Armenian News Network - Groong: Week In Review Podcast

Dmitry Suslov - War, Leverage, and Corridors, Russia’s View from All Fronts | Ep 534, Apr 25, 2026

• Armenian News Network / Groong • Episode 534

Share episode

Use Left/Right to seek, Home/End to jump to start or end. Hold shift to jump forward or backward.

0:00 | 1:10:08

Conversations on Groong - April 25, 2026

In this episode of the Groong podcast, we speak with Dr. Dmitry Suslov about the shifting geopolitical landscape across the Iran war, the Ukraine conflict, and the South Caucasus. We examine the fragile state of the Iran war and its impact on global trade and regional escalation, Russia’s strategic positioning, and the potential for a broader conflict involving Azerbaijan and Turkey. The discussion then turns to the Ukraine war, focusing on attrition, Europe’s growing militarization, and the prospects for a long-term Russia–Europe confrontation. Finally, we explore Russia’s policy in the South Caucasus, including Armenia’s political trajectory, tensions following Pashinyan’s Moscow visit, and the broader balance of power shaping Armenia’s future.

Topics:

  • Iran war dynamics and Russia’s role
  • Ukraine war and Europe’s militarization
  • Armenia’s pivot and Russia’s response
  • Regional power balance

Guest

Hosts


Episode 534 | Recorded: April 24, 2026

SHOW NOTES: https://podcasts.groong.org/534

VIDEO: https://youtu.be/kjUQN8LVuFk

#Russia #IranWar #UkraineWar #SouthCaucasus #Armenia #TRIPP #Geopolitics #Eurasia


Subscribe and follow us everywhere you are: linktr.ee/groong

Asbed (00:00:04):

From Iran to Ukraine to the South Caucasus,

Asbed (00:00:07):

is Russia really gaining leverage across conflicts or getting pulled into a wider

Asbed (00:00:12):

strategic trap?

Asbed (00:00:13):

Hello, everyone, and welcome to this Conversations on Groong episode.

Asbed (00:00:17):

Stay with us for a very interesting discussion with Dr. Dmitry Suslov today.

Asbed (00:00:23):

He is a Russian political scientist,

Asbed (00:00:25):

foreign policy analyst,

Asbed (00:00:26):

and commentator specializing in the great power politics of Russia,

Asbed (00:00:30):

Russia-US relations,

Asbed (00:00:32):

and European security,

Asbed (00:00:34):

also the evolving international order.

Hovik (00:00:37):

And folks, this episode is being recorded on April 24, 2026.

Hovik (00:00:41):

And we want to express,

Hovik (00:00:45):

of course,

Hovik (00:00:46):

our sympathy to Armenians who are commemorating the Armenian Genocide Remembrance

Hovik (00:00:52):

Day today.

Hovik (00:00:53):

And on behalf of Groong,

Hovik (00:00:54):

I just want to say that we,

Hovik (00:00:56):

of course, remember,

Hovik (00:00:57):

but more importantly,

Hovik (00:00:59):

we demand and we will continue demanding until historic justice is returned to

Hovik (00:01:05):

Armenians.

Asbed (00:01:06):

And Hovik,

Asbed (00:01:07):

let me just say, not only sympathy,

Asbed (00:01:08):

our full solidarity to Armenians with our causes.

Hovik (00:01:12):

And before we go to the discussion,

Hovik (00:01:14):

very quickly,

Hovik (00:01:15):

if you're just joining us,

Hovik (00:01:16):

if you just found us on YouTube,

Hovik (00:01:18):

please make sure you're subscribed.

Hovik (00:01:20):

It helps us a lot.

Hovik (00:01:21):

But also like,

Hovik (00:01:22):

comment,

Hovik (00:01:23):

and share this content with your friends and everywhere you can so that we can get

Hovik (00:01:27):

seen by more people.

Hovik (00:01:30):

And of course, if you feel really generous,

Hovik (00:01:33):

you can help us monetarily by going to podcasts.groong.org/donate.

Hovik (00:01:38):

Thank you very much for that.

Hovik (00:01:40):

And without further ado, on with the show.

Asbed (00:01:43):

Dr. Dimitri Suslov, welcome to the Groong Podcast.

Suslov (00:01:47):

My pleasure.

Hovik (00:01:47):

Hello.

Hovik (00:01:49):

Welcome, Dr. Suslov.

Hovik (00:01:50):

Thank you for accepting our invitation.

Suslov (00:01:52):

Thank you very much.

Asbed (00:01:55):

Let's jump straight into our first topic.

Asbed (00:01:57):

The war on Iran has moved into an unstable pause rather than any kind of a resolution.

Asbed (00:02:02):

A fragile ceasefire is in place,

Asbed (00:02:04):

but it is being violated on multiple fronts and all the time,

Asbed (00:02:08):

while the U.S. naval blockade and Iran's countermoves in the Strait of Hormuz keep tensions high

Asbed (00:02:13):

and global trade disrupted.

Asbed (00:02:15):

At the same time,

Asbed (00:02:16):

both sides retain the capacity to escalate quickly and negotiations are ongoing but

Asbed (00:02:21):

appearing far from any kind of a durable settlement.

Asbed (00:02:24):

From your vantage point in Moscow, what is your outlook on this war on Iran?

Suslov (00:02:30):

Well, I think that this fragile peace or the situation of no peace,

Suslov (00:02:34):

no war will continue for a while.

Suslov (00:02:38):

I'm quite skeptical on the ability of the United States and Iran to find a mutually

Suslov (00:02:43):

acceptable solution,

Suslov (00:02:44):

you know,

Suslov (00:02:45):

or as Trump says, forever peace, peace for all time.

Suslov (00:02:51):

I think that the positions of the sides are diametrically opposite and very

Suslov (00:02:56):

difficult to be reconciled,

Suslov (00:02:58):

or at least quickly.

Suslov (00:03:03):

You know, Iran basically de facto won this conflict.

Suslov (00:03:06):

And of course, it's very difficult for the United States to accept it.

Suslov (00:03:13):

So today,

Suslov (00:03:14):

the position of the policy of the United States seems to be,

Suslov (00:03:20):

you know,

Suslov (00:03:21):

to try to coerce Iran into a settlement that could be acceptable for the United

Suslov (00:03:28):

States through economic pressure.

Suslov (00:03:32):

through the economic exhaustion of Iran by actually the naval blockade,

Suslov (00:03:38):

and at the same time to try to facilitate the internal fractions and contradictions

Suslov (00:03:44):

within Iran,

Suslov (00:03:47):

the quarrels between the so-called liberals and so-called conservatives within the

Suslov (00:03:52):

Iranian leadership.

Suslov (00:03:53):

So on the one hand,

Suslov (00:03:54):

the United States is offering some economic incentives,

Suslov (00:03:59):

stimulating the liberals,

Suslov (00:04:01):

On the other hand, it is imposing this naval blockade.

Suslov (00:04:08):

But my sense is that Iran has huge resilience potential, right?

Suslov (00:04:14):

And Iran can sustain much more pain than the global economy.

Suslov (00:04:19):

which suffers from the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz,

Suslov (00:04:24):

and the regional allies and partners of the United States,

Suslov (00:04:28):

the Arab Gulf monarchies.

Suslov (00:04:31):

So there is a fight, basically.

Suslov (00:04:34):

who will blink first, who will make movements first as a result of that economic suffering.

Suslov (00:04:43):

Iran thinks and Iran is convinced that time is on its side.

Suslov (00:04:49):

The United States hopes that,

Suslov (00:04:52):

you know,

Suslov (00:04:53):

with internal contradictions and economic troubles within Iran will compel it to

Suslov (00:05:00):

to show some flexibility, more flexibility at the negotiation table.

Suslov (00:05:05):

And, you know, when both sides believe that time is on each side,

Suslov (00:05:10):

it is not an incentive for a quick peace and not a precondition for a quick peace.

Suslov (00:05:17):

At the same time, you know, the options of the United States are very limited.

Suslov (00:05:22):

Because a resumption of war actually is not in the interests of the United States.

Suslov (00:05:29):

It could be in the interests of Israel,

Suslov (00:05:31):

but not in the interests of the United States or the Trump administration.

Suslov (00:05:36):

The United States will achieve nothing.

Suslov (00:05:39):

through the resumption of the war,

Suslov (00:05:41):

it will just hurt more the American position,

Suslov (00:05:46):

the domestic political position of Donald Trump and Republicans in the United

Suslov (00:05:52):

States who are already suffering hugely,

Suslov (00:05:55):

and also the Arab allies,

Suslov (00:05:57):

the Arab monarchies of the Gulf.

Asbed (00:06:00):

You mentioned that Iran has de facto won this war.

Asbed (00:06:03):

If this is the case,

Asbed (00:06:05):

does the U.S. failure in Iran weaken the kind of leverage that it has on Ukraine?

Suslov (00:06:10):

Absolutely.

Suslov (00:06:11):

Well, I think that Iran generally,

Suslov (00:06:14):

that this Iran situation or the outcome of the Iranian conflict weakens the United

Suslov (00:06:21):

States globally,

Suslov (00:06:23):

weakens the American position vis-a-vis all its allies and partners in the Middle

Suslov (00:06:28):

East, in Asia Pacific,

Suslov (00:06:29):

and also in Europe.

Suslov (00:06:32):

And it weakens the global standing and domestic political standing of Donald Trump

Suslov (00:06:38):

and the Trump administration,

Suslov (00:06:39):

which,

Suslov (00:06:40):

as you rightly said,

Suslov (00:06:41):

and that's a problem,

Suslov (00:06:43):

and that's one of the negative outcomes.

Suslov (00:06:47):

One of the disadvantages for Russia is that weakening of the United States and

Suslov (00:06:56):

weakening of Donald Trump decreases even more its leverage vis-a-vis Ukraine and

Suslov (00:07:03):

vis-a-vis Europe.

