politically correct than necessary recently.

Hovik (00:59:33):

So this is also our opportunity to be more unhinged and more politically incorrect

Hovik (00:59:38):

as we talk about these stories.

Hovik (00:59:40):

All right. Well, what's on your mind then?

Hovik (00:59:42):

So let's talk about our favorite, favorite character in Armenia.

Hovik (00:59:47):

Of course, besides Nikol Pashinyan is Tigran Avinyan, the mayor of Yerevan.

Hovik (00:59:53):

So for years the Pashinyan government has hammered away at Seyran Ohanyan's Lake

Hovik (00:59:58):

Sevan property only when it's convenient to do so and brushing it under the carpet

Hovik (01:00:03):

at other times.

Hovik (01:00:05):

And it has paraded this property as proof that the old guard enriched itself while

Hovik (01:00:10):

ordinary Armenians struggled.

Hovik (01:00:12):

But there is another Lake Sevan property.

Hovik (01:00:14):

Actually, there are hundreds, but this one seems to be garnering less of the regime's attention.

Hovik (01:00:19):

But the second property doesn't belong to an opposition politician.

Hovik (01:00:24):

It belongs to one of Pashinyan's lieutenants, Tigran Avignon, or his family, to be more precise.

Hovik (01:00:32):

Tigran Avignon's father, Armin Avignon, to be even more precise.

Hovik (01:00:35):

It is complete with swimming pools,

Hovik (01:00:38):

auxiliary buildings,

Hovik (01:00:39):

and even solar panel structures and so forth.

Hovik (01:00:42):

This HETC investigation, which we'll link to, is pretty extensive.

Hovik (01:00:48):

So, you know, we'll just leave it for your further investigation in the show notes.

Hovik (01:00:53):

Just to say that not all Lake Sevan properties are created equal.

Asbed (01:00:57):

Some are... And not all of them belong to opposition members.

Hovik (01:01:00):

Exactly.

Hovik (01:01:01):

Exactly.

Asbed (01:01:02):

Hovig,

Asbed (01:01:03):

I wanted to talk a little bit about the case of the persecution of Archbishop

Asbed (01:01:08):

Bagrat Galstanyan.

Asbed (01:01:09):

The trial has now reached a stage where some of the evidence can be publicized,

Asbed (01:01:14):

and the Srbazan's team released an unedited version of the audio recording a few

Asbed (01:01:19):

weeks back that you recall.

Asbed (01:01:21):

It went viral on civil contract botnets and stuff like that.

Asbed (01:01:26):

Well, Srbazan denounced the proceedings as fake.

Asbed (01:01:30):

We'll provide the links in the show notes.

Asbed (01:01:33):

Dismissing the charges as political theater.

Asbed (01:01:36):

And critics argue that the case underscores the Pashinyan administration's campaign

Asbed (01:01:40):

against the Armenian Apostolic Church,

Asbed (01:01:43):

while supporters insist it is about holding clerics accountable under the law.

Asbed (01:01:48):

In fact, let me just add one more thing.

Asbed (01:01:50):

This has become a theme everywhere.

Asbed (01:01:52):

You see these...

Asbed (01:01:54):

You know, bought people or paid off people or whatever who come and they all have the same

Asbed (01:01:59):

language suddenly.

Asbed (01:02:00):

While Pashinyan was going against the church and they saw that Pashinyan has

Asbed (01:02:05):

absolutely nothing to do with the church,

Asbed (01:02:06):

has no jurisdiction over the church.

Asbed (01:02:08):

Now they're saying everybody's on the same page saying,

Asbed (01:02:11):

oh, it's the people that they're going after,

Asbed (01:02:13):

not the church itself.

Hovik (01:02:15):

Yeah. Yeah.

Hovik (01:02:16):

And before I go on,

Hovik (01:02:18):

I just want to also mention that the senior investigative committee official in

Hovik (01:02:23):

charge of prosecuting all of these opposition figures,

Hovik (01:02:25):

whether it's Bagrat Srbazan,

Hovik (01:02:28):

Mikayel Ajabahyan,

Hovik (01:02:29):

but also Billionaire Samvel Karapetyan,

Hovik (01:02:31):

has like a week or so,

Hovik (01:02:33):

or maybe two weeks ago,

Hovik (01:02:34):

suddenly resigned.

Hovik (01:02:36):

But coming back to the substance of what you said,

Hovik (01:02:39):

Aspet,

Hovik (01:02:40):

I want to highlight how ridiculous this is,

Hovik (01:02:42):

because this is being painted not just as,

Hovik (01:02:45):

you know,

Hovik (01:02:46):

formers and so forth, but it's also being painted as Bagrat Srbazan being a pro-Russian politician,

Hovik (01:02:52):

even though there's not a shred of evidence of doing that.