Suslov (00:07:04):

You know, more than half a year passed since the Anchorage summit between Trump and Putin.

Suslov (00:07:10):

And even when Trump's position was stronger,

Suslov (00:07:14):

the United States turned out to be unable to deliver.

Suslov (00:07:19):

the implementation of the summit outcomes, right?

Suslov (00:07:26):

Namely,

Suslov (00:07:27):

the US was unable to deliver the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the remaining

Suslov (00:07:33):

part of Donbas,

Suslov (00:07:34):

which they still control.

Suslov (00:07:37):

And in the situation of weakened Trump,

Suslov (00:07:42):

In the situation of the crisis of transatlantic relations,

Suslov (00:07:46):

the chances that Donald Trump would be able to convince Kiev and Europe to accept

Suslov (00:07:53):

this condition,

Suslov (00:07:55):

to accept this term,

Suslov (00:07:56):

is even less.

Suslov (00:07:58):

This is why we are much less hopeful and much more pessimistic about the negotiated

Suslov (00:08:05):

settlement of the Ukraine conflict in conditions of the weakening of the United

Suslov (00:08:12):

States and Donald Trump.

Asbed (00:08:14):

We'll talk more about Ukraine in just a moment.

Asbed (00:08:17):

I have a couple more questions about Iran.

Asbed (00:08:19):

There are reports that Iran has granted free passage for friendly countries.

Asbed (00:08:24):

I say, quote, friendly countries through the Strait of Hormuz.

Asbed (00:08:28):

Are Russian ships able to sail through the Strait today?

Suslov (00:08:33):

Well,

Suslov (00:08:34):

I don't think that Russian ships actually transport the Middle Eastern oil and

Suslov (00:08:40):

other resources through the Persian Gulf.

Suslov (00:08:43):

You know, we export our Russian oil through other means,

Suslov (00:08:48):

you know, and through the Russian ports.

Suslov (00:08:51):

But my judgment is that the Strait of Hormuz is de facto blocked completely today because...

Suslov (00:08:59):

Iran blocks and prohibits all the movement not authorized by Iran,

Suslov (00:09:07):

and the United States blocks all the movement which is authorized by Iran.

Suslov (00:09:13):

This ultimately results into the complete and total blockade of the Strait,

Suslov (00:09:19):

which is extremely disastrous.

Suslov (00:09:22):

for the world economy and for the Arab Gulf countries who are unable to export

Suslov (00:09:28):

their resources now through the Persian Gulf.

Suslov (00:09:32):

The only remaining opportunity for them is the rest,

Suslov (00:09:38):

actually, and the Suez channel, which again could be blocked by the Houthis.

Suslov (00:09:46):

And if the United States resumes the war,

Suslov (00:09:53):

strikes against Iran,

Suslov (00:09:55):

let alone if the United States tries to escalate this war,

Suslov (00:09:59):

it is most likely that the Houthis will block the Red Sea too,

Suslov (00:10:04):

and then the complete Middle Eastern region will be out of the global economy and

Suslov (00:10:09):

of the global energy,

Suslov (00:10:12):

which will result into an energy crisis much more severe and much deeper than the

Suslov (00:10:19):

one in 1970.

Asbed (00:10:21):

Dr. Suslov,

Asbed (00:10:23):

coming back to the Iran war,

Asbed (00:10:25):

actually,

Asbed (00:10:26):

I want to talk a little bit about what people call the Northern Front,

Asbed (00:10:31):

Iran,

Asbed (00:10:32):

Azerbaijan, Turkey.

Asbed (00:10:33):

Of course, there is also Armenia.

Asbed (00:10:35):

And you might recall that early in the war,

Asbed (00:10:37):

there were some drone attacks on the exclave Nakhichevan.

Asbed (00:10:42):

And of course, some people claim that those came originated from Iran.

Asbed (00:10:46):

And that led to a huge amount of acrimony between Aliyev and Iran.

Asbed (00:10:51):

And then suddenly,

Asbed (00:10:52):

just within two or three days,

Asbed (00:10:53):

the whole thing disappeared and Aliyev was sending humanitarian aid to Iran.

Asbed (00:10:58):

But I'm sure that this issue was just shuffled under the rug and has not disappeared.

Asbed (00:11:04):

And some analysts believe that if the situation should devolve in the Iran war,

Asbed (00:11:09):

and some kind of a ground attack becomes an option for the West,

Asbed (00:11:14):

there's going to be a role for Azerbaijan and possibly even Turkey to play.

Asbed (00:11:18):

What do you think is going on on this front?

Asbed (00:11:22):

And under what conditions could there suddenly be an engagement on the part of

Asbed (00:11:26):

Turkey and Azerbaijan against Iran?

Suslov (00:11:28):

Well, first,

Suslov (00:11:29):

I'm absolutely convinced that the chances for a land invasion in Iran are

Suslov (00:11:34):

negligible because they will bring nothing but huge troubles for the invaders,

Suslov (00:11:40):

namely for the United States or the countries

Suslov (00:11:43):

who could hypothetically participate in that land invasion.

Suslov (00:11:48):

The United States simply lacks the material resources,

Suslov (00:11:52):

including the people,

Suslov (00:11:53):

for a full-fledged invasion.

Suslov (00:11:56):

Iran is a 90 million people country.

Suslov (00:12:01):

That would require huge accumulation of manpower for a land invasion.

Suslov (00:12:08):

Whereas a limited invasion,

Suslov (00:12:10):

there were speculations about,

Suslov (00:12:12):

for instance, occupation of the island of Kharg or the maritime region,

Suslov (00:12:19):

you know, the coastline of Iran.

Suslov (00:12:23):

absolutely nothing from the military perspective.

Suslov (00:12:27):

It will just bring even more destruction for the Arab Gulf countries and even more casualties.

Suslov (00:12:34):

Actually, that would bring a lot of casualties for the United States.

Suslov (00:12:38):

Iran will not capitulate at all as a result of this limited land operation.

Suslov (00:12:45):

On the contrary,

Suslov (00:12:46):

Iran will double down on retaliation and on the military damage,

Suslov (00:12:52):

on the damage that Iran will inflict on the region as a whole.

Suslov (00:12:57):

So the damage for the whole region will increase without bringing the desired outcomes for the

Suslov (00:13:06):

for the United States.

Suslov (00:13:07):

This is actually why Trump does not want a land operation, and I think he makes it quite clear.

Suslov (00:13:16):

As for that episode with drones and the speculations about the Northern Front,

Suslov (00:13:23):

I'm absolutely sure that it was an Israeli provocation.

Suslov (00:13:27):

You know,

Suslov (00:13:28):

because it happened in the earlier stages of that war when the outcome was not

Suslov (00:13:33):

clear yet,

Suslov (00:13:35):

right? Now we know that Iran basically survived.

Suslov (00:13:40):

And this is the major Iranian victory.

Suslov (00:13:42):

You know, this is why I say that Iran basically prevailed in this war because Iran stayed.

Suslov (00:13:47):

Iran survived.

Suslov (00:13:48):

It did not capitulate.

Suslov (00:13:50):

And it compelled basically the United States to...

Suslov (00:13:53):

halts the military operation.

Suslov (00:13:55):

That's victory.

Suslov (00:13:57):

But in the beginning of that conflict,

Suslov (00:13:59):

it was not clear whether Iran would survive or not,

Suslov (00:14:02):

right?

Suslov (00:14:03):

And in those conditions to open other fronts and to draw the other neighboring

Suslov (00:14:10):

countries into attacking Iran seemed completely foolish from the Iranian

Suslov (00:14:17):

perspective. So Iran could not do that.

Suslov (00:14:19):

The country which was interested in multiplicating the fronts and in bringing more

Suslov (00:14:25):

countries in against Iran.

Suslov (00:14:28):

Basically, these were Israel and the United States, right?

Suslov (00:14:31):

And they were much more interested in engaging Azerbaijan against Iran than Iran itself.

Suslov (00:14:41):

So I believe that it was an, you know, an operation under false flag as it is called.

Suslov (00:14:50):

But, you know, when it became clear that it was not Iran behind that,

Suslov (00:14:58):

and basically Turkey was not interested in the spillover of this war into the South

Suslov (00:15:06):

Caucasus and Azerbaijan.

Suslov (00:15:07):

Yeah, that's right.

Suslov (00:15:09):

So then there was this stabilization,

Suslov (00:15:13):

and as you rightly said,

Suslov (00:15:14):

the Azerbaijani president started to send humanitarian aid to Iran instead of the

Suslov (00:15:22):

landing missiles.

Suslov (00:15:24):

Right, or missiles.

Hovik (00:15:27):

Dr. Suslov, we hear a lot about Russia's strategic partnership with Iran.

Hovik (00:15:33):

Of course, Russia and China are viewed as the main partners of Iran.

Hovik (00:15:37):

How much military cooperation and support is ongoing between Iran and Russia?

Hovik (00:15:43):

We hear...

Hovik (00:15:44):

differing opinions on this.

Hovik (00:15:46):

And also in terms of China,

Hovik (00:15:49):

we hear that China right now is pushing very hard to tamper down or to restrict

Hovik (00:15:57):

Iranian responses and hopefully push it towards negotiations.

Hovik (00:16:02):

What is the role of Russia and China at this stage of the conflict?

Suslov (00:16:06):

Well, Russia is also interested in settlement and not interested in the resumption of war.

Suslov (00:16:13):

You know,

Suslov (00:16:14):

on the one hand,

Suslov (00:16:15):

tactically,

Suslov (00:16:16):

tactically,

Suslov (00:16:17):

Russia is benefiting from this situation economically as well.

Suslov (00:16:21):

Well,

Suslov (00:16:22):

because the demand on Russian oil is increasing,

Suslov (00:16:26):

the oil prices are increasing,

Suslov (00:16:29):

Russia is getting more profits,

Suslov (00:16:30):

getting more money,

Suslov (00:16:32):

and the United States is compelled to extend this pause on the sanctions against

Suslov (00:16:40):

the Russian oil.

Suslov (00:16:43):

However, in the longer-term prospect,

Suslov (00:16:45):

if there is a long-term crisis,

Suslov (00:16:49):

if this situation is not resolved for months,

Suslov (00:16:53):

there is a big chance,

Suslov (00:16:55):

a big risk of a world economic crisis,

Suslov (00:16:58):

of world economic recession,

Suslov (00:17:00):

basically.

Suslov (00:17:01):

And this world economic recession will hurt Russia much.

Suslov (00:17:05):

Right.

Suslov (00:17:06):

Because Russia is quite economically fragile.

Suslov (00:17:09):

Russia is very much dependent on the conjuncture of world economy.

Suslov (00:17:13):

The world economic recession or the world economic depression will again bring the

Suslov (00:17:17):

oil prices down because the demand.

Suslov (00:17:21):

will fall.

Suslov (00:17:22):

And Russia will suffer.

Suslov (00:17:24):

Russia will suffer.

Suslov (00:17:25):

So strategically, Russia is not interested in endless continuation of that conflict.

Suslov (00:17:31):

So China, of course, is suffering already now.

Suslov (00:17:35):

Many other Asian countries like Philippines and Indonesia and Pakistan are

Suslov (00:17:40):

suffering even more because already now they are feeling the shortage,

Suslov (00:17:45):

the deficit of oil and gasoline as a result.

Suslov (00:17:48):

So Russia and China are trying to facilitate the negotiations.

Suslov (00:17:54):

Russia is offering itself as a mediator, as a potential mediator.

Suslov (00:17:58):

The same refers to China and so on and so forth.

Suslov (00:18:02):

As for our relations with Iran, yet, of course, Iran is our strategic partner.

Suslov (00:18:09):

And to tell the truth,

Suslov (00:18:10):

we are very happy that Iran survived after that war because the collapse of Islamic

Suslov (00:18:16):

Republic of Iran.

Suslov (00:18:18):

Chaos in Iran would hurt Russian interests hugely, right?

Suslov (00:18:25):

Russia would have been cut off from the potential access to the Persian Gulf and

Suslov (00:18:29):

the Indian Ocean,

Suslov (00:18:31):

and the implementation of the North-South corridor would be under question,

Suslov (00:18:35):

and so on and so forth.

Suslov (00:18:37):

So of course,

Suslov (00:18:38):

Iran is our partner,

Suslov (00:18:39):

privileged partner,

Suslov (00:18:41):

and we have robust cooperation with Iran.

Suslov (00:18:44):

However,

Suslov (00:18:45):

we are not providing direct military help,

Suslov (00:18:49):

direct military assistance to Iran now because we do not want to antagonize the

Suslov (00:18:55):

United States, right?

Suslov (00:18:57):

It is absolutely obvious

Suslov (00:18:59):

that if Russia had provided military help to Iran now in its fight against the

Suslov (00:19:06):

United States,

Suslov (00:19:07):

the United States most likely could provide military aid to Ukraine.

Suslov (00:19:14):

retaliation could return to providing military aid to Ukraine.

Suslov (00:19:18):

We are not interested in that.

Suslov (00:19:20):

We are interested in restraint of the United States vis-a-vis Ukraine,

Suslov (00:19:25):

which is much more important for us.

Suslov (00:19:27):

So we are also restraintful in our assistance to Iran.

Suslov (00:19:34):

So there were speculations about Russia providing intel information to Iran.

Suslov (00:19:40):

You know,

Suslov (00:19:41):

I do not know,

Suslov (00:19:42):

of course, the information on that,

Suslov (00:19:46):

you know,

Suslov (00:19:47):

but I would not be surprised if Russia had done it because basically we know that

Suslov (00:19:53):

the United States is already providing intel information to Ukraine and the Trump

Suslov (00:19:58):

administration continued to do that.

Suslov (00:20:00):

So perhaps Russia could mirror. This approach...

Asbed (00:20:03):

Tit-for-tat.

Suslov (00:20:05):

... tit-for-tat, absolutely but not providing weapons because the direct

Suslov (00:20:11):

provision of weapons is something that the united states is not doing vis-a-vis

Suslov (00:20:16):

vis-a-vis Ukraine right now, also Iran is not the only Russian

Suslov (00:20:24):

partner in the Middle East, we have very good partnership relations with the Arab

Suslov (00:20:29):

gulf countries you know united Arab emirates is the member of BRICS

Suslov (00:20:34):

Saudi Arabia is also a strategic partner of Russia,

Suslov (00:20:38):

and we are interested in sustaining this balance between Iran on the one hand and

Suslov (00:20:44):

Arab Gulf countries on the other hand.

Suslov (00:20:47):

We do not want to antagonize them.

Suslov (00:20:49):

by assisting Iran too much right of course our sympathy in the conflict

Suslov (00:20:55):

between Iran and the united states is at the Iranian side because we consider Iran

Suslov (00:21:00):

to be a victim which was attacked without provocation and so on and so forth

Suslov (00:21:05):

right illegal immoral invasion and so on, but even

Suslov (00:21:14):

in the conflict between Iran and the Arab Gulf countries, we are at no one's side.

Suslov (00:21:20):

We don't want to take any kind of position.

Suslov (00:21:24):

And we also try to convince Iran not to

Suslov (00:21:29):

overreact in the Iranian retaliation against the American attacks from the

Suslov (00:21:35):

territories of the Arab Gulf countries,

Suslov (00:21:38):

right? Because again,

Suslov (00:21:39):

we want to continue to sustain our balanced partnership with Iran on the one hand

Suslov (00:21:45):

and the Arab Gulf monarchies on the other hand.

Suslov (00:21:49):

That makes sense.

Hovik (00:21:51):

Dr. Suslov, let's turn our attention back to Ukraine for a little while.

Hovik (00:21:56):

If you listen to Russian leaders and Russian media, there is continuous progress every day.

Hovik (00:22:02):

There are announcements of new villages and new land being taken.

Hovik (00:22:06):

There's also analysts who say that it's basically a grinding attrition,

Hovik (00:22:13):

and there is no clear sign of a breakthrough in the war in Ukraine.

Hovik (00:22:17):

How would you describe the current state?

Hovik (00:22:20):

What's your outlook? And also, do you see how this war will end in Ukraine?

Suslov (00:22:27):

Oh, that's a very difficult question.

Suslov (00:22:29):

First, I completely agree that it is the war of attrition.

Suslov (00:22:35):

The nature of the warfare has fundamentally changed due to the massive introduction of drones.

Suslov (00:22:43):

You know, today you cannot conduct the classic

Suslov (00:22:50):

maneuver warfare.

Suslov (00:22:52):

And it is not a maneuver warfare.

Suslov (00:22:55):

You know, every square meter is observed and destroyed.

Suslov (00:23:00):

You know, any movement of manpower or of people

Suslov (00:23:05):

and especially of the armor is immediately noticed and destroyed by drones.

Suslov (00:23:12):

The frontline looks like a kill zone, basically.

Suslov (00:23:18):

Roughly, it is the 20 kilometers kill zone.

Suslov (00:23:21):

So this explains the very slow pace of the Russian offensive.

Suslov (00:23:29):

You simply cannot,

Suslov (00:23:31):

you know, physically,

Suslov (00:23:33):

you cannot proceed quicker due to this massive presence of drones for observation

Suslov (00:23:43):

and also for destruction.

Suslov (00:23:48):

So this is indeed the war of attrition.

Suslov (00:23:51):

And the outcome of this war will be determined by which side collapses first.

Suslov (00:23:58):

And we are talking about the collapse not necessarily of the

Suslov (00:24:02):

the front line, but the internal collapse.

Suslov (00:24:05):

Something like what happened with the German Empire in 1918.

Suslov (00:24:12):

Germany was basically winning,

Suslov (00:24:14):

it was not losing at the front line,

Suslov (00:24:17):

but then the internal collapse resulted into the German defeat in the First World

Suslov (00:24:24):

War.

Suslov (00:24:26):

We are talking about which side will exhaust itself to the critical point first.

Suslov (00:24:33):

Russia has an advantage in manpower,

Suslov (00:24:37):

you know,

Suslov (00:24:38):

and basically the manpower deficit is the major weakness of Ukraine.

Suslov (00:24:45):

Also, Ukraine is at the external life support.

Suslov (00:24:49):

You know, the economic sustainability of Ukraine is provided by Europe.

Suslov (00:24:54):

And to continue this topic about the war of attrition,

Suslov (00:24:57):

basically,

Suslov (00:24:58):

we are no longer talking about the Russian-Ukrainian war.

Suslov (00:25:02):

We are talking about the Russia-Europe war right now.

Suslov (00:25:06):

And this has become a Russia-Europe war because the Ukrainian,

Suslov (00:25:12):

you know, what matters most in the war of attrition is the rear.

Suslov (00:25:17):

It is not the front line.

Suslov (00:25:18):

It is the rear.

Suslov (00:25:20):

Right.

Suslov (00:25:21):

The economy, the population, the production, the logistics and so on and so forth.

Suslov (00:25:27):

The rear.

Suslov (00:25:28):

And the Ukrainian rear is not Ukraine.

Suslov (00:25:31):

The Ukrainian rear is Europe.

Suslov (00:25:34):

which is providing Ukraine with everything, right?

Suslov (00:25:38):

So that explains this stalemate which exists today, right?

Suslov (00:25:46):

But the fundamental difference is that Russian resilience is determined by Russia.

Suslov (00:25:56):

Ukrainian resilience is determined by Europe.