Hovik (01:02:56):

And one of the sort of media...

Hovik (01:03:00):

that is one of the forum-funded media in Armenia.

Hovik (01:03:04):

The name sounds like it rhymes with botnet or something.

Hovik (01:03:09):

It has net in the end.

Hovik (01:03:10):

One of the columnists for that media said,

Hovik (01:03:13):

you know, yeah,

Hovik (01:03:14):

Pashinyan is cracking down on the opposition,

Hovik (01:03:17):

but if you look at the details of that case,

Hovik (01:03:19):

there's probably something there.

Hovik (01:03:21):

so the details are out the audio investigation has been released and it's

Hovik (01:03:27):

completely completely edited in such a way to present it as him plotting a

Hovik (01:03:33):

revolution where it's just like you know discussion with his supporters and in one

Hovik (01:03:37):

of those discussions he i believe let's say i'm going to rephrase it and say what's

Hovik (01:03:41):

your thoughts on criminal uh on on capital punishment right and you know if you're

Hovik (01:03:45):

in favor of capital punishment

Hovik (01:03:47):

then you're plotting a revolution.

Hovik (01:03:48):

That's basically the logical chain that the Armenian government has followed,

Hovik (01:03:53):

but it's not just a logical chain,

Hovik (01:03:55):

it's actually the conversation has been edited in that manner.

Hovik (01:03:58):

If you listen to it the first time, you think, wow, there's something very serious here.

Hovik (01:04:03):

They're talking about shooting people,

Hovik (01:04:04):

but imagine those things can be recorded in any conversation among ordinary people,

Hovik (01:04:10):

right?

Hovik (01:04:11):

I mean, people are upset with the government, and you just imagine taking pieces out of that and

Hovik (01:04:17):

putting them together in such a way that it makes it very incriminating evidence.

Hovik (01:04:21):

Obviously, this case is going to go nowhere, I guarantee it.

Hovik (01:04:24):

But this government is going to write out as much as it can from it.

Hovik (01:04:29):

And the main goal is to keep Bagrat Srbazan,

Hovik (01:04:31):

Archbishop Mikayel Ajapahyan,

Hovik (01:04:33):

and Samvel Karapetyan in jail,

Hovik (01:04:35):

however much they can.

Asbed (01:04:37):

Well, this is the kind of editing that Sergei Eisenstein would be very proud of.

Hovik (01:04:42):

Yeah.

Asbed (01:04:43):

What else is on your mind?

Hovik (01:04:45):

Okay, another thing that I want to turn your attention to is the infamous Azerbaijani

Hovik (01:04:50):

laundromat.

Hovik (01:04:52):

You know,

Hovik (01:04:53):

ever since Aliyev not only was able to start an illegal war against Armenia without

Hovik (01:05:00):

a peep from the world,

Hovik (01:05:01):

Aliyev was able to ethnically cleanse Artsakh without a peep.

Hovik (01:05:05):

So this seems to be very minor.

Hovik (01:05:07):

But we should note that

Hovik (01:05:09):

The way that Ali have achieved success partly is through buying off politicians.

Hovik (01:05:14):

This is what the Azerbaijani laundromat was about.

Hovik (01:05:19):

There have been many European politicians that have been implicated in this laundromat.

Hovik (01:05:25):

They've been paid off to promote and support pro-Azerbaijani and anti-Armenian positions.

Hovik (01:05:33):

And one of those people was Eduard Lintner.

Hovik (01:05:36):

former member of Bundestag,

Hovik (01:05:38):

who was found guilty of getting nearly 4 million euros from Azeri sources.

Hovik (01:05:44):

And he provided various services for that money,

Hovik (01:05:48):

including voting on pro-Azerbaijani measures in the European Parliament.

Hovik (01:05:53):

But what's even more interesting is that after all these years of prosecution and

Hovik (01:05:59):

court trials...

Hovik (01:06:00):

What was his sentence?

Hovik (01:06:02):

Nine months in prison,

Hovik (01:06:03):

Fully suspended.

Asbed (01:06:04):

You know,

Asbed (01:06:06):

I know that most people would trade nine months of their lives for $4 million

Asbed (01:06:11):

because that's money well earned.

Asbed (01:06:15):

Then they get off and they're scot-free.

Hovik (01:06:17):

People would commit crimes with a life sentence for that money as long as their family would be.

Hovik (01:06:22):

Absolutely. I mean, yeah.

Hovik (01:06:23):

So to me, this seems more like a endorsement of this kind of activity.

Asbed (01:06:29):

Absolutely.

Asbed (01:06:30):

It says basically this is good business.