Hovik (00:26:00):

So in this context, is Russia prepared for a long-term strategic conflict with Europe?

Hovik (00:26:09):

Because that's what it's going towards.

Hovik (00:26:11):

And especially in the context of this hot war,

Hovik (00:26:16):

essentially Russia has retooled its economy to be on the military footing all the

Hovik (00:26:21):

time.

Hovik (00:26:22):

How long can Russia sustain its economy and industry, especially as it's geared towards the war?

Suslov (00:26:29):

Well,

Suslov (00:26:30):

on your latest question,

Suslov (00:26:33):

the economists are saying that Russia can continue the current war of attrition for

Suslov (00:26:39):

a couple of years more without a severe domestic economic crisis.

Suslov (00:26:46):

So we still have resources to do that.

Suslov (00:26:51):

As for a Russia-Europe conflict, you know, this conflict is already ongoing, right?

Suslov (00:26:57):

The major reason for the continuation of the war is Europe.

Suslov (00:27:02):

The major party which is basically rejecting the terms of peace offered by the

Suslov (00:27:09):

Trump administration is Europe.

Suslov (00:27:12):

The major part of which is sustaining Ukraine economically and militarily is Europe.

Suslov (00:27:19):

So we are already in this confrontation with Europe.

Suslov (00:27:23):

The question is, will this confrontation spill over immediately?

Suslov (00:27:27):

into the direct hot war between Russia and Europe or not?

Suslov (00:27:32):

Or at which stage will this confrontation spill over into the hot war,

Suslov (00:27:38):

direct military clash between Russia and Europe?

Suslov (00:27:41):

And unfortunately, the risks of this direct military confrontation, the combat,

Suslov (00:27:48):

or at least missile strikes between Russia and Europe directly increased in the

Suslov (00:27:56):

recent times because the volume of the European participation,

Suslov (00:28:01):

I would say,

Suslov (00:28:02):

in this direct participation in this war has increased.

Suslov (00:28:11):

There are multiple joint enterprises between Ukraine and Europe,

Suslov (00:28:17):

produced drones, right?

Suslov (00:28:19):

I already said that drones is today the major arm, right?

Suslov (00:28:27):

The major weapon used at this war,

Suslov (00:28:31):

both at the front line and also for deep strikes into the rear of each other.

Suslov (00:28:38):

And now Europe is increasing the volume of drones supplied to Ukraine.

Suslov (00:28:46):

And we are talking about hundreds of thousands of drones annually,

Suslov (00:28:51):

which will allow Ukraine to hit Russia with roughly 1,500 drones,

Suslov (00:28:59):

European produced drones,

Suslov (00:29:02):

right?

Suslov (00:29:03):

European produced drones daily.

Suslov (00:29:06):

And that's a problem. right?

Suslov (00:29:07):

That's a big problem and basically the only way for Russia is to...

Suslov (00:29:15):

prevent the production and the provision though the production is

Suslov (00:29:21):

already ongoing but the provision of those drones to Ukraine. So Russia has

Suslov (00:29:26):

already started to claim that if this provision of

Suslov (00:29:29):

drones is ongoing,

Suslov (00:29:31):

Russia will probably have no other alternative than to use direct military force

Suslov (00:29:37):

against those enterprises in European countries,

Suslov (00:29:41):

which means direct Russian missile attacks against Germany,

Suslov (00:29:46):

against France,

Suslov (00:29:47):

against Italy,

Suslov (00:29:48):

against UK,

Suslov (00:29:50):

right? And the other European countries which produce those drones for Ukraine.

Suslov (00:29:57):

And again,

Suslov (00:29:58):

This is the war of attrition, right?

Suslov (00:30:00):

And the Ukrainian attrition is the chances of Ukraine to survive this attrition is

Suslov (00:30:10):

provided by Europe.

Suslov (00:30:12):

Ukraine and Europe conduct assaults against the Russian rear.

Suslov (00:30:17):

So why shouldn't Russia conduct assaults against the Ukrainian?

Suslov (00:30:21):

rear, which is not Ukraine per se, but Europe.

Suslov (00:30:24):

But we are in a very dangerous territory now, right?

Suslov (00:30:27):

Because if Russia comes to that point when it will hit enterprises in the

Suslov (00:30:34):

territories of European countries,

Suslov (00:30:36):

we are talking about Third World War with very quick chances of the nuclear

Suslov (00:30:41):

escalation.

Asbed (00:30:42):

Hmm.

Asbed (00:30:43):

Dr. Suslov,

Asbed (00:30:44):

you mentioned a little earlier that the conflict continues to depend on one side on

Asbed (00:30:49):

the Russian decisions and on the other side,

Asbed (00:30:52):

EU decisions.

Asbed (00:30:54):

And of course, the EU usually needs 28 countries to agree on a direction.

Asbed (00:30:59):

And while its leadership is full of rabid anti-Russian people like Kaja Kallas and

Asbed (00:31:06):

other people who just,

Asbed (00:31:07):

you know,

Asbed (00:31:08):

one directional,

Asbed (00:31:09):

that's

Asbed (00:31:11):

Cohesion was stopped by Viktor Orban.

Asbed (00:31:14):

They could never quite agree to move completely anti-Russian.

Asbed (00:31:19):

Has the loss of the prime ministership,

Asbed (00:31:21):

the elections in Hungary by Viktor Orbán changed any of the calculus that Russia

Asbed (00:31:26):

has regarding EU's cohesion and decision-making ability to continue this war?

Suslov (00:31:33):

Not necessarily because I would not overestimate the factor of Viktor Orban as a

Suslov (00:31:38):

stumbling block for the EU anti-Russian policy and decisions.

Suslov (00:31:43):

You know,

Suslov (00:31:47):

with Viktor Orbán's participation,

Suslov (00:31:50):

European Union has adopted 19 packages of anti-Russian sanctions.

Suslov (00:31:56):

And only the 20th

Suslov (00:31:58):

was adopted after Viktor Orbán.

Suslov (00:32:01):

So come on.

Suslov (00:32:02):

I mean,

Suslov (00:32:03):

nothing prevented Viktor Orbán from ultimately voting yes in favor of those

Suslov (00:32:11):

sanctions, right?

Suslov (00:32:13):

And also, I mean, Viktor Orbán blocked the provision of the 90 billion euro

Suslov (00:32:25):

credit to Ukraine,

Suslov (00:32:28):

not because he didn't want the European Union to provide this credit,

Suslov (00:32:33):

but because Ukraine was blackmailing Hungary with the cutoff of the oil,

Suslov (00:32:39):

of the Russian oil through the Druzhba pipeline.

Suslov (00:32:43):

And nothing changed after Orbán.

Suslov (00:32:46):

Basically, right?

Suslov (00:32:48):

The new Hungarian or the future Hungarian,

Suslov (00:32:52):

the pending Hungarian prime minister,

Suslov (00:32:54):

Peter Magyar,

Suslov (00:32:56):

also rejects the Hungarian participation in the provision of that 90 billion euro

Suslov (00:33:03):

credit to Ukraine.

Suslov (00:33:05):

And he also claims that Hungary will continue to be dependent on the Russian oil.

Suslov (00:33:12):

Ukraine switched off that pipeline after the defeat of Viktor Orban.

Suslov (00:33:19):

Hungary, and now it is still Orban's government, right?

Suslov (00:33:22):

But Hungary removed the veto on the provision of that credit, of the EU credit to Ukraine.

Suslov (00:33:32):

At the same time,

Suslov (00:33:33):

we see that Magyar,

Suslov (00:33:35):

the new Hungarian prime minister,

Suslov (00:33:37):

is also national oriented,

Suslov (00:33:40):

right?

Suslov (00:33:41):

He also wants to promote the Hungarian national interests more in cooperation with

Suslov (00:33:47):

the EU institutions rather than in confrontation with the EU institutions.

Suslov (00:33:52):

So his methodologically,

Suslov (00:33:54):

you know, his methods could be different from Orban,

Suslov (00:33:57):

but not the strategy,

Suslov (00:33:58):

right? Not the fundamentals.

Suslov (00:34:01):

Also,

Suslov (00:34:02):

we see that in Bulgaria and national oriented and considered to be pro-Russian

Suslov (00:34:09):

leader and political party one.

Suslov (00:34:12):

So basically, I do not see a fundamental difference.

Suslov (00:34:17):

and the fundamental change in the European Union, right?

Suslov (00:34:23):

And the point is that the institutions of the European Union and the leading

Suslov (00:34:29):

countries of the European Union,

Suslov (00:34:30):

Germany and France,

Suslov (00:34:32):

are still controlled by the anti-Russian elites,

Suslov (00:34:37):

and the anti-Russian policy remains to be the consolidating factor for the European

Suslov (00:34:45):

Union plus United States.

Asbed (00:34:48):

So I'm going to turn a little bit to Russian foreign policy towards the South

Asbed (00:34:52):

Caucasus,

Asbed (00:34:53):

Armenia.

Asbed (00:34:54):

And earlier this month,

Asbed (00:34:56):

as we all know, Nikol Pashinyan's visit to Moscow turned quite tense with a rare public exchange,

Asbed (00:35:03):

heated public exchange between him and Vladimir Putin.

Asbed (00:35:07):

followed by pointed warnings from the Russian officials over Armenia's pro-EU and

Asbed (00:35:11):

pro-West pivots.

Asbed (00:35:13):

Moscow signaled possible consequences,

Asbed (00:35:15):

including the loss of cheap gas,

Asbed (00:35:17):

constraints on the future of the Armenian nuclear power plant,

Asbed (00:35:21):

and broader economic pressure.

Asbed (00:35:23):

Officials also framed the trip,

Asbed (00:35:25):

the Trump route, as a challenge to the regional order in place since 1828.

Asbed (00:35:29):

It was interesting to note how far back Russia's foreign policy thinks about the

Asbed (00:35:35):

regional order stemming from the Turkmenchai Treaty.

Asbed (00:35:40):

Despite this,

Asbed (00:35:41):

Pashinyan presented the visit to the Armenian public as constructive and good,

Asbed (00:35:46):

and said that he plans to follow up a summit with Putin after I think he's

Asbed (00:35:51):

expecting to win the June elections.

Asbed (00:35:53):

Now, is it possible that Russia could eventually agree to some kind of a long period of

Asbed (00:35:58):

neither here nor there policy by Pashinyan,

Asbed (00:36:02):

especially if he manages to maintain power after June 7?

Asbed (00:36:05):

We've heard from people like Alexander Lukashenko that Armenia can no longer sit on two chairs.

Suslov (00:36:11):

What do you think?

Suslov (00:36:12):

From the Russian perspective, it is not a policy of neither here nor there.

Suslov (00:36:17):

It is the policy of deliberate movement towards the West, step by step reorientation

Suslov (00:36:26):

towards the European Union and step by step phasing out of the remaining

Suslov (00:36:33):

cooperation and alliance with Russia.

Suslov (00:36:38):

Of course, Pashinyan does not want

Suslov (00:36:41):

to cut relations with Russia immediately like that because he doesn't have

Suslov (00:36:46):

alternatives right now right he wants a phased and long process of managed

Suslov (00:36:53):

reduction of the relations with Russia that's the point right and pashinyan thinks

Suslov (00:36:58):

and the current Armenian leadership think that they will control

Suslov (00:37:03):

and manage this process of step-by-step reduction or phasing out of political,

Suslov (00:37:11):

military,

Suslov (00:37:12):

economic, and so on relations with Russia,

Suslov (00:37:15):

right? They cannot afford to withdraw from the EU.

Suslov (00:37:18):

Eurasian Economic Union now,

Suslov (00:37:20):

but they could do it later on at a certain stage,

Suslov (00:37:23):

and no question they want to do it later on at a certain point,

Suslov (00:37:29):

then when they hope they will have the alternatives.

Suslov (00:37:33):

They cannot afford to demand the withdrawal of the Russian military base from

Suslov (00:37:38):

Gyumri because they do not have the alternatives,

Suslov (00:37:41):

right?

Suslov (00:37:42):

Because there is still no peace treaty with Azerbaijan,

Suslov (00:37:45):

because the relations with Turkey are still troubled.

Suslov (00:37:48):

and so on and so forth,

Suslov (00:37:49):

but,

Suslov (00:37:50):

and they have no alternatives in terms of the security guarantees,

Suslov (00:37:54):

but they hope to acquire those alternative security guarantees,

Suslov (00:37:59):

and as soon as they do it,

Suslov (00:38:01):

the Russian military base will be out,

Suslov (00:38:03):

right,

Suslov (00:38:04):

and so on. So Pashinyan thinks that he can control that process of the reduction of relations.

Suslov (00:38:11):

And the major point of Putin's and Overchuk's,

Suslov (00:38:17):

the deputy prime minister responsible for the Eurasian economic integration,

Suslov (00:38:20):

who made those statements,

Suslov (00:38:23):

the point which the Russian side made during

Suslov (00:38:26):

during that visit was, no, you will not control that process, right?

Suslov (00:38:31):

That we also have agency in the Russian-Armenian relations, right?

Suslov (00:38:36):

And we can accelerate certain things, you know,

Suslov (00:38:41):

not waiting for Armenian gradual reorientation to the European Union and broadly to the West.

Suslov (00:38:53):

Of course, Russia is not interested in the destruction of the remnants of Russian-Armenian

Suslov (00:38:59):

relations.

Suslov (00:39:00):

We are interested in the preservation of our military presence.

Suslov (00:39:03):

We are interested in Armenian membership in the Eurasian Economic Union.

Suslov (00:39:08):

And so on and so forth.

Suslov (00:39:09):

Right.

Suslov (00:39:10):

But we are not interested in that as an interim measure,

Suslov (00:39:16):

you know, to make the Armenian reorientation more comfortable.

Suslov (00:39:21):

Come on.

Suslov (00:39:22):

Right. We are not interested.

Asbed (00:39:24):

It doesn't make any sense.

Asbed (00:39:26):

Absolutely.

Suslov (00:39:27):

Absolutely. So this is why basically Russia made this statement, right?

Suslov (00:39:33):

That Armenia has to decide.

Suslov (00:39:37):

If Armenia is moving towards the European Union, which is defensively,

Suslov (00:39:41):

at war with Russia, by the way, right?

Suslov (00:39:44):

Today,

Suslov (00:39:45):

not even the United States,

Suslov (00:39:46):

but the European Union is the major Russian adversary,

Suslov (00:39:49):

including military adversary,

Suslov (00:39:50):

political adversary,

Suslov (00:39:51):

economic adversary,

Suslov (00:39:53):

and so on and so forth.

Suslov (00:39:54):

This is one nature of the Russian-Armenian relations.

Suslov (00:39:57):

If Armenia is an ally and partner,

Suslov (00:40:00):

it's another nature of Russian-Armenian relations,

Suslov (00:40:04):

and Armenia has to decide.

Suslov (00:40:06):

Russia does not want to cut the diversification of Armenian foreign policy.

Suslov (00:40:12):

By the way, Russia does not want to restrict Armenia from diversifying its foreign relations.

Suslov (00:40:19):

Of course,

Suslov (00:40:20):

Armenia is welcome to cooperate with the United States,

Suslov (00:40:24):

to cooperate with the European Union,

Suslov (00:40:26):

to cooperate with Turkey,

Suslov (00:40:28):

with whoever you like,

Suslov (00:40:29):

right?

Suslov (00:40:30):

But what Russia is against of is this reorientation,

Suslov (00:40:36):

which includes the degradation of Russian-Armenian relations,

Suslov (00:40:40):

right?

Suslov (00:40:41):

Because the Armenian government is not just building relations.

Suslov (00:40:45):

It is explicitly replacing one relations with the other relations,

Suslov (00:40:52):

but it is doing that in a slow step-by-step managed process to make it more

Suslov (00:40:57):

comfortable for the current Armenian population.

Suslov (00:41:01):

So Russia is not willing to do that.

Suslov (00:41:04):

You know, the counter argument,

Suslov (00:41:05):

which we often hear from our Armenian friends who support that policy is,

Suslov (00:41:12):

come on,

Suslov (00:41:13):

Armenia will not join the European Union immediately.

Suslov (00:41:15):

in years and maybe decades, so Russia shouldn't be worried.

Suslov (00:41:19):

But look,

Suslov (00:41:23):

we see what is happening with the countries who proclaim their will to join the

Suslov (00:41:28):

European Union.

Suslov (00:41:30):

demands that those countries synchronize their foreign policy with the one of the

Suslov (00:41:35):

Brussels before,

Suslov (00:41:37):

long before their accession into the European Union,

Suslov (00:41:41):

right? Georgia is also very far from joining the European Union as well as Serbia.

Suslov (00:41:47):

But already now,

Suslov (00:41:48):

European Union demands those countries who proclaim membership in the EU as their

Suslov (00:41:54):

strategic choice,

Suslov (00:41:56):

that they reject their national foreign policy and adopt EU foreign policy as their

Suslov (00:42:02):

national foreign policy.

Asbed (00:42:08):

It's a very exclusive relationship demand as well.

Suslov (00:42:11):

Absolutely, absolutely.

Hovik (00:42:14):

Dr. Suslov,

Hovik (00:42:15):

so despite the narratives by Pashinyan,

Hovik (00:42:18):

of course fully supported by state media in Armenia and their Western EU puppet

Hovik (00:42:24):

masters,

Hovik (00:42:26):

in my opinion Armenians are currently in a

Hovik (00:42:29):

state of dysphoria,

Hovik (00:42:31):

stemming from the war,

Hovik (00:42:33):

the ethnic cleansing of Artsakh,

Hovik (00:42:35):

it is a big burden to bear on the shoulders.

Hovik (00:42:39):

On top of this, we are hearing about plans for more capitulation by Pashinyan.

Hovik (00:42:45):

We're talking about the church,

Hovik (00:42:46):

the constitution,

Hovik (00:42:47):

and essentially the core of Armenian identity is on the chopping block.

Hovik (00:42:52):

To many of us, and i don't mean to dilute or demean the Russian experience, but

Hovik (00:42:59):

this is as bad as the experience of Nazis in 1941 in USSR where Armenians

Hovik (00:43:07):

also suffered along with the Russians and Azerbaijan is even

Hovik (00:43:13):

pushing its own idea of of lebensraum where with this western Azerbaijan

Hovik (00:43:18):

concept.

Hovik (00:43:19):

So the truth is that the majority of Armenians simply, I would say, want dignity.

Hovik (00:43:24):

And this is what will motivate Armenians in the June elections to vote for the

Hovik (00:43:29):

opposition and not Pashinyan.

Hovik (00:43:32):

Meanwhile,

Hovik (00:43:33):

Pashinyan, of course,

Hovik (00:43:34):

is labeling anyone who is in the opposition and anyone who doesn't sign up to his

Hovik (00:43:39):

plan of capitulation to Azerbaijan as revanchists.

Hovik (00:43:43):

So this hope of dignity, again, maybe it's emotional, but I'm going to go back to that.

Hovik (00:43:49):

If the Armenian opposition has these hopes,

Hovik (00:43:53):

and if the opposition wins in these elections,

Hovik (00:43:56):

of course, I'm not asking you to go into details about Armenian politics,

Hovik (00:43:59):

but from the perspective of Russia,

Hovik (00:44:02):

we see that Russia wants to balance its relations with Azerbaijan.