Hovik (01:06:31):

It's not even a slap on the wrist.

Hovik (01:06:32):

Yeah.

Hovik (01:06:33):

Continue doing what you're doing, European politicians.

Asbed (01:06:36):

You want more information about good business?

Asbed (01:06:40):

Well, last week,

Asbed (01:06:41):

Armenia's government announced that it would sell its 20% stake in Viva Armenia.

Asbed (01:06:47):

These shares were acquired under highly questionable circumstances in January 2024,

Asbed (01:06:53):

when Fedilco Group Limited donated them to the government.

Asbed (01:06:58):

And this came at a time when in 2024, it almost...

Asbed (01:07:01):

I mean, it was very surprising to see so many corporations that were having problems with

Asbed (01:07:06):

the Armenian government suddenly deciding to donate 12%,

Asbed (01:07:10):

20% of their overall shares,

Asbed (01:07:12):

basically a stake in the company to the Armenian government.

Asbed (01:07:15):

And everybody was mystified.

Asbed (01:07:16):

It's like, oh, what is it?

Asbed (01:07:18):

Suddenly we become all altruistic and deciding to give it to them.

Asbed (01:07:23):

That became a pattern.

Asbed (01:07:24):

Well,

Asbed (01:07:26):

One of the reasons I think that this one happened was because telco was considered

Asbed (01:07:31):

critical in national security infrastructure.

Asbed (01:07:34):

And Pashinyan, I think,

Asbed (01:07:35):

went on the air and announced that if that was the case,

Asbed (01:07:38):

then Armenia should have a presence at the table,

Asbed (01:07:41):

should have a say in this critical infrastructure.

Asbed (01:07:45):

Well, now they've unceremoniously sold it.

Asbed (01:07:50):

Or I think I saw the amount was like $50 million, but I'd have to check that again.

Asbed (01:07:55):

There have been so many of these things that all those announcements were made,

Asbed (01:07:59):

all those justifications were brought forward,

Asbed (01:08:01):

and then suddenly the government sells it back for money.

Asbed (01:08:05):

What do you think?

Hovik (01:08:06):

I mean, I can't add anything else other than even today when we're talking about

Hovik (01:08:11):

nationalizing the assets or nationalizing the electric networks of Armenia.

Hovik (01:08:17):

The argument is being brought forward that it's Armenia's strategic infrastructure,

Hovik (01:08:23):

critical infrastructure,

Hovik (01:08:25):

Armenian government should have a stake,

Hovik (01:08:27):

but what's in reality going to happen is that

Hovik (01:08:30):

property is going to be resold.

Hovik (01:08:34):

I'm sure that people are getting rich while doing this as well,

Hovik (01:08:37):

but for political expediency as well.

Hovik (01:08:40):

So when Pashinyan essentially almost forced Russia's MTS, I would say,

Asbed (01:08:50):

yeah if it wanted to continue doing business in armenia then you have to relinquish

Hovik (01:08:54):

20% shares to the armenian government well uh what happened was it forced MTS to

Hovik (01:08:59):

sell its shares through various different persecutions you know investigations and

Hovik (01:09:04):

so forth so harassment and then after that the new company that acquired the phone

Hovik (01:09:09):

network gave part of its shares to the Armenian government so amazing how that

Hovik (01:09:12):

works and then

Hovik (01:09:14):

Just like that, you know, now the Armenian government ends up selling it.

Asbed (01:09:18):

Yeah.

Asbed (01:09:19):

Other companies, Zangezur,

Asbed (01:09:20):

Molybdenum Combine and the Amulsar Gold Mine,

Asbed (01:09:24):

which almost came to fruition back in,

Asbed (01:09:26):

what was it,

Asbed (01:09:28):

2017, 2018.

Asbed (01:09:29):

And then eco-activists suddenly stopped this whole thing for,

Asbed (01:09:32):

I guess, now for about 7 or 8 years.

Asbed (01:09:34):

But then it was allowed to restart this project.

Asbed (01:09:39):

Yeah. Of course, with a certain number of the shares transferred to the government of Armenia.

Hovik (01:09:45):

And most of those eco-activists are now part of the government in Armenia.

Asbed (01:09:48):

Ministers of government.

Asbed (01:09:50):

But let me also add,

Asbed (01:09:52):

even if all of the money,

Asbed (01:09:54):

the $50 million or whatever,

Asbed (01:09:55):

hundreds of millions of dollars,

Asbed (01:09:57):

eventually make their way to the Armenian treasury,

Asbed (01:09:59):

these deals are being brokered and somebody's making a lot of money in the middle.

Asbed (01:10:04):

And guess who would be making the money?

Asbed (01:10:06):

Exactly.