Hovik (00:44:06):

And in my opinion,

Hovik (00:44:08):

I don't think this dignity will be restored without military balance in the region.

Hovik (00:44:14):

So what is Russia prepared to do

Hovik (00:44:17):

to restore military balance in case a more friendly government comes to power?

Suslov (00:44:23):

Well,

Suslov (00:44:24):

first I think that the narrative promoted by the current Armenian government that a

Suslov (00:44:32):

victory of the current opposition would automatically bring war is absolutely

Suslov (00:44:38):

false. There are no grounds for that at all.

Suslov (00:44:42):

You know,

Suslov (00:44:43):

I strongly doubt that a hypothetical government led by opposition would want to

Suslov (00:44:50):

reconquer something that Armenia tragically lost as a result of the Second Karabakh

Suslov (00:44:58):

War.

Suslov (00:45:01):

Moreover,

Suslov (00:45:02):

the situation is absolutely contrary to what Nikol Pashinyan and the current

Suslov (00:45:08):

Armenian government is saying,

Suslov (00:45:10):

right?

Suslov (00:45:11):

Because the major guarantor of peace is deterrence.

Suslov (00:45:16):

You rightly said the Azerbaijani speculations about the Western Armenia,

Suslov (00:45:20):

you know, and so on and so forth,

Suslov (00:45:21):

right?

Suslov (00:45:22):

They want the direct access to Turkey.

Suslov (00:45:25):

They want a corridor controlled by Azerbaijan through the current territory of

Suslov (00:45:30):

Armenia and so on and so forth.

Hovik (00:45:32):

And they're, of course, also saying that 300,000 Azerbaijanis need to come to Armenia.

Hovik (00:45:36):

That's also, you know, I think not too distant in the, you know, in the plan.

Suslov (00:45:40):

Absolutely.

Suslov (00:45:41):

Absolutely.

Suslov (00:45:42):

And the policy of appeasement

Suslov (00:45:45):

which is currently conducted by the Pashinyan government,

Suslov (00:45:49):

because what he is doing is appeasement in the 1930s understanding of this term,

Suslov (00:45:55):

will not bring peace.

Suslov (00:45:57):

It will undermine peace.

Suslov (00:46:00):

because he also ruins the deterrence.

Suslov (00:46:05):

You know,

Suslov (00:46:06):

come on, Europe will not provide deterrence to Armenia vis-a-vis Azerbaijan and Turkey,

Suslov (00:46:12):

neither France nor United States nor ever.

Suslov (00:46:16):

The only factor which is at the Armenian side,

Suslov (00:46:20):

which is providing deterrence,

Suslov (00:46:21):

is Russia plus Iran.

Suslov (00:46:23):

By the way, another country interested in the survival of Armenia is Iran.

Suslov (00:46:29):

And what is the current government of Armenia doing?

Suslov (00:46:32):

It is destroying the relations with Russia and also destroying the relations with Iran.

Suslov (00:46:38):

So for nothing, right?

Suslov (00:46:40):

Which limits, which weakens the deterrence.

Suslov (00:46:44):

And by weakening the deterrence,

Suslov (00:46:46):

it increases the chances for a renewed Azerbaijani aggression against Armenia.

Suslov (00:46:54):

So if the opposition wins,

Suslov (00:46:58):

The policy of appeasement will stop,

Suslov (00:47:01):

but the policy of peace,

Suslov (00:47:03):

I think,

Suslov (00:47:04):

will strengthen from the side of Armenia.

Suslov (00:47:08):

We expect the opposition also to normalize and strengthen the relations with Russia

Suslov (00:47:14):

without breaking relations with Europe and the United States,

Suslov (00:47:19):

because,

Suslov (00:47:20):

of course, Armenia is welcome to continue partnership with the United States and Europe.

Suslov (00:47:26):

Partnership, not integrations.

Suslov (00:47:28):

partnership with Europe and the United States.

Suslov (00:47:34):

Russia is fully committed to preserving its military presence in Armenia,

Suslov (00:47:39):

the Gyumri military base.

Suslov (00:47:42):

Also, Russia is interested to continue supplying Armenia with arms and weapons.

Suslov (00:47:49):

And look, the war in Ukraine will end sooner or later because there are no forever wars.

Suslov (00:47:57):

And I mean, I do not expect that war to last five years more or something like that.

Suslov (00:48:04):

It will end definitely sooner.

Suslov (00:48:06):

We don't know exactly when, but it will definitely end.

Suslov (00:48:10):

And when the war in Ukraine ends,

Suslov (00:48:13):

Russia will come out of that war,

Suslov (00:48:16):

will emerge from that war as a military superpower,

Suslov (00:48:21):

right? Because the Russian armed forces will be more than one

Suslov (00:48:25):

million armed forces, equipped, trained with unique military experience and so on and so forth.

Suslov (00:48:33):

The Russian military industrial potential will not be destroyed or diminished.

Suslov (00:48:38):

The Russian military potential will be strengthened.

Suslov (00:48:42):

So the Russian capacity to defend Armenia and to deter the enemies of Armenia will

Suslov (00:48:51):

strengthen really much after the end of the war in Ukraine.

Suslov (00:48:57):

Even before the war in Ukraine,

Suslov (00:48:59):

you know,

Suslov (00:49:01):

Russia will not,

Suslov (00:49:02):

of course,

Suslov (00:49:05):

will not reject its alliance obligations with the Armenia.

Hovik (00:49:11):

Now, I don't want to re-litigate what happened in 2020, 2023.

Hovik (00:49:17):

Some Armenians, even in the opposition, have questions to Russia about that.

Hovik (00:49:22):

Many blame the issue on,

Hovik (00:49:23):

let's say,

Hovik (00:49:24):

especially what happened in Artsakh in 2023 on Russia,

Hovik (00:49:27):

the Ukraine factor.

Hovik (00:49:29):

But, you know, I'm going to go back to this issue of dignity.

Hovik (00:49:33):

So a new government comes to power.

Hovik (00:49:36):

And it starts to assert the rights and security of refugees from Artsakh.

Hovik (00:49:43):

Will Russia support this?

Hovik (00:49:45):

And will Russia make it also part of the agenda between Azerbaijan and Russia?

Hovik (00:49:51):

Or will Russia try to slow down Armenia?

Hovik (00:49:54):

Because I think that, you know, any dignified Armenian, you know,

Hovik (00:49:59):

I have to say,

Hovik (00:50:00):

my friends,

Hovik (00:50:01):

some of my good friends who every day were cleaning up the graves of their sons in

Hovik (00:50:08):

Artsakh are no longer able to do that.

Hovik (00:50:10):

And, you know, putting myself in their position, I think that I have to ask that question.

Hovik (00:50:15):

How can the...

Hovik (00:50:18):

rights and the security of Artsakh residents,

Hovik (00:50:21):

including their right to live on their own homeland,

Hovik (00:50:24):

which they have occupied for thousands of years,

Hovik (00:50:26):

how can that be ensured in the near term or midterm?

Hovik (00:50:31):

What are your thoughts about that?

Suslov (00:50:33):

Well, I think that Russia will be at the Armenian side on that question.

Suslov (00:50:37):

From the Russian perspective,

Suslov (00:50:40):

the exodus of Armenians from the Nagorno-Karabakh region was a tragedy.

Suslov (00:50:45):

Russia didn't want that.

Suslov (00:50:47):

You know, basically,

Suslov (00:50:48):

Russia hoped that the status quo,

Suslov (00:50:52):

which emerged in November 2020,

Suslov (00:50:55):

you know,

Suslov (00:50:56):

the Sochi summit,

Suslov (00:50:58):

and basically the division of the regions,

Suslov (00:51:01):

which you Armenians call Artsakh,

Suslov (00:51:03):

into something including Stepanakert,

Suslov (00:51:07):

belonging to Armenians.

Suslov (00:51:10):

and something belonging to Azerbaijan would be a permanent status quo without any exodus.

Suslov (00:51:19):

The later developments,

Suslov (00:51:21):

the conquering of Azerbaijan of the whole region,

Suslov (00:51:24):

followed up by the exodus of ethnic Armenians was against the Russian will,

Suslov (00:51:32):

against the Russian efforts.

Suslov (00:51:34):

Russia certainly did not facilitate that.

Suslov (00:51:37):

Russia was against that.

Suslov (00:51:40):

And Russia didn't welcome that.

Suslov (00:51:42):

And of course,

Suslov (00:51:43):

Russia would open the question of the refugees in its negotiations with Azerbaijan,

Suslov (00:51:51):

which are troubled as well,

Suslov (00:51:53):

by the way,

Suslov (00:51:54):

right?

Suslov (00:51:55):

And no, certainly Russia will not restrain Armenia in opening up those questions.

Suslov (00:52:03):

Russia could, you know, not, you know,

Suslov (00:52:08):

could some kind of restrain Armenia in the hypothetical efforts to reconquer the

Suslov (00:52:16):

Nagorno-Karabakh if any Armenian government would want that.

Suslov (00:52:20):

But I do not expect any Armenian government realistically to try to reconquer

Suslov (00:52:26):

Nagorno-Karabakh with the use of force.

Suslov (00:52:30):

But as for the humanitarian issues,

Suslov (00:52:33):

the issue of the refugees from Artsakh and so on,

Suslov (00:52:37):

Russia will certainly promote their rights and raise that issue at the agenda of

Suslov (00:52:47):

Russian-Azerbaijani relations.

Hovik (00:52:49):

But, okay, let me counter that because we know the militaristic posture of Azerbaijan.

Hovik (00:52:56):

And, you know, we know that Pashinyan, of course, is threatening war.

Hovik (00:53:01):

I don't know if he knows anything that we don't.

Hovik (00:53:02):

But I think we should not underestimate the willingness of Azerbaijan to maybe

Hovik (00:53:09):

even,

Hovik (00:53:10):

maybe it's tactical,

Hovik (00:53:11):

maybe like short-term military maneuvers.

Hovik (00:53:14):

if it doesn't get what it wants in terms of the leadership of Armenia right so

Hovik (00:53:20):

let's say that the chance is small, but if the opposition wins and Aliyev is

Hovik (00:53:26):

demanding the change of the constitution, and the opposition says no deal and it

Hovik (00:53:32):

goes to war, how far is Russia prepared to go to ensure the security of armenia

Hovik (00:53:38):

Will it provide arms and will it even fight side by side with Armenians against the

Hovik (00:53:44):

Azerbaijanis?

Suslov (00:53:45):

I have no doubt that if there is a full-blown Azerbaijani invasion against Armenia,

Suslov (00:53:53):

and now we are no longer talking about Nagorno-Karabakh,

Suslov (00:53:56):

but we are talking about Armenia proper in its internationally recognized border,

Suslov (00:54:01):

Now,

Suslov (00:54:02):

if there is a full-blown Azerbaijani aggression against Armenia,

Suslov (00:54:07):

Russia will definitely fulfill its alliance obligations,

Suslov (00:54:10):

which includes,

Suslov (00:54:12):

of course, any military assistance to Armenia,

Suslov (00:54:17):

perhaps up to joining the fight.

Suslov (00:54:19):

I would not exclude that.

Suslov (00:54:21):

And again,

Suslov (00:54:22):

I would reiterate the point that those people who consider Russia to be weak,

Suslov (00:54:28):

they are wrong.

Suslov (00:54:30):

Because Russia is waging the most difficult war whatsoever now in Ukraine without a

Suslov (00:54:39):

defeat,

Suslov (00:54:40):

to put it mildly.

Suslov (00:54:43):

And we have a unique experience

Suslov (00:54:46):

We have good weapons and many people, manpower.

Suslov (00:54:51):

And basically the things that you are talking about reiterate the point about the

Suslov (00:54:56):

necessity of deterrence,

Suslov (00:54:58):

right? Because what will deter Azerbaijan?

Suslov (00:55:01):

from trying that full-blown invasion,

Suslov (00:55:04):

if it doesn't like the outcome of the Armenian elections,

Suslov (00:55:08):

is deterrence.

Suslov (00:55:09):

And at this stage, the only party to provide this deterrence is Russia.

Suslov (00:55:14):

This is why,

Suslov (00:55:15):

of course,

Suslov (00:55:16):

Armenia is interested objectively in stabilizing and normalizing the relations with

Suslov (00:55:22):

Russia, again,

Suslov (00:55:23):

without cutting the alternatives,

Suslov (00:55:25):

of course.

Asbed (00:55:26):

Yeah.

Asbed (00:55:27):

Dr. Suslov,

Asbed (00:55:28):

you noted a moment ago that the relations between Russia and Azerbaijan are not

Asbed (00:55:33):

100% great,

Asbed (00:55:35):

and they haven't been great since December 2024,

Asbed (00:55:37):

when that AZAL flight crashed and Ilham Aliyev took the opportunity to really

Asbed (00:55:42):

deteriorate the relationship.

Asbed (00:55:44):

But recently,

Asbed (00:55:46):

Overchuk was in Azerbaijan and a fairly high profile meeting that aimed to restore

Asbed (00:55:52):

relations.

Asbed (00:55:53):

He was also in Artsakh and he expressed Russia's willingness to take part in

Asbed (00:55:59):

reconstruction projects.

Asbed (00:56:00):

How would you generally characterize Russian-Azerbaijani relations right now as

Asbed (00:56:06):

both countries are trying to make up this relationship a little bit?

Suslov (00:56:10):

Well, as I said, they are troublesome relations, troubled relations.

Asbed (00:56:14):

Can you say more about the basis of those troubles?

Suslov (00:56:19):

Sure.

Suslov (00:56:20):

I think that the accident,

Suslov (00:56:23):

the tragedy with the airplane was a trigger rather than a reason for deterioration

Suslov (00:56:29):

of relations.

Suslov (00:56:31):

The reason is the belief of Azerbaijani leadership after the second

Suslov (00:56:39):

Nagorno-Karabakh war that now Russia needs them more than they need Russia.

Suslov (00:56:44):

Basically, right, that they have won, they have this euphoria of victory.

Suslov (00:56:50):

They demand a new kind of the new status of Azerbaijan, including in its relations with Russia.

Suslov (00:56:59):

and basically they believe that Russia in the current conditions,

Suslov (00:57:03):

you know, when Russia is fighting the West or fighting Europe in Ukraine with all sanctions

Suslov (00:57:09):

and so on and so forth,

Suslov (00:57:10):

with all the military conflict going on in Ukraine,

Suslov (00:57:16):

that Russia needs them more than they need Russia,

Suslov (00:57:20):

right? And this is why they afford

Suslov (00:57:23):

much more offensive and not even polite,

Suslov (00:57:27):

to put it mildly,

Suslov (00:57:29):

rhetoric and gestures vis-a-vis Russia,

Suslov (00:57:33):

including humiliating Russia.

Suslov (00:57:35):

So that was the situation.

Suslov (00:57:37):

However,

Suslov (00:57:39):

I think with some participation of Turkey,

Suslov (00:57:43):

who made it clear to Baku that even Turkey is not interested in a complete

Suslov (00:57:49):

deterioration of the Russian-Azerbaijani relations and even further destabilization

Suslov (00:57:54):

of the South Caucasus,

Suslov (00:57:56):

the government in Baku kind of

Suslov (00:57:59):

you know, melted down its rhetorical offensive against Russia.

Suslov (00:58:05):

And we have some relative stabilization without the resolution of the fundamentals, right?

Suslov (00:58:12):

But relative stabilization of relationships.

Suslov (00:58:15):

So you rightly mentioned the Overchuk's visit to Azerbaijan.

Suslov (00:58:20):

We came to kind of business as usual in the economic field,

Suslov (00:58:25):

in the economic field of our relations,

Suslov (00:58:28):

which are mutually beneficial.

Suslov (00:58:30):

Because, I mean, in the beginning of our conversation, we mentioned the North-South Corridor.

Suslov (00:58:36):

I mean, objectively, Azerbaijan is a part and parcel of this North-South Corridor.

Suslov (00:58:42):

So Russia also, of course, is interested.

Suslov (00:58:44):

that in preservation of relatively good relations with Azerbaijan from that

Suslov (00:58:51):

logistical perspective,

Suslov (00:58:52):

from the perspective of sanctions,

Suslov (00:58:54):

you know,

Suslov (00:58:55):

and so on and so forth.

Suslov (00:58:56):

This is why there was the visits to Azerbaijan.

Suslov (00:58:59):

I mean,

Suslov (00:59:00):

yes, we are interested in normalization of relations with Azerbaijan,

Suslov (00:59:07):

but this does not reject what we discussed before.

Suslov (00:59:10):

If there is a full-scale invasion of Azerbaijan in Armenia,

Suslov (00:59:15):

Russia will sacrifice its relations with Azerbaijan for the sake of its alliance

Suslov (00:59:20):

obligations with Armenia.

Asbed (00:59:22):

Understood. When we talk about Overture visiting Artsakh and declaring Russia's readiness to

Asbed (00:59:27):

participate in restoration,

Asbed (00:59:29):

reconstruction,

Asbed (00:59:30):

and we are seeing the destruction of Armenian and Christian heritage,

Asbed (00:59:34):

the last of it is a church in Stepanakert,

Asbed (00:59:37):

which was inaugurated in 2019,

Asbed (00:59:39):

has been completely wiped out.

Asbed (00:59:41):

Does Russia take into account the destruction of such heritage in its conversations

Asbed (00:59:47):

with Azerbaijan?

Asbed (00:59:48):

In what way?

Suslov (00:59:50):

Of course, you know,

Suslov (00:59:51):

I think that the implicit message in Russian offer to participate in reconstruction

Suslov (00:59:59):

was basically Russian interest in protection of that cultural Christian heritage,

Suslov (01:00:05):

right? Because, yeah, you're absolutely right.

Suslov (01:00:08):

The Nagorno-Karabakh is one of the ancient,

Suslov (01:00:10):

has one of the most ancient monasteries and churches in the world.

Suslov (01:00:15):

You know, this is part of the Christian heritage.

Suslov (01:00:19):

And Russia, of course, does not want that to be destroyed completely.

Suslov (01:00:25):

Russia wants that to be protected.

Suslov (01:00:27):

And perhaps Russian participation in some reconstruction of the region could ensure that.

Hovik (01:00:35):

Hmm.

Hovik (01:00:36):

Okay, well, thank you for all this time for us, Dr. Suslov.

Hovik (01:00:41):

I have one last question before we let you go, if that's okay?

Suslov (01:00:46):

Absolutely, yes.

Hovik (01:00:48):

So we, earlier this year, I believe, we had Professor Andrei Tsygankov on our podcast.

Hovik (01:00:56):

And according to him,

Hovik (01:00:57):

Russia essentially in the mid-2010s turned to the idea of this state civilization

Hovik (01:01:04):

as a transnational concept that helps combat ethno-nationalism and separatist

Hovik (01:01:09):

pressures that were present at the time and crop up from time to time.

Hovik (01:01:15):

Now, Russian theorists have developed that idea further into this concept of Eurasianism.

Hovik (01:01:21):

which is, I guess, opposed to the Slavic Orthodox civilization model proposed by Huntington in his

Hovik (01:01:27):

clash of civilizations.

Hovik (01:01:29):

Can we get your take on what is Eurasianism?

Hovik (01:01:34):

And what role do you see Armenia playing?

Hovik (01:01:38):

Because, you know,

Hovik (01:01:39):

we hear a lot of things that,

Hovik (01:01:40):

Armenia is already,

Hovik (01:01:41):

of course, getting a lot of economic benefits from its relationship with Russia.