Asbed (01:10:07):

I have one final item, I guess.

Asbed (01:10:09):

We can talk about Pashinyan and indecent language.

Asbed (01:10:12):

Most people will be going, it's like, what?

Asbed (01:10:14):

Really?

Asbed (01:10:15):

Something like that? Well,

Asbed (01:10:17):

Armenia's anti-corruption committee has found that Nikol Pashinyan is in breach of

Asbed (01:10:21):

ethics after reviewing public complaints that he used very bad words,

Asbed (01:10:27):

the F word,

Asbed (01:10:28):

but we can't say that on Groong because we're a family-friendly show.

Asbed (01:10:32):

So he used it in social media and an opposition claim that he called a political

Asbed (01:10:36):

opponent a scumbag during a parliamentary debate was found to be true.

Asbed (01:10:42):

What do you think he's going to get for this?

Asbed (01:10:44):

Pretrial detention?

Asbed (01:10:46):

Years in prison?

Hovik (01:10:47):

Speaking about things that are against,

Hovik (01:10:52):

you know, that are potentially criminal in nature,

Hovik (01:10:54):

he has multiple times said,

Hovik (01:10:55):

you know,

Hovik (01:10:56):

if I ever do something wrong,

Hovik (01:10:57):

you can cut off my hands and other gory things.

Hovik (01:11:00):

You can put me under a firing squad.

Hovik (01:11:03):

You can shoot me.

Hovik (01:11:04):

And he always uses this gory, violent language.

Hovik (01:11:08):

But I bet he'll get none of that.

Hovik (01:11:10):

Probably even something better than European parliamentarians get for being,

Hovik (01:11:14):

you know, on the Azerbaijani payroll.

Hovik (01:11:16):

Right.

Asbed (01:11:16):

That's right.

Asbed (01:11:17):

But that's all I have.

Asbed (01:11:19):

Anything else?

Hovik (01:11:20):

Yeah, that's all.

Hovik (01:11:22):

Is this not enough?

Hovik (01:11:23):

Are you not entertained, Asbed?

Asbed (01:11:25):

Oh, if this is all the corruption that there is in Armenia, I think it's doing fine.

Asbed (01:11:29):

But this is just the tip of the iceberg, as they say.

Hovik (01:11:33):

In reality, we had to cut a lot from this section because it's been several weeks since we've

Hovik (01:11:38):

done the kitchen sink.

Hovik (01:11:40):

And Asbed gets really upset when we lengthen the show too much.

Asbed (01:11:

43) I do.

Asbed (01:11:44):

This is already going to an hour and whatever.

Asbed (01:11:46):

I don't even know, an hour and 20 minutes.

Asbed (01:11:49):

I like the shows under an hour.

Asbed (01:11:51):

And well, maybe we should eventually separate these and we'll have a kitchen sink playlist.

Hovik (01:11:57):

Let us know what you think about our shows.

Hovik (01:12:00):

Because I keep telling us that our listeners don't mind us having long shows,

Hovik (01:12:04):

but he seems to disagree.

Hovik (01:12:05):

So let us know what you think.

Asbed (01:12:07):

Yeah, tell us.

Asbed (01:12:08):

We don't have to guess at what you're thinking.

Asbed (01:12:10):

Tell us about it.

Hovik (01:12:11):

Yeah, exactly.

Asbed (01:12:13):

Okay, folks.

Asbed (01:12:14):

Well, that was our Week in Review show recorded on August 18, 2025.

Asbed (01:12:19):

Earlier in the show,

Asbed (01:12:20):

we were talking with Dr.

Asbed (01:12:21):

Sergei Melkonian,

Asbed (01:12:22):

who is currently a research fellow at APRI Armenia,

Asbed (01:12:25):

a Yerevan-based think tank.

Asbed (01:12:27):

He served as assistant to president of Armenia,

Asbed (01:12:29):

Armen Sarkisian,

Asbed (01:12:30):

on foreign policy matters for the Middle East and post-Soviet space.

Asbed (01:12:35):

Sergei is also a guest lecturer at Yerevan State University and the Russian Armenian University.

Hovik (01:12:40):

Just one more thing, please find us on social media.

Hovik (01:12:42):

And if you haven't subscribed,

Hovik (01:12:44):

like,

Hovik (01:12:45):

share and subscribe,

Hovik (01:12:46):

obviously,

Hovik (01:12:47):

to us so that we can get in front of many more eyes.

Hovik (01:12:52):

I'm Hovik Manucharyan from Yerevan.

Asbed (01:12:54):

And I'm Asbed Bedrossian in Los Angeles.

Asbed (01:12:56):

We'll talk to you next week.

Hovik (01:12:57):

Bye-bye.

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