Hovik (01:01:46):

And we're hearing about

Hovik (01:01:48):

If Armenia goes towards the west, then they will be cut off.

Hovik (01:01:52):

But what is a better future in terms of this Eurasianism, if you believe in that?

Hovik (01:01:58):

Or how do you believe the region will be reorganized in the future?

Hovik (01:02:05):

And what is Armenia's role in the region?

Suslov (01:02:07):

Sure.

Suslov (01:02:08):

Well, let me say several things.

Suslov (01:02:10):

First, the Russian civilization approach is very different from Huntingtonian one.

Suslov (01:02:14):

Because Samuel Huntington was talking about clash of civilizations.

Suslov (01:02:18):

Russia is talking about partnership of civilizations.

Suslov (01:02:23):

Russia claims that the relations between different civilizations should be

Suslov (01:02:27):

harmonious unless one civilization tries to impose itself against the other.

Suslov (01:02:35):

Secondly, Russia,

Suslov (01:02:36):

of course,

Suslov (01:02:37):

now proclaims itself officially as a country-civilization,

Suslov (01:02:41):

right?

Suslov (01:02:42):

Because,

Suslov (01:02:43):

well,

Suslov (01:02:44):

first, we no longer consider ourselves to be part of the Western civilization or Western

Suslov (01:02:51):

civilizations due to the fact that their cultural evolution,

Suslov (01:02:56):

value evolution is different from what

Suslov (01:03:00):

We value, you know,

Suslov (01:03:03):

and because we are at hybrid, at the state of hybrid war, and could turn into the hot

Suslov (01:03:08):

war with the West and with Europe.

Suslov (01:03:13):

Also, we try to define ourselves,

Suslov (01:03:15):

you know,

Suslov (01:03:16):

because Russia is not a nation state in the classical European understanding of

Suslov (01:03:20):

that term.

Suslov (01:03:22):

At the same time,

Suslov (01:03:23):

it would probably be politically incorrect and not nice to define ourselves as

Suslov (01:03:29):

empire.

Suslov (01:03:31):

So we found some alternative in the form of country civilization.

Suslov (01:03:36):

This is more than a nation state, which is basically what Russia is.

Suslov (01:03:41):

Russia is more than a nation state, and this country civilization

Suslov (01:03:46):

should not be in the state of confrontation or in this lonstant clash with the

Suslov (01:03:52):

other civilizations.

Suslov (01:03:53):

But on the contrary,

Suslov (01:03:54):

we want cooperation,

Suslov (01:03:56):

even integration,

Suslov (01:03:58):

you know, and partnership with the other civilizations.

Suslov (01:04:01):

And the cooperation of Eurasian players and Eurasian civilizations create Eurasia,

Suslov (01:04:08):

greater Eurasia.

Suslov (01:04:09):

So Russian, contemporary Russian Eurasian is also very much different from the Gumilovs.

Suslov (01:04:17):

Eurasianism of the early 20th century,

Suslov (01:04:21):

and very different from Zhirinovsky's Eurasianism,

Suslov (01:04:24):

which was the imperial expansion whatsoever in Eurasia.

Suslov (01:04:31):

Today, by Eurasianism,

Suslov (01:04:33):

Russia claims that basically Eurasia is the greatest continent in the world.

Suslov (01:04:39):

And Eurasian countries are objectively interested in peace,

Suslov (01:04:44):

in having peaceful relations among them,

Suslov (01:04:47):

in facilitation of economic cooperation between them.

Suslov (01:04:52):

And we are not interested in divisions and confrontations within Eurasia.

Suslov (01:04:58):

So the Russian Eurasianism entails that, right?

Suslov (01:05:02):

And of course, this Russian Eurasianism is the alternative to the European countries.

Suslov (01:05:06):

choice, which was the Russian choice in the previous times, right?

Suslov (01:05:11):

We no longer choose Europe.

Suslov (01:05:13):

We consider Europe to be a periphery of the world rather than the centerpiece.

Suslov (01:05:18):

So Eurasia is much more central and

Suslov (01:05:21):

Eurasia is the region where Russia is central,

Suslov (01:05:24):

where Russia is the region,

Suslov (01:05:27):

one of the leaders,

Suslov (01:05:28):

one of the poles of integration.

Suslov (01:05:31):

And I mean, it is also not confrontational, it is not against anyone else.

Suslov (01:05:36):

in favor of cooperation stability and security this is why Russia is talking about

Suslov (01:05:43):

actually eurasian security system which right which which needs to be indivisible

Suslov (01:05:49):

and so on and so forth you know as for Armenia so far Armenia is a member of

Suslov (01:05:56):

the eurasian economic union and Eurasian economic union is one of the pillars of

Suslov (01:06:03):

what Russia considers to be greater Eurasia

Suslov (01:06:06):

So Armenia already now is an inherent participant of this greater Eurasia.

Suslov (01:06:11):

Again, it is not Russian Eurasianism.

Suslov (01:06:14):

It is a greater Eurasia as a geo-economic community, right, which is created by

Suslov (01:06:21):

by the Eurasian Economic Union, by China, by Iran, by the Eurasian players.

Suslov (01:06:28):

But this greater Eurasian partnership is not isolated and must not be isolated from

Suslov (01:06:34):

the rest of the world

Suslov (01:06:36):

must not be in the state of confrontation with the rest of the world.

Suslov (01:06:40):

Actually, when Russia talks about Great Eurasian Partnership,

Suslov (01:06:44):

it always,

Suslov (01:06:45):

always emphasizes that it is open for Europe,

Suslov (01:06:48):

even open for Europe,

Suslov (01:06:50):

if Europe rejects the current confrontational approach vis-a-vis Russia.

Suslov (01:06:55):

So this is why Armenian relations with the European Union

Suslov (01:07:00):

Again,

Suslov (01:07:01):

cooperation and partnership relations between Armenia and the European Union do not

Suslov (01:07:06):

contradict Armenian participation in the Eurasian processes as a member of the

Suslov (01:07:12):

Eurasian Economic Union.

Suslov (01:07:14):

But what Armenia,

Suslov (01:07:15):

from the Russian perspective,

Suslov (01:07:16):

should not do is to switch sides,

Suslov (01:07:24):

should not try to integrate into the European Union as a full member

Suslov (01:07:29):

or associated member,

Suslov (01:07:31):

because that,

Suslov (01:07:33):

given the current policy of the European Union vis-a-vis Russia and vis-a-vis

Suslov (01:07:38):

Eurasia,

Suslov (01:07:39):

by the way,

Suslov (01:07:40):

European Union does not want Eurasia to exist,

Suslov (01:07:42):

this Great Eurasia.

Suslov (01:07:44):

European Union Union wants the Eurasian countries to be a periphery of the EU, right?

Suslov (01:07:50):

So given the current policy of the European Union,

Suslov (01:07:55):

of course,

Suslov (01:07:56):

Armenian choice in favor of the EU would contradict and cannot coexist the Armenian

Suslov (01:08:03):

participation in the Eurasian Economic Union and in the creation of Greater

Suslov (01:08:08):

Eurasia.

Asbed (01:08:10):

Dr. Suslov, what a fantastic conversation and discussion here.

Asbed (01:08:15):

I'm already looking forward to our next time with you on our show.

Asbed (01:08:19):

Thank you so much for joining us.

Asbed (01:08:21):

I thoroughly enjoyed your insight.

Suslov (01:08:24):

Thank you very much.

Suslov (01:08:25):

My pleasure.

Suslov (01:08:26):

Good to be with you.

Suslov (01:08:28):

Goodbye.

Asbed (01:08:29):

That's our show today, recorded on April 24, 2026.

Hovik (01:08:36):

And this day is special for Armenians.

Hovik (01:08:37):

It is Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day.

Hovik (01:08:40):

And I just want to say on behalf of Groong that we remember, and more importantly, we demand.

Asbed (01:08:46):

Yes, absolutely.

Asbed (01:08:49):

We've been talking with

Asbed (01:08:50):

Dr. Dmitry Suslov,

Asbed (01:08:51):

who is a Russian political scientist,

Asbed (01:08:53):

foreign policy analyst,

Asbed (01:08:55):

and commentator specializing in great power politics,

Asbed (01:08:59):

especially Russia-US relations,

Asbed (01:09:01):

European security,

Asbed (01:09:02):

and the evolving international order.

Asbed (01:09:05):

He serves as deputy director of the Center for Comprehensive European and

Asbed (01:09:09):

International Studies at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow.

Asbed (01:09:14):

He's also affiliated with the Valdai Discussion Club.

Asbed (01:09:17):

For more information,

Asbed (01:09:18):

you can go to our website and click on the links,

Asbed (01:09:21):

podcasts.Groong.org/episode-number.

Hovik (01:09:25):

Okay, folks, very quickly, support us by SUBSCRIBING, COMMENTING, LIKING, SHARING.

Hovik (01:09:33):

Hitting the bell icon and also monetarily by going to podcasts.groong.org/donate.

Hovik (01:09:39):

All of that is much appreciated.

Hovik (01:09:41):

We hope that you are interested by the content we're working on and come back again

Hovik (01:09:48):

in the future.

Hovik (01:09:49):

I'm Hovik Manucharyan.

Asbed (01:09:51):

And I'm Asbed Bedrossian in Los Angeles.

Asbed (01:09:54):

We'll talk to you soon.

Asbed (01:09:55):

Bye-bye.

Hovik (01:09:55):

Take care.

Hovik (01:09:56):

Bye.

Head Shot

Asbed Bedrossian

Co-host
Head Shot

Hovik Manucharyan

Co-host
Head Shot

Dmitry Suslov

Guest

Podcasts we love

Check out these other fine podcasts recommended by us, not an algorithm